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Xcellis – Uncompromising Storage to Power Your Workflows

A powerful and scalable system that simplifies storage architecture and streamlines operations. Xcellis enhances workflows, boosts efficiency, improves productivity, and enables business insight.

Converged Architecture

Operating multiple storage systems to satisfy different performance and connectivity requirements is wasteful and costly. Quantum Xcellis creates a highly efficient storage environment that supports workflows, promotes collaboration, and fits your business requirements. Never underpowered or overprovisioned, flexible Xcellis storage is designed to manage storage on your terms.

Unified Access

Demanding workflows have increased the need for collaboration among core and extended team members By combining both SAN performance with the ease of NAS connectivity, Xcellis extends collaboration to the broadest range of users. This provides the right level of performance to the right people, improves collaboration, and simplifies deployments and workflows.

Continuous Scalability

Quantum believes you shouldn’t have to forklift-replace components to…

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Xcellis – Uncompromising Storage to Power Your Workflows

A powerful and scalable system that simplifies storage architecture and streamlines operations. Xcellis enhances workflows, boosts efficiency, improves productivity, and enables business insight.

Converged Architecture

Operating multiple storage systems to satisfy different performance and connectivity requirements is wasteful and costly. Quantum Xcellis creates a highly efficient storage environment that supports workflows, promotes collaboration, and fits your business requirements. Never underpowered or overprovisioned, flexible Xcellis storage is designed to manage storage on your terms.

Unified Access

Demanding workflows have increased the need for collaboration among core and extended team members By combining both SAN performance with the ease of NAS connectivity, Xcellis extends collaboration to the broadest range of users. This provides the right level of performance to the right people, improves collaboration, and simplifies deployments and workflows.

Continuous Scalability

Quantum believes you shouldn’t have to forklift-replace components to scale storage. Nor should you have to pay for additional hardware to overcome architectural deficiencies. Xcellis scales capacity and performance in parallel or independently, providing users access to the space and bandwidth required to get the job done.

High-Performance

Xcellis workflow storage is flat out fast. Users in any workflow, whether it’s genomic research, 4K video, surveillance or any other demanding field, will feel like they’re directly attached, interacting in real time with data streams that bring less capable systems to their knees. But it’s not just streaming performance that matters; Xcellis also accelerates workflows with support for key applications with no change in process, and access to content from any tier.

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StorNext Connect and Xcellis
Insight and Control for StorNext Environments

Powerful, multi-user storage systems are, by nature, complex—but that doesn’t mean they have to be complicated. Every Xcellis system includes StorNext Connect™, a single-pane view of the entire StorNext environment. More than just a monitoring and reporting tool, StorNext Connect provides interactive guides for easy deployment and scaling of Xcellis systems.

In dynamic, business-critical data environments, managing change is crucial. StorNext Connect provides the insight needed to evaluate usage and plan for change rather than react to it.

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Quantum sensing with massive and fast entangled atoms from dissociation of rotationally and vibrationally cold dimers in supersonic beams

Home » Partner search » Quantum sensing with massive and fast entangled atoms from dissociation of rotationally and vibrationally cold dimers in supersonic beams Reply to partner search PROJECT OVE…

Izvor: Quantum sensing with massive and fast entangled atoms from dissociation of rotationally and vibrationally cold dimers in supersonic beams

Quantum sensing with massive and fast entangled atoms from dissociation of rotationally and vibrationally cold dimers in supersonic beams

PROJECT OVERVIEW

PS ID: PS-PL-103846
Status: Open
Date of last Modification: 19/01/2017
Date of Publication: 19/01/2017
Closure Date: 15.03.2017

PROJECT DESCRIPTION

Proposal Outline:

Studies of entanglement in a pair of fast and massive atoms created in a process of controlled dissociation of homonuclear diatoms are proposed in order to extends a gallery of “objects” between which creation of entanglement is possible. Outcome of this approach can be used to broaden quantum sensing to atoms that possess rest mass and considerable kinetic energies. Using technique of supersonic molecular beam, methods of laser spectroscopy and stimulated Raman adiabatic passage (STIRAP), quantum entanglement between two atoms possessing antiparallel components of a nuclear atomic angular momentum in a single act of selective molecular dissociation can be created. Analysis of the quantum entanglement will rely on a detection of coincidences of two atoms with antiparallel components of a nuclear atomic angular momentum appearing in two distant detectors localized in so-called planes of detection using a process of spin state selective two-photon excitation-ionization (TPEI). Results of studies of quantum entanglement between atoms “born” from a single dimer would gain interest of scientists investigating tests of quantum mechanics and aspects of quantum sensing with hot (not ultra-cold) and massive (not photons with no rest mass) objects. It will pioneer the way towards better understanding subtleties of quantum information processing and quantum sensing.

PARTNER PROFILE SOUGHT

Required skills and Expertise:

Theoretical and experimental experience in molecular spectroscopy of 2-group, 12-group and lanthanide (Yb, Er, Dy) dimers in supersonic beam experience. Experience in stimulated Raman adiabatic passage (STIRAP) and spin state selective two-photon excitation-ionization (TPEI).

Description of work to be carried out by the partner(s) sought:

Theoretical and experimental studies of stimulated Raman adiabatic passage (STIRAP), creation of pairs of entangled atoms followed by spin state selective two-photon excitation-ionization (TPEI), detection of the created entanglement and study Bell inequalities for the system of a pair of massive neutral fast atoms. Molecular spectroscopy of van der Waals dimers (Zn2, Cd2, Hg2, Yb2, Er2, Dy2, Be2, Mg2, Ca2, Sr2, Ba2, Ra2) in supersonic beams.

Type of partner(s) sought:

university level research group

industrial end-user

 

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PROPOSER INFORMATION
Organisation:Jagiellonian University, Faculty of Physics. Astronomy and Applied Computer Science
Department:Physics
Type of Organisation:
University
Country:
Poland
Manipulation of Molecules with Electromagnetic Fields
Mikhail Lemeshko,1,2,3, ∗ Roman V. Krems,4,3, † John M. Doyle,2 and Sabre Kais5 1ITAMP, Harvard-Smithsonian Center for Astrophysics, 60 Garden Street, Cambridge, MA 02138, USA 2Physics Department, Harvard University, 17 Oxford Street, Cambridge, MA 02138, USA 3Kavli Institute for Theoretical Physics, University of California, Santa Barbara, CA 93106, USA 4Department of Chemistry, University of British Columbia, Vancouver, BC V6T 1Z1, Canada 5Departments of Chemistry and Physics, Purdue University, West Lafayette, Indiana 47907, USA (Dated: September 18, 2013)
I. INTRODUCTION
The past few decades have witnessed remarkable developments of laser techniques setting the stage for new areas of research in molecular physics. It is now possible to interrogate molecules in the ultrafast and ultracold regimes of molecular dynamics and the measurements of molecular structure and dynamics can be made with unprecedented precision. Molecules are inherently complex quantum-mechanical systems. The complexity of molecular structure, if harnessed, can be exploited for yet another step forward in science, potentially leading to technology for quantum computing, quantum simulation, precise field sensors, and new lasers. The goal of the present article is to review the major developments that have led to the current understanding of molecule – field interactions and experimental methods for manipulating molecules with electromagnetic fields. Molecule – field interactions are at the core of several, seemingly distinct, areas of molecular physics. This is reflected in the organization of this article, which includes sections on Field control of molecular beams, External field traps for cold molecules, Control of molecular orientation and molecular alignment, Manipulation of molecules by nonconservative forces, Ultracold molecules and ultracold chemistry, Controlled many-body phenomena, Entanglement of molecules and dipole arrays, and Stability of molecular systems in high-frequency super-intense laser fields. By combining these topics in the same review, we would like to emphasize that all this work is based on the same basic Hamiltonian. This review is also intended to serve as an introduction to the excellent collection of articles appearing in this same-titled volume of Molecular Physics [1–27]. These original contributions demonstrate the latest developments exploiting control of molecules with electromagnetic fields. The reader will be treated to a colourful selection of articles on topics as diverse as Chemistry in laser fields, Quantum dynamics in helium droplets, Effects of microwave and laser fields on molecular motion, Rydberg molecules, Molecular structure in external fields, Quantum simulation with ultracold molecules, and Controlled molecular interactions, written by many of the leading protagonists of these fields. This article is concerned chiefly with the effects of electromagnetic fields on low-energy rotational, fine-structure and translational degrees of freedom. There are several important research areas that are left outside the scope of this paper, most notably the large body of work on the interaction of molecules with attosecond laser pulses and high harmonic generation [28], coherent control of molecular dynamics [29] and optimal control of molecular processes [30]. We limit the discussion of resonant interaction of light with molecules to laser cooling strategies. We do not survey spectroscopy or transfer of population between molecular states. Even with these restrictions, this is a vast area to review, as is apparent from the number of references. We did our best to include all relevant results, with an emphasis on experimental work. However, some references may have been inadvertently omitted, for which the authors apologize. The in-depth discussion of selected topics of this article can be found in previous review articles. In particular, Refs. [31–41] provide an introduction to the field of cold molecules, Refs. [33, 42–46] review the work on controlled molecular beams, and Refs. [47–51] discuss molecules in short laser pulses. This special issue and review article have been prepared in celebration of the 60th birthday of Professor Bretislav Friedrich, who is currently a Research Group Leader at the Fritz Haber Institute of the Max Planck Society and Honorarprofessor at the Technische Universit¨at Berlin. Bretislav has made key contributions that became the origin of several of the research areas described here. Bretislav’s work is an example of transformative research that converts simple ideas into profound results. Inspired by Bretislav’s work is the present article.
∗ mikhail.lemeshko@gmail.com † rkrems@chem.ubc.ca
2
Manipulation of Molecules with Electromagnetic Fields
Mikhail Lemeshko,1,2,3, ∗ Roman V. Krems,4,3, † John M. Doyle,2 and Sabre Kais5 1ITAMP, Harvard-Smithsonian Center for Astrophysics, 60 Garden Street, Cambridge, MA 02138, USA 2Physics Department, Harvard University, 17 Oxford Street, Cambridge, MA 02138, USA 3Kavli Institute for Theoretical Physics, University of California, Santa Barbara, CA 93106, USA 4Department of Chemistry, University of British Columbia, Vancouver, BC V6T 1Z1, Canada 5Departments of Chemistry and Physics, Purdue University, West Lafayette, Indiana 47907, USA (Dated: September 18, 2013
The past few decades have witnessed remarkable developments of laser techniques setting the stage for new areas of research in molecular physics. It is now possible to interrogate molecules in the ultrafast and ultracold regimes of molecular dynamics and the measurements of molecular structure and dynamics can be made with unprecedented precision. Molecules are inherently complex quantum-mechanical systems. The complexity of molecular structure, if harnessed, can be exploited for yet another step forward in science, potentially leading to technology for quantum computing, quantum simulation, precise field sensors, and new lasers. The goal of the present article is to review the major developments that have led to the current understanding of molecule – field interactions and experimental methods for manipulating molecules with electromagnetic fields. Molecule – field interactions are at the core of several, seemingly distinct, areas of molecular physics. This is reflected in the organization of this article, which includes sections on Field control of molecular beams, External field traps for cold molecules, Control of molecular orientation and molecular alignment, Manipulation of molecules by nonconservative forces, Ultracold molecules and ultracold chemistry, Controlled many-body phenomena, Entanglement of molecules and dipole arrays, and Stability of molecular systems in high-frequency super-intense laser fields. By combining these topics in the same review, we would like to emphasize that all this work is based on the same basic Hamiltonian. This review is also intended to serve as an introduction to the excellent collection of articles appearing in this same-titled volume of Molecular Physics [1–27]. These original contributions demonstrate the latest developments exploiting control of molecules with electromagnetic fields. The reader will be treated to a colourful selection of articles on topics as diverse as Chemistry in laser fields, Quantum dynamics in helium droplets, Effects of microwave and laser fields on molecular motion, Rydberg molecules, Molecular structure in external fields, Quantum simulation with ultracold molecules, and Controlled molecular interactions, written by many of the leading protagonists of these fields. This article is concerned chiefly with the effects of electromagnetic fields on low-energy rotational, fine-structure and translational degrees of freedom. There are several important research areas that are left outside the scope of this paper, most notably the large body of work on the interaction of molecules with attosecond laser pulses and high harmonic generation [28], coherent control of molecular dynamics [29] and optimal control of molecular processes [30]. We limit the discussion of resonant interaction of light with molecules to laser cooling strategies. We do not survey spectroscopy or transfer of population between molecular states. Even with these restrictions, this is a vast area to review, as is apparent from the number of references. We did our best to include all relevant results, with an emphasis on experimental work. However, some references may have been inadvertently omitted, for which the authors apologize. The in-depth discussion of selected topics of this article can be found in previous review articles. In particular, Refs. [31–41] provide an introduction to the field of cold molecules, Refs. [33, 42–46] review the work on controlled molecular beams, and Refs. [47–51] discuss molecules in short laser pulses. This special issue and review article have been prepared in celebration of the 60th birthday of Professor Bretislav Friedrich, who is currently a Research Group Leader at the Fritz Haber Institute of the Max Planck Society and Honorarprofessor at the Technische Universit¨at Berlin. Bretislav has made key contributions that became the origin of several of the research areas described here. Bretislav’s work is an example of transformative research that converts simple ideas into profound results. Inspired by Bretislav’s work is the present article
 II. MOLECULES IN FIELDS
A. Individual molecules
Unlike atoms, molecules possess the vibrational and rotational degrees of freedom, with characteristic energy scales ∼100 MHz – 100 THz. Electronic excitations in molecules usually correspond to optical transition frequencies (1014− 1015 Hz), vibrational excitations to the infrared region (1013 −1014 Hz), and rotational excitations to the microwave region (109 −1011 Hz). In addition to the spin-orbit and hyperfine interactions, intrinsic to any atomic or molecular system, the rotational motion of molecules gives rise to new perturbations, such as Λ-doubling, which generates closely spaced energy levels with characteristic excitation frequencies < 100 MHz [52]. The eigenstates of a molecular Hamiltonian can be generally expanded in products of the electronic, vibrational and rotational states dressed by the electron and nuclear spin states. The interactions of the electrons and nuclei with the static and far-off-resonant optical fields used in experiments give rise to matrix elements with magnitudes ≤ 100 GHz. Except in special cases, these interactions are unlikely to perturb the electronic and vibrational structure of molecules. On the other hand, the rotational, fine and hyperfine structure can be strongly altered by an applied field. In this section, we summarize general considerations at the core of the analysis of molecular structure in dc and non-resonant ac fields. Sec. VI discusses the effects of resonant and nearly resonant optical fields on molecular energy levels. In the absence of external fields, the molecular energy levels can be labeled by four quantum numbers, corresponding to the eigenvalues of four commuting operators: the Hamiltonian, the square of the total angular momentum J2, the Z-component of J and the parity operator, in addition to other (almost) good quantum numbers, if any. The presence of an axially symmetric external field perturbs the isotropy of space, which leads to couplings between states of different J. The operators describing field-induced interactions can be expressed in terms of rank−1 spherical tensors, leading to selection rules |∆J| = 0,1 for couplings in first order and |∆J| = 0,2 for couplings in second order. Since the rotation about the field axis leaves the system invariant, the projection M of the total angular momentum on the field direction remains a good quantum number. This quantum number is no longer good if two non-parallel fields are applied. Maxwell’s equations define the magnetic B and electric E fields in terms of the vector A and scalar ϕ potentials as follows B = ∇×A (1) E = ∇ϕ− ∂A ∂t . (2) This shows that E is a vector, whereas B is a pseudovector. As a result, electric-field-induced interactions must couple states of different parity, while interactions induced by the magnetic field must conserve parity. It should also be noted that, for an electromagnetic wave, the magnitudes of the magnetic and electric fields are related as E = Bc, where c is the speed of light. This implies that it is much easier to perturb the molecular energy levels by an electric field than by a magnetic one. The effect of a dc electric field on the molecular structure is determined by the matrix elements of the operator VE = −µ·E, (3) where µ =Pn qnrn, the vectors rn give the positions of charges qn and the sum extends over both the electrons and the nuclei in the molecule. For molecules in a particular electronic and vibrational state, it is convenient to define the permanent dipole operator d = hψ|µ|ψi, where |ψi is a product of the electronic and vibrational states. This vector operator depends on the angles that specify the orientation of the molecule’s symmetry axis in a space-fixed coordinate frame. In the ground electronic state, the magnitude of d ranges from zero for nonpolar molecules to ∼ 10 Debye for strongly polar molecules. The interaction of a molecule with an electric field can be characterized by a dimensionless parameter η = dE/∆±, which gives the ratio of the Stark energy to the splitting of the opposite parity levels ∆± at zero field. For example, for closed-shell linear molecules, ∆± is determined by the rotational constant Be, while for symmetric top molecules or open-shell molecules in a Π electronic state ∆± is given by the value of the Λ-splitting. The Stark shifts of the molecular energy levels are approximately quadratic functions of the electric field magnitude when η ≪ 1 and linear when η ≫ 1. In the case of a linear rigid rotor, an electric field creates a coherent superposition of the rotational states |˜ JMi=X J c ˜ JM J |JMi.
While J is not a good quantum number, it is often possible to introduce an adiabatic label, ˜ J, such that the hybrid state |˜JMi→|JMi when the electric field magnitude E → 0. The degree of molecular orientation in the laboratory frame is given by the expectation value of the orientation cosine, hcosθi˜JM =h˜JM|cosθ|˜JMi, which corresponds to the expectation value of the electric dipole moment in the space-fixed frame, hdi˜ JM = dhcosθi˜ JM. Note that at any finite value of the electric field, the molecular orientation is confined to a finite range of angles, e.g. at a relatively strong field value of 100 kV/cm the axis of a NaK molecule (d = 2.7 Debye, Be = 0.091 cm−1) keeps librating with the amplitude ±25◦. According to the uncertainty principle, in order to achieve a perfect orientation, hcosθi = 1, one would need to hybridize an infinite number of the angular momentum states. A force acting on a molecule in an electric field is given by the negative gradient of the Stark energy, WStark, F = −∇WStark(E) (5) This can be used to confine molecular ensembles in external field traps and manipulate (accelerate, decelerate or deflect) molecular beams. The ground state of a molecule in an external field is always high-field seeking. Since creating a local maximum of a dc field is forbidden by the Earnshaw theorem [53, 54], trapping and decelerating high-fieldseeking molecules presents a challenge. A number of techniques such as Alternating-Gradient Stark Deceleration [55– 62], ac electric trapping [63–66], and and optical deceleration and trapping [67–71] have been developed to deal with this problem, as discussed in Sec. III. Due to a high density of states, all states of complex polyatomic molecules are high-field seeking. Trapping weak-field-seekers in a field minimum is more feasible, but leads to a number of issues such as collision-induced relaxation resulting in trap loss, as discussed in Section IV. Molecules with partially filled electronic shells exhibit the Zeeman effect. A magnetic field interacts with the electronic spin and orbital angular momenta, which, if coupled to the molecular axis, results in molecular alignment. Since the magnetic-field operator couples states of the same parity, molecules in a magnetic field are aligned, but not oriented. Semiclassically this can be thought of as a linear combination of magnetic moment projections in both directions along the molecular axis. The Zeeman interaction operator can be generally written as [72]
Vm = (gLΛ + gSΣ)
MΩµBB J(J + 1)
, (6)
where gL = 1 and gS ≈ 2 are the orbital and spin gyromagnetic ratios, µB is the Bohr magneton, B is the magnetic field magnitude, M is the projection of the total angular momentum J on the laboratory Z-axis, Λ and Σ are the projections of the electron orbital and spin angular momenta onto the molecular axis, and Ω = Λ + Σ. While a magnetic field hybridizes states of the same parity, it may bring states of opposite parity close together. When this happens, the dynamical properties of molecules, such as molecular orientation [73, 74] and collision dynamics [75–84], become very sensitive to external electric fields. The action of a far-detuned optical field on molecular rotational states was first considered by Zon and Katsnelson [85], and independently by Friedrich and Herschbach [67, 86, 87]. In a far-off-resonant radiative field of intensity I, the rotational levels of a molecule undergo a dynamic Stark shift, as given by the Hamiltonian [88] H = BJ2 −g(t) I 2cε0 eje∗ l αlab jl (ω), (7)
where ej and el are the polarizations of incoming and outgoing photons, αlab jl (ω) is the dynamic (frequency-dependent) polarizability in the laboratory frame, and g(t) gives the time-profile of the pulse. We note that higher-order terms in the multipole expansion of the potential, such as second-order hyperpolarizability, pertaining to the 4th power of the field strength, are likely negligible at laser intensities below 1012 W/cm2, see, e.g., Ref. [89]. For a linear molecule the only nonzero polarizability components in the molecular frame are αzz = αk and αxx = αyy = α⊥. In the case of a linearly polarized laser field, Hamiltonian (7) can be recast as (in units of Be): H = J2 −g(t)∆η(ω)cos2 θ −g(t)η⊥(ω), (8) where θ is the angle between the molecular axis and the polarization vector of the laser field. Thus, because of the azimuthal symmetry about the field vector, the induced dipole potential involves just the polar angle θ between the molecular axis and the polarization axis of the laser pulse. The dimensionless interaction parameter ∆η(ω) = ηk(ω) − η⊥(ω) with ηk,⊥(ω) = αk,⊥(ω)I/(2ε0cBe). We note that Eq. (8) was derived in Refs. [67, 86] using the semiclassical approach and the rotating wave approximation. The polarization vector of an optical field defines an axis of cylindrical symmetry, Z. The projection, M, of the angular momentum J on Z is then a good quantum number, while J is not. However, one can again use the value of.
J of the field-free rotational state that adiabatically correlates with the hybrid state as a label, denoted by ˜ J, so that |˜ J,M;∆ηi→|J,Mi for ∆η → 0. For clarity, we also label the values of ˜ J by the tilde, e.g. with ˜0 corresponding to ˜ J = 0. The induced-dipole interaction (8) preserves parity, hybridizing states with even or odd values of J, |˜ J,M;∆ηi =X J c ˜ JM J (∆η)|JMi, J + ˜ J even, (9)
and therefore aligns molecules in the laboratory frame. Aligned molecules do not possess a space-fixed dipole moment, in contrast to species oriented by an electrostatic field. We note that at the far-off-resonant wavelengths (∼1000 nm) usually employed in alignment and trapping experiments, the dynamic polarizability αij(k) approaches its static limit, αij(0), for a number of molecules, e.g. CO, N2, and OCS. However, this is not the case for alkali dimers having low-lying excited 1Σ and 1Π states, such as KRb and RbCs. Virtual transitions to these states contribute to the ground-state dynamic polarizability, rendering it a few times larger than the static value [90, 91]. A far-off-resonant optical field of sufficiently large intensity leads to the formation of “tunneling doublets” – closelying states of opposite parity with the same M and ∆ ˜ J = 1 [67]. The doublet states can be mixed by extremely weak electrostatic fields, which paves the way to achieving strong molecular orientation in the laboratory frame [92, 93]. The energy gap between neighboring doublets increases with the field intensity, and is proportional to 2√∆η in the strong-field limit [94]. As we demonstrate below, at large ∆η interaction between two ground-state molecules can be described within the lowest tunneling doublet [95]. Detailed theory of combined action of electrostatic and laser fields with noncollinear polarizations has been elaborated in refs. [94, 96–99] for continuous-wave and pulsed laser fields. As discussed in Section VD, molecules can also be aligned by short laser pulses. In the nonadiabatic regime a laser pulse leads to the formation of a rotational wave packet with time-dependent coefficients, ψ(∆η(t)) =X J cJ(∆η(t))|J,Miexp−iEJt ~ (10) where EJ labels the energies of the field-free J-states. The alignment cosine, hcos2 θi(t), also becomes time-dependent and the molecules exhibit “revivals” – nonzero alignment after a pulse has passed. The effect of combined electrostatic field and short laser pulses was first studied by Cai et al. [100], and subsequently by a number of theorists and experimentalists, see Sec. VB.
B. Long-range intermolecular interactions
Interactions between molecules at large intermolecular separations are particularly important for the two-body, fewbody and many-body dynamics at low temperatures. In fact, the work of many authors including Bohn and coworkers [101–105], Micheli and coworkers [106, 107], Gorshkov and coworkers [108], and Lemeshko and Friedrich [95, 109] aiming at the suppression of inelastic scattering at ultralow temperatures relies on the controllability of the longrange dipole-dipole interactions, which play the dominant role in the interaction potential between polar molecules separated by a large distance [110]. For non-polar molecules, the interaction potential at large intermolecular distances is usually dominated by the quadrupole-quadrupole interactions, which can also be tuned by external fields [111–114]. A gas of molecules with tunable long-range interactions can be exploited to study novel many-body physics, as discussed in Section VIII. The analytical form of the long-range intermolecular interactions can be obtained using the multipole expansion of the electrostatic interaction between the electrons and nuclei of two molecules separated by a distance r, generally written as [115–118]
V =
∞ Xn 1,n2=0X νλ
(−1)ν+λ An(n1,n2) rn+1
C(n1n2n;νλ ν + λ)Yn1ν (θ1,φ1)Yn2λ (θ2,φ2)Yn,−ν−λ (θ,φ), (11)
where
An(n1,n2) = (4π)
3 2
(−1)n2 (2n + 1) (2n + 1)! (2n1 + 1)!(2n2 + 1)!
1 2
Qn1Qn2, (12)
C(J1J2J,M1M2M) are the Clebsch-Gordan coefficients [119, 120], Qnirepresents the ni-th multipole moment of
molecule i (i = 1,2), and n = n1 + n2. The angles (θ1,2,φ1,2) and (θ,φ) give the orientation of the molecular axes and the intermolecular radius-vector in the laboratory frame, respectively. The lowest order non-zero multipole for a neutral heteronuclear diatomic molecule is the dipole moment corresponding to ni = 1. For a homonuclear diatomic molecule, it is the quadrupole moment with ni = 2. When r is large, the interaction of Eq. (11) can be treated as a perturbation. The long-range interaction between neutral molecules is thus determined by the matrix elements of the operator (11), which can be evaluated with high accuracy if the eigenstates of the isolated molecules are known; in this article we do not discuss retardation effects. Eq. (11) and the rules of angular momentum algebra [119–122] can be used to establish the following useful results. If molecules are in states with J = 0, the diagonal long-range interaction is given by the van der Waals potential ∼ C6/r6 (plus higher order terms). For molecules in states with J > 1, the dominant contribution to the long-range potential is determined by the quadrupole-quadrupole interaction, decaying as ∼ C5/r5. In the limit of ultracold temperatures, the effect of intermolecular potentials with the long-range van der Waals or quadrupole-quadrupole interactions can be described by the s-wave scattering length a. The scattering length determines the effective contact interaction (4π~2a/m)δ(r) which enters as a pseudopotential in the many-body Gross-Pitaevskii equation. If the molecules are prepared in superpositions of different parity states, the intermolecular potential at large r is dominated by the dipole-dipole interaction. The dipole-dipole interaction decays as ∼ 1/r3 and possesses an anisotropic angular dependence. The contact interaction is no longer sufficient to parametrize the system and it is necessary to introduce an anisotropic pseudopotential [123]. In the studies of molecular Bose-Einstein condensates, the pseudopotential is often written as a sum of the contact interaction, representing the short-range part of the interaction, and an explicit dipole-dipole interaction term derived from the multipole expansion [124, 125]. This is equivalent to the Born approximation and is accurate for most systems of interest. Dipole-dipole interactions can be created (and tuned) by applying a dc electric field, which orients polar molecules in the laboratory frame, Eq. (4). One can also engineer tunable dipole-dipole interactions by dressing molecules with microwave fields [126]. In this case, a microwave field is applied to couple the rotational states of different parity (e.g. J = 0 and J = 1). While the time average of the laboratory frame dipole moment thus created is zero, the dipole moment is non zero in the rotating frame. Since all molecules oscillate in phase, this gives rise to non-zero dipole-dipole interactions. This effect can be used to tune the magnitude and sign of the dipole-dipole interactions [106–108] and achieve the dipole blockade of microwave excitations in ensembles of polar molecules [126]. It is worth noting that the term “long-range”, although used in physical chemistry for any interactions at large r, needs to be redefined in the context of ultracold scattering and many-body physics of ultracold molecules. The “long-range” potentials V (r) correspond to a diverging integralR V (r)dr. In this sense, the dipole-dipole interaction is long-range in three dimensions, but short range in two and one dimensions. In the absence of screening [127], in systems with long range interactions the energy per particle depends not only on the particle density, but also on the total number of particles.
III. FIELD CONTROL OF MOLECULAR BEAMS
The molecular beam technique was pioneered in 1911 by Dunoyer [128], who demonstrated that sodium atoms travel in vacuum along straight lines and thereby confirmed one of the key assumptions of the kinetic theory of gases. Ten years later Kallmann and Reiche from the Kaiser Wilhelm Institute for Physical Chemistry and Electrochemistry in Berlin 1 proposed to deflect a beam of polar molecules using an inhomogeneous electric field. The goal of the experiment was to determine whether a dipole moment is a property of individual molecules or if it arises only in the bulk due to the intermolecular interactions [129]. The article of Kallmann and Reiche prompted Stern to publish a proposal describing his ongoing experiment [130], which later became the celebrated Stern-Gerlach experiment on spatial quantization, based on deflection of an atomic beam in an inhomogeneous magnetic field [131]. The first experiment on electric field deflection of polar molecules was performed by Stern’s graduate student Wrede several years later [132]. In the following decades, control over the transverse molecular motion was achieved by developing focusing techniques for molecular beams. In 1939, Rabi proposed the molecular beam magnetic resonance method that allowed for accurate measurements of magnetic dipole moments [133]. In the 1950’s, Bennewitz and coworkers used electric fields to focus a molecular beam onto a detector [134], and Townes and coworkers used an electric quadrupole to
1 Now Fritz Haber Institute of the Max Planck Society
focus a state-selected beam of ammonia molecules to a microwave cavity, a key ingredient of the maser [135, 136]. Further technological developments allowed for control of more complex species. The electrostatic deflection technique allowed to separate different stereoisomers of complex molecules [137]. Alternating gradient focusing technique provided a means to transversely confine high-field seeking molecules, including polyatomic species [55–58, 60–62, 138– 144], such as benzonitrile (C7H5N) [59], and complexes formed between benzonitrile molecules and argon atoms [145]. The same technique was used for the development of electric field guides for polyatomic molecules in specific rotational states [146]. The alternating gradient technique also allowed selective control of structural isomers of neutral molecules [144, 147], and spatial separation of state- and size-selected neutral clusters [148]. The velocity selection of molecules can be performed using a curved electrostatic guide [149–153] or a rotating nozzle [154, 155]. Strebel et al. demonstrated velocity selection of ammonia molecules with a rotating nozzle, followed by guiding using a charged wire [156]. Magnetic deflection of molecular beams has been used for state analysis and selection, see Ref. [157] and references therein. When subject to an intense laser field, molecules acquire an induced dipole moment. This opens a way to manipulate the motion of any polarizable molecules, not just of polar ones, by modulating the intensity of an applied laser field. Stapelfeldt et al. [158] demonstrated the deflection of a molecular beam by a gradient of an intense laser field. Optical deflection of I2 and CS2 molecules was also demonstrated by Sakai et al. [159]. Purcell and Barker measured the effect of molecular alignment on the optical dipole force acting on molecules, and proposed to use molecular axis polarization to control the translational motion [160]. Zhao et al. demonstrated a cylindrical lens for molecules formed by a nanosecond laser pulse [161] and a laser-formed “molecular prism” that allowed them to separate a mixture of benzene and nitric oxide [162]. The prism was also used to separate benzene and carbon disulfide molecules [163]. Averbukh et al. proposed and experimentally demonstrated spatial separation of molecular isotopes using nonadiabatic excitation of vibrational wavepackets [164, 165]. The effects of laser-induced pre-alignment on the Stern-Gerlach deflection of paramagnetic molecules by an inhomogeneous static magnetic field were studied in Ref. [166]. It was theoretically shown that using strong femtosecond laser pulses one can efficiently control molecular deflection in inhomogeneous laser fields [167]. Gershnabel and Averbukh investigated deflection of rotating rigid rotor and symmetric top molecules in inhomogeneous optical and static electric fields and discussed possible applications for molecular optics [166, 168–170]. Two experiments investigated the effect of microwave fields on molecules in a molecular beam [171, 172], opening the prospect for manipulation of molecular beams with low-frequency ac fields. Quantum state dependent deflection of OCS molecules and characterization of the resulting single-state molecular beam by impulsive alignment was recently demonstrated by Nielsen et al. [173]. Although experiments on controlling the transverse motion of molecular beams date back to the work of Stern and Gerlach, control of the longitudinal motion remained a challenge until very recently. Electric field deceleration of neutral molecules was first attempted by John King at the Massachusetts Institute of Technology to produce a slow beam of ammonia in order to obtain a maser with an ultranarrow linewidth. At the University of Chicago, Lennard Wharton constructed an 11-m-long molecular beam machine for the acceleration of LiF molecules in highfield-seeking states from 0.2 to 2.0 eV, aiming to produce high-energy molecular beams for reactive scattering studies. Unfortunately, both of these experiments were unsuccessful and were discontinued [55, 174]. Only in 1999, Meijer and coworkers demonstrated that the longitudinal motion of molecules can be controlled by the ‘Stark decelerator’ – they slowed a beam of metastable CO molecules from 225 m/s down to 98 m/s [175]. Soon thereafter, Gould and coworkers presented a proof-of-principle experiment demonstrating the slowing of a beam of Cs atoms [176]. In a Stark decelerator, an array of electrodes creates an inhomogeneous electric field with periodic minima and maxima of the field strength. Polar molecules travelling in this electric field potential lose kinetic energy, when climbing the potential hills, and gain kinetic energy, when going down the hills. To prevent kinetic energy gain, the electric field is temporally modulated so that the molecules most often travel against the gradient of the electric field potential. To obtain full insight into the dynamics of this process, the group of Meijer studied the phase stability of the Stark decelerator [177–181], the group of Friedrich developed analytic models of the acceleration and deceleration dynamics [181, 182], and Sawyer et al. provided a detailed study of the Stark deceleration efficiency [183]. After Stark deceleration was demonstrated for metastable CO (a3Π) molecules [175], it was applied to a number of other molecules, including 14,15ND3 [184, 185], NH3 [178], OH [186–190], OD [191], NH (a1∆) [192, 193], NO [194], H2CO [195], SO2 [196], LiH [197], CaF [198], YbF [199], and SrF [200, 201]. Stark deceleration of CH3F [202] and CH [203] has been discussed, though not yet realized. Translationally cold ground-state CO molecules were produced by optical pumping of Stark-decelerated metastable CO [204]. Detailed understanding of the deceleration dynamics allowed the development of methods for controlling the longitudinal motion of molecular beams on much smaller length scales. Marian et al. [205] demonstrated an 11 cm long wire Stark decelerator, whereas Meek et al. [206–209] developed a molecular chip decelerator – a structure about 50 mm long – and brought molecules to standstill. Later, molecular spectroscopy experiments were performed on a chip [210, 211]. Based on a similar idea, the microstructured reflection [212] and focusing [213] techniques were demonstrated. As a larger-scale analogue of the chip, deceleration of molecules in a macroscopic traveling potential
was developed by Osterwalder and coworkers [199, 214, 215]. Quintero-P´erez et al. [216] used the traveling-wave decelerator to bring the ammonia molecules to a standstill. In many cases, Stark deceleration experiments are state-selective and decelerate molecules in low-field-seeking states. Extending the technique to molecules in high-field-seeking states has proven difficult, primarily because high-fieldseekers are attracted to the electrodes, which mars the transverse stability of the beam. To overcome this problem, it has been proposed to use alternating gradient focusers [55, 58, 62], leading to the demonstration of deceleration of metastable CO [56], YbF [57], OH [60], and benzonitrile (C7H5N) [59] in high-field-seeking states, and guiding of low- and high-field-seeking states of ammonia [150]. This is particularly important for polyatomic molecules, which in many cases cease to have low-field-seeking rotational states, due to a large density of states interacting with the field. The Stark deceleration method, as demonstrated by Meijer and coworkers, is applicable only to polar molecules. To make the technique more general, Merkt, Softley, and their coworkers demonstrated an alternative method based on exciting molecules to a Rydberg state, which responds to an electric field due to an enormous dipole moment produced by the Rydberg electron and the ionic core. It was shown that a beam of H2 molecules can be effectively slowed [217, 218]. Beams of paramagnetic atoms and molecules can be slowed using a Zeeman decelerator, which was applied to deceleration of neutral H and D atoms [219–221], metastable Ne atoms [222, 223], oxygen molecules [224, 225], and methyl radicals [226]. Phase stability in a Zeeman decelerator was studied by Wiederkehr et al. [227]. Another type of a Zeeman decelerator recently demonstrated is based on a moving, three-dimensional magnetic trap with tunable velocity [228]. Narevicius et al. [229] proposed to build a Zeeman decelerator using a series of quadrupole traps. This proposal was experimentally realized by Lavert-Ofir et al. [230, 231] for metastable Ne atoms. Using the analogy with optical deflection of molecular beams, Friedrich proposed to use a gradient of an optical dipole force to slow molecules – a so-called “optical scoop” [232]. While the optical scoop technique has not yet been demonstrated experimentally, it was shown that molecules can be trapped in a moving periodic potential of a laser beam [68, 69]. This technique allows one to trap, accelerate, and decelerate molecules preserving their narrow velocity spread, which amounts to an optical decelerator for molecules [70, 71]. Exploiting the ac Stark effect, Enomoto and Momose proposed a microwave decelerator [233], which was experimentally realized by Merz et al. [234]. Finally, Ahmad et al. [235] recently proposed to use coherent pulse trains for slowing multilevel atoms and molecules.
IV. EXTERNAL FIELD TRAPS FOR COLD MOLECULES
“If one extends the rules of two-dimensional focusing to three dimensions, one possesses all ingredients for particle trapping.” While referring (mainly) to trapping of charged particles, these words of Wolfgang Paul in his Nobel address [236] also proved prophetic for cold molecules. One of the motivations behind the work on controlling the longitudinal motion of molecular beams was the prospect of slowing molecules to a standstill in order to confine them in a trap. The external field traps exploit the dc Zeeman, dc Stark, or ac Stark effect in order to confine molecules in a particular quantum state by gradients of an applied field. As a consequence of Maxwell’s equations, it is possible to generate a dc field configuration, whether magnetic or electric, with a three-dimensional minimum, but not with a three-dimensional maximum. As a result, dc magnetic and electric fields can only be used to confine neutral molecules in low-field-seeking states [54]. On the other hand, ac fields can be focused with a gradient of intensity leading to a three-dimensional maximum, which, depending on the detuning from resonance, can be used to confine molecules in either low-field-seeking states or high-field-seeking states. By preselecting molecules in a particular quantum state, external field traps effectively orient them, which can be used for a variety of applications such as controlled chemistry [237] or spectroscopy of large oriented molecules [238–240]. Confining molecules in an external field trap can provide long interrogation times for precision spectroscopy experiments compared to molecular beams [185, 241–245] and accurate measurements of the radiative lifetimes of vibrationally and electronically excited states [246–248]. The latter is especially important for free radicals, for which there are few alternative methods. Confining molecules in an external field is also necessary for sympathetic or evaporative cooling, currently the only methods for reaching quantum degeneracy with atomic ensembles. Ultracold molecules may open a new frontier in precision measurements leading to far-reaching applications. It is expected that experiments with ultracold molecules will provide a new, much improved, limit on the value of the electron electric dipole moment [249–251] and the time variation, if any, of the fundamental constants [243, 252–255]. Following the original proposal for buffer-gas loading of atoms and molecules into a magnetic trap [256, 257], Weinstein and coworkers reported the trapping of a neutral molecular radical CaH in a magnetic trap [258]. Beyond stimulating the research on cold molecules, magnetic trapping of molecules in the environment of an inert buffer gas
TABLE I. Summary of the external field traps developed for neutral molecules to date. Only selected representative references are given. See text for a more comprehensive list of references. Trap type molecule trap depth (K) molecule number density (cm−3) Representative references Electrostatic OH, OD, CO (a3Π1), NH3, ND3 0.1 − 1.2 104 − 108 106 − 108 [151, 188, 191, 216, 248, 272] NH(a1∆), CH3F, CH2O, CH3Cl [266, 280, 282] Chip electrostatic CO (a3Π1) 0.03 − 0.07 103 − 104 107 (10/site) [207] Thin-wire electrostatic NaCs 5 · 10−6 104 − 105 105 − 106 [271] AC electric 15ND3 5 · 10−3 103 − 104 ∼ 105 [63–66] Magneto-electrostatic OH 0.4 105 3 · 103 [267] Magnetic OH 0.2 105 106 [268, 283] Magnetic CaH, NH ∼ 1 108 − 1010 107 − 1010 [193, 258, 262, 284] Magnetic CrH, MnH 1 105 106 [261] Magnetic Cs2 4 · 10−6 105 < 108 [269] Magnetic KRb 0.5 ∼ 20 − 30 104 [285] Optical dipole trap alkali dimers, Sr2 10−6 105 1012 [286–297] Optical lattice KRb, Cs2, Sr2 10−6 104 (0.1 − 1)/site [110, 296–300]
became a useful tool for Zeeman spectroscopy [259, 260], accurate measurement of the radiative lifetimes of long-lived molecular levels [248] and the study of atomic and molecular collisions at temperatures near and below 1 Kelvin, see Sec. VII. In addition to CaH, the experiments demonstrated the trapping of CrH and MnH [261] as well as of all the four stable isotopomers of NH radicals [81, 262, 263]. Long lifetimes of magnetically trapped molecules exceeding 20 seconds have been achieved [263]. Although not widely used for molecules, trapping of magnetic species in the ground state is possible using an ac magnetic trap developed by Cornell et al. [264]. After achieving magnetic trapping, the number of various traps designed for molecules has quickly multiplied. Following the proposal by Wing [54], Jongma et al. [265] proposed a scheme for trapping of CO molecules in an electrostatic trap. First electrostatic trapping experiment has been performed by Bethlem et al. for Stark-decelerated ammonia molecules [184]. In the follow-up studies, trapping of OH [188], OD [191], metastable CO [248], and metastable NH [266], has been demonstrated. Sawyer et al. demonstrated magneto-electrostatic [267] and then permanent magnetic [268] trapping of OH. Vanhaecke et al. [269] demonstrated trapping of Cs2 molecules in a quadrupole magnetic trap. Hogan et al. [270] demonstrated loading of magnetic atoms into a trap after Zeeman deceleration, a technique that can be likewise used for molecules. Kleinert et al. [271] trapped NaCs molecules in a trap consisting of four thin wires creating a quadrupolar trapping field. The thin wires forming the electrodes of the trap allowed them to superimpose the trap onto a magneto-optical trap. Rieger et al. [151] reported an electrostatic trap consisting of five ring-shaped electrodes and two spherical electrodes at both ends. The trap was continuously loaded with a quadrupole guide, resulting in a steady-state population of trapped molecules. Kirste et al. [272] trapped ND3 molecules in the electrostatic analogue of a Ioffe-Pritchard trap. Van Veldhoven et al. demonstrated a cylindrical AC trap capable of trapping molecules in both low-field-seeking and high-field-seeking states [63, 64]. Schnell et al. developed a linear AC trap for ground-state polar molecules [65, 66]. A storage ring for neutral molecules was proposed by Katz [273] and later realized by Crompvoets et al. [274]. The storage ring led to the development of the molecular synchrotron [275–277], i.e. a ring trap, in which neutral molecules can be accelerated or decelerated with high degree of control [278]. An alternative design for a molecular synchrotron was proposed by Nishimura et al. [279]. A microstructure trap for polar molecules was designed by Englert et al. [280]. Confinement of OH radicals in a magnetoelectrostatic trap [267], which consists of a pair of coils located on the beam axis combined with an electrostatic quadrupole, as well as magnetic reflection by an array of magnets [281] was demonstrated with a Starkdecelerated beam. Accumulation of Stark-decelerated NH molecules in a magnetic trap was demonstrated by Riedel et al. [193]. The possibility of confining polarizable diatomic molecules by a laser field was proposed by Friedrich and Herschbach [67], and first demonstrated for Cs2 molecules by Takekoshi et al. [286]. In subsequent years, optical trapping has become a widely used tool for trapping such species as KRb, LiCs, RbCs, as well as a broad range of homonuclear diatomic molecules, such as Cs2, Sr2, Rb2, K2 [32, 33, 36, 297, 300–302]. Two-dimensional magneto-optical trapping of YO molecules was recently demonstrated by Hummon et al. [303]. When prepared at ultracold temperatures, molecules can be trapped in a periodic potential of a laser beam – optical lattice – similarly to what had been previously achieved with ultracold atoms [297–300, 304]. In order to aid experiments aiming to create controlled ensembles of ultracold molecules trapped in optical lattices, Kotochigova and Tiesinga [305] studied the possibility of manipulating ultracold molecules in optical lattices with microwave fields and Aldegunde et al. [306] presented a detailed study of microwave spectra of cold polar molecules in the presence of electric and magnetic fields. By analogy with optical traps, DeMille et al. [307] proposed to confine molecules in a microwave cavity. Due to small energy separation of the rotational energy levels and the low frequency of microwave fields, microwave traps have the promise of providing strong confinement over a large volume. Microwave trapping of molecules has yet to be realized. Table I summarize
the current state of the art in the development of external field traps for neutral molecules. While the present article focuses on neutral molecules, it is necessary to acknowledge the tremendous recent progress in cooling and trapping of molecular ions. Due to their charge, even complex molecular ions can be trapped and cooled to milliKelvin temperatures [308–313]. Just like neutral alkali metal dimers prepared from ultracold atoms, molecular ions can be prepared in a selected rovibrational state by optical pumping [314, 315] or sympathetic cooling of previously state selected ions [316]. Molecular ions can be trapped for a few hours, with the rotational state lifetimes (for apolar ions) exceeding 15 minutes [316]. The trapping and the accumulation of ions in specific rovibrational states can be used for highly accurate rotational [317], hyperfine [318], and photodissociation [319] spectroscopy, and provides a new approach to measuring the electric dipole moment of electron [320].
V. CONTROLLING MOLECULAR ROTATION
A. Molecular orientation in electrostatic fields
The development of techniques for orienting and aligning molecules was largely motivated by the prospects of controlling molecular reaction dynamics. In field-free collision experiments, molecules rotate freely with the direction of the internuclear axes distributed uniformly in three-dimensional space. Restricting molecular rotations has long been a challenge. In the early 1960’s Toennies and coworkers studied scattering of state-selected TlF molecules with a wide range of atomic and molecular collision partners in the presence of a homogeneous electrostatic field [321– 325]. Experiments with symmetric top molecules, which possess nearly degenerate states of opposite parity and can, therefore, be effectively oriented by a weak electrostatic field of a hexapole, were pioneered by the groups of Brooks and Bernstein in the mid-1960’s [326–329]. They used the hexapole technique to study the effect of the orientation of reagents on the outcome of a number of chemical reactions, showing, e.g., that the chemical reactivity of K with CH3I [330] and Rb with CH3I [331, 332] is substantially greater if the atom collides with the I end of the molecule. On the other hand, the results were different for the reaction of K with CF3I [333], where the reaction favors the process of K attacking the CF3 end of the molecule. Parker, Stolte and coworkers investigated the steric effects in collisions of He with CH3F [334] and Ca with CH3F [335] as well as the influence of an electrostatic field on the reactivity of NO with O3 [336] and Ba with N2O [337, 338]. The hexapole technique was used to probe the changes of the integral cross sections in rotationally inelastic collisions with oriented reagents. By selecting the initial states with a hexapole field, and then orienting the molecular axis by a static electric field, ter Meulen and coworkers observed that O- and H-ended collisions of OH(X) with Ar lead to different yields for low and high J′ levels [339, 340]. Stolte and coworkers observed an oscillatory dependence of the steric asymmetry in collisions of NO(X) with He and Ar [341–344]. Hexapole state selection was also used by Stolte and coworkers to measure the differential cross sections for collisions of He and D2 with NO in a single Λ-doublet level [345, 346]. Kaesdorf et al. studied angular-resolved photoelectron spectra of CH3I oriented by an electric hexapole field [347]. Kasai et al. used a 2-meter long electric hexapole to produce state-selected molecular beams of high intensity [348]. While the interaction of a rigid rotor molecule with an electric field was theoretically studied in 1970 by von Meyenn [349], orienting molecules other than symmetric tops with external fields has, for a long time, been considered impractical. It was believed that orienting a molecular dipole in the laboratory frame would require an extremely high field strength [350]. As an example we refer the reader to the paper by Brooks [351] published in Science in 1976, which contains a sections entitled ‘Brute force – how not to orient molecules’. Brooks referred to attempts to orient molecular dipoles by strong fields as the “brute force methods”, and estimated the field strength required to suppress rotation and orient HCl to be 12 MV/cm, which is experimentally unfeasible. The “brute force” techniques were juxtaposed with the orientation methods based on choosing proper molecules, such as symmetric tops. Only in the 1990’s it was understood that it is possible to orient any polar molecule upon rotational cooling to very low temperatures (< 10 K). The pioneering experiments were performed by Loesch and Remscheid who investigated the steric effect in K+CH3I collisions [352], and by Friedrich and Herschbach, who oriented a diatomic molecule (ICl) in a 1Σ electronic state for the first time [353, 354]. The effect of orientation of ICl on inelastic collisions with Ar was studied in Ref. [355]. Later, Loesch and coworkers investigated the influence of the molecular orientation on the velocity and angular distributions of the products in K+CH3Br [356], K+ICl [357], Li+HF→LiF+H [358], and K+C6H5I [359] reactions (for a review see Ref. [360]). Friedrich and coworkers explored the effect of an electrostatic field on Ar+ICl collisions and found that the field suppresses rotationally inelastic scattering [361]. In a subsequent study, Friedrich considered the thermodynamic properties of molecular ensembles in electrostatic and radiative fields [362–364]. The spectroscopic signature of pendular states resulting from molecule-field interactions were investigated theoretically and experimentally in subsequent articles [365, 366]. Block et al. [367] showed that a strong electrostatic field leads to collapse of the infrared spectrum of the (HCN)3 molecule. Pendular states of ICl in an electrostatic field
were detected via linear optical dichroism measurements by Slenczka [368]. Pendular spectroscopy allowed Slenczka, Friedrich and Herschbach [369] to measure the dipole moment of an excited-state of ICl(B3Π0). Orientation of pyrimidine was measured spectroscopically [370]. A review of linear dichroism spectroscopy of large biological molecules oriented and aligned inside helium nanodroplets is presented in Ref. [371]. De Miranda et al. performed the first experiment on controlling molecular orientation in the ultracold temperature regime [110]. In addition to stereodynamics, the techniques for orienting molecules with external fields can be used for determining molecular properties. For example, Gijsbertsen and coworkers [372] showed that a measurement of the ion distribution produced by photodissociation of molecules oriented in a strong dc electric field can be used to determine the direction (sign) of the molecular dipole moment. In the case of NO, it was found that the dipole moment corresponds to N−O+. Gonz´alez-F´erez and Schmelcher developed techniques employing an electrostatic field to manipulate molecular rovibrational states [373–377], control molecular association and dissociation [378, 379], as well as radiative transition rates [380]. Melezhik and Schmelcher presented a method for ultracold molecule formation in a waveguide [381]. In the most recent developments, Rydberg molecules, consisting of a ground-state atom bound to a highly-excited atom were predicted theoretically [382–384] and observed experimentally [385]. These molecules are spatially very extended and possess a substantial value of a dipole moment, even in the case of homonuclear species [386]. Such molecules thus represent an attractive target for manipulation by electric and magnetic fields [387, 388]. Mayle et al. [389] proposed a mechanism for electric field control of ultralong-range triatomic polar Rydberg molecules. Rittenhouse and Sadeghpour predicted the existence of long-range polyatomic Rydberg molecules, consisting of a Rydberg atom and a polar dimer and developed techniques to coherently manipulate them using a Raman scheme [390].
B. Molecular alignment in magnetic and laser fields
Apart from orientation (a single-headed arrow ↑), molecules can also be aligned (a double-headed arrow l) along a particular space-fixed axis, not favoring one direction over another. In order to achieve alignment, one needs to apply a field preserving the parity of states such as a magnetic or a far-off-resonant laser field. The possibility to align paramagnetic molecules and ions in a magnetic field was first discussed by Friedrich and Herschbach [391], and then experimentally demonstrated for an excited state of ICl by Slenczka et al. [392]. A magnetic field hybridizes states of the same parity, but it may result in crossings between some states of opposite parity. This effect can be used to achieve strong orientation of molecules in combined magnetic and electric fields. Spectroscopy of ICl molecules in parallel strong electric and magnetic fields was performed in refs. [393, 394]. The properties of 2Σ and 3Σ molecules in parallel electric and magnetic fields were investigated later in refs. [73–84, 395–400]. It was shown that ensembles of polar paramagnetic molecules in combined static fields can be used for accurate 2D mapping of an ac field within a broad range of frequencies [401]. Zare [402] proposed an alternative method of creating aligned molecules by exciting them with linearly polarized light. This technique was used by Loesch and Stienkemeier [403] to study the reactions Sr+HF→SrF+H and K+HF→KF+H. It was found that the reactivity of Sr with HF at low energies is greater when the HF bond is perpendicular to the approach direction of Sr, whereas the reactivity of the K+HF system is greater when the HF bond is parallel to the approach direction. At higher collision energies, the reactivity of Sr with HF becomes more pronounced for the collinear geometry, whereas the reactivity of K with HF is insensitive to the orientation of the HF bond. Zare and coworkers studied the steric effect in reactions of Cl with vibrationally excited CH4 and CHD3 by varying the direction of approach of the Cl atom relative to the C–H stretching bond with different polarizations of the infrared excitation laser [404]. Strong molecular polarization can also be achieved by removing the population of certain M sublevels by selective photodissociation. This technique was pioneered by de Vries et al. [405] who created a polarized beam of IBr to study the reaction of IBr with metastable Xe∗ producing XeI∗ and XeBr∗. It was found that the reaction cross section is larger when the Xe∗ atom approaches parallel to the plane of rotation of IBr, and smaller for the perpendicular approach direction. Finally, a coherent superposition of parity states can be prepared by a two-color phase locked laser excitation [406]. Qi et al. showed that Autler-Townes effect can be used to achieve all-optical molecular alignment [407]. With the advance of optical technology it has been realized that the rotational motion of molecules can be steered using an intense laser field. Scattering of intense far-off-resonant laser light from symmetric-top molecules was first studied by Zon and Katsnelson in the mid-70’s [85]. Some 20 years later, unaware of this work, Friedrich and Herschbach [67] presented a theoretical description of alignment of buffer-gas-cooled molecules by a far-detuned laser field, based on the experimental evidence provided by Normand et al. [408]. The possibility of alignment, focusing, and trapping of molecules in intense laser fields was studied in detail in the subsequent work of Friedrich and Herschbach
[86, 87], and Seideman [409–414]. Friedrich and Herschbach studied the spectroscopic signatures of pendular states and collapse of infrared spectrum [415]. Dion et al. [416] performed a numerical study of the effects of permanent and induced dipole moments on alignment. The theoretical proposals prompted the development of novel experiments on molecular alignment. Kim and Felker spectroscopically detected the pendular states resulting from alignment of the naphthalene trimer molecules and benzene-argon complexes [417–419]. Mathur and coworkersdetected the pendular states by measuring ion distributions after photodissociation of CS2, CO2, NO2, H2O, CCl4, CHCl3, and CH2Cl2 molecules by an intense linearly polarized picosecond pulse [420–424]. Posthumus et al. [260] performed a double-pulse measurement of molecular alignment. The first direct evidence of adiabatic molecular alignment and its quantitative characterizationby measuring photofragment distributions were reported in the seminal papers of Sakai, Stapelfeldt, and coworkers, for I2, ICl, CS2, CH3I, and C6H5I molecules [425, 426], also see Ref. [427]. Ji et al. studied final state alignment in all-optical multiple resonance quantum-state selected photodissociation of K2 [428, 429]. Larsen et al. [430] performed controlled photodissociation of I2 molecules, manipulating the branching ratio of the I+I and I∗+I product channels by aligning the molecular axis. The role of rotational temperature in adiabatic molecular alignment was studied experimentally in Ref. [431]. Pentlehner et al. studied alignment of C6H4I2, C6H5I, and CH3I molecules dissolved in helium nanodroplets [432]. In the case of a polyatomic molecule, alignment by a single linearly polarized laser field leads to 1D alignment, i.e. only one molecular axis becomes aligned. Achieving a complete 3D alignment had been a challenging task and was first demonstrated by Larsen et al. [433] for 3,4−dibromothiophene molecules in an elliptically polarized laser field. The theory of 3D alignment and external field control of the torsional motion in polyatomic molecules was developed by Seideman and coworkers [434, 435]. Manipulating torsion in molecules using laser pulses was demonstrated experimentally and theoretically in refs. [436–438]. A method of coherent control of torsion in biphenyl derivative using laser fields was proposed in Ref. [439]. Spence and Doak proposed to use alignment to perform structural studies of small proteins via single-molecule X-ray diffraction [440]. State selection and manipulation of molecular beams for the applications of diffraction studies was discussed in Ref. [441]. Ortigoso discussed the possibility of using microwave pulses to engineer coherent rotational states in asymmetric top molecules [442]. If the linear polarization of an intense laser is slowly rotating, the molecular alignment must adiabatically follow it; thus a laser field can act as an “optical centrifuge” for molecules. Speeding up the rotation makes it possible to prepare molecules in rotational states with extremely high angular momenta, all the way to the dissociation limit, as demonstrated for Cl2 in Ref. [443, 444]. The possibility to use optical centrifuge for selective dissociation was studied in subsequent papers [445–447]. The difference in molecular moments of inertia require different torques for dissociation, making it possible to separate molecules composed of different isotopes, such as 35Cl2 and 37Cl2. The optical centrifuge was used to study the dynamics and collisions of polyatomic molecules in high-energy rotational states [448, 449]. Motivated by the work of Forrey et al. [450–452] Korobenko and coworkers [453] developed an optical centrifuge to study collisions of cold diatomic molecules in highly excited rotational states. A cw laser approach for excitation of the highest possible rotational levels was also proposed for Li2 [454]. The electron distribution in aligned molecules can be studied using strong-field ionization, as first demonstrated experimentally by Litvinyuk et al. [455]. Dooley et al. [456] performed direct imaging of rotational wave-packet dynamics via ion imaging after Coulomb explosion of N2 and O2 molecules. The theory of alignment-dependent ionization probability of molecules in a double-pulse laser field was developed by Zhao et al. [457]. Suzuki et al. [458] developed a technique to control multiphoton ionization of aligned I2 molecules using time-dependent polarization pulses. Intense laser ionization of transiently aligned CO was studied in Ref. [459]. Kumarappan et al. [460] measured the electron angular distributions resulting from multi-photon ionization of laser-aligned CS2 molecules. Ionization of one- and three-dimensionally-oriented benzonitrile [461] and oriented OCS [462] molecules by intense circularly polarized femtosecond laser pulses provided insight into the structure of molecular orbitals. Recombination of electrons appearing due to strong-field ionization results in high-harmonic generation (HHG) [463]. In aligned molecules, high-order harmonic generation leads to quantum interference [464–468], which can be used to study the role of orbital symmetry [469], and other electronic and rotational properties of molecules [470]. Itatani et al. [471] used HHG for imaging the molecular electron orbitals of N2. Wagner et al. [472] studied the molecular dynamics using coherent electrons from HHG. The dependence of the HHG polarization and ellipticity on molecular alignment was elucidated by Levesque and coworkers [473] and Kanai and coworkers [474]. The possibility to observe ellipticity in higher order harmonic generation from aligned molecules and its relations to the underlying molecular potential were studied in refs. [475, 476]. Kelkensberg et al. [477] measured photoelectron angular distribution from aligned molecules interacting with intense XUV pulses, which revealed contributions from the different orbitals of a CO2 molecule. Lock et al. [478] demonstrated experimentally and theoretically that high-harmonic generation can be used as a sensitive probe of the rotational wave packet dynamics. Bartels et al. [479] showed that the time-dependent phase modulation induced by molecular rotational wave packets can be used to manipulate the phase and spectral content of ultrashort light pulses (e.g. increase the bandwidth of the pulse) [479]. Frumker and coworkers [480] developed a method to study the dynamics of oriented molecules by detecting harmonic radiation
Laser-induced molecular alignment techniques can also be used for measuring polarizability anisotropies of rare gas diatomic molecules [481, 482], to control surface phenomena such as surface reactions [483], and self-assembly of aligned molecules on liquid surfaces [484]. Applications of aligned and oriented molecules to study elementary processes on surfaces was discussed by Vattuone et al. [485]. It was shown that laser-induced torsional alignment of nonrigid molecules can be performed in a nuclear-spin-selective way, which allows for selective manipulation of nuclear spin isomers [486]. Kiljunen et al. studied the effect of a crystal field on alignment of matrix-isolated species [487–489]. The alignment of organic molecules adsorbed on a semiconductor surface was proposed to realize a fast molecular switch for conductance [490, 491]. Khodorkovsky et al. [492] proposed techniques to modify the molecule-surface scattering using laser pulses. The possibility to use tailored laser pulses to control molecular machines was discussed in Ref. [493]. Artamonov and Seideman showed that simultaneous alignment and focusing of molecules can be achieved due to the field enhancement by surface plasmons of metal nanoparticles [494].
C. Molecular orientation in combined fields
Although a far-off-resonant laser field mixes only states of same parity, it leads to the formation of the so-called tunneling doublets – closely lying states of opposite parity. In a way, these doublets are similar to tunneling doublets in ammonia or Λ-doublets in open-shell molecules, such as OH, and can be hybridized by very weak electrostatic fields leading to strong molecular orientation [72]. The possibility to achieve enhanced molecular orientation in collinear laser and electrostatic fields was first theoretically considered by Friedrich and Herschbach [92, 93]. Later, Ha¨rtelt and Friedrich provided a detailed study of symmetric-top states in electric and radiative fields with an arbitrary polarization tilt [94]. The theory was extended to asymmetric tops by Omiste et al. [96]. A theoretical description of laser alignment and combined-field orientation of benzonitrile was presented in Ref. [97]. Sokolov et al. proposed a technique based on a combination of an infrared and ultraviolet laser pulses to achieve molecular orientation [495]. Enhanced molecular orientation in combined electrostatic and laser fields was demonstrated by Friedrich et al. [496, 497] for HXeI molecules, and by Sakai et al. [498, 499] for OCS. Tanji et al. [500] demonstrated the possibility of three-dimensional orientation of polyatomic molecules by combined electrostatic and elliptically polarized laser fields. Orientation of a large organoxenon (H–Xe–CCH) molecule in combined laser and electrostatic fields was recently demonstrated in Ref. [501]. Trippel et al. [7] demonstrated strong alignment and orientation of molecular samples at kHz repetition rate. In more exotic developments, it was shown that molecules in combined electrostatic and radiative fields can be described by supersymmetric quantum mechanics, which allows one to find analytically solvable cases of the combinedfield problem [502, 503].
D. Interaction with short laser pulses: nonadiabatic alignment and orientation
Laser pulses shorter than the rotational period perturb the rotational energy states of a molecule nonadiabatically. When a molecule is subjected to such a short laser pulse, a rotational wave packet is formed. The phases of the rotational states in the rotational wave packet evolve in time even after the pulse is gone, which manifests itself in revivals of alignment. The idea of using short laser pulses for time-dependent molecular alignment was proposed by Ortigoso et al. [504] and elaborated by other authors [505–507]. The effect of thermal averaging on the postpulse alignment and the experimental limitations to observe it were studied by Machholm [508]. A number of authors [507, 509–511] presented numerical calculations for molecular dynamics during and after short and long pulses which illustrated the relative effect of the adiabatic and nonadiabatic interactions. Rotational wavepacket dynamics in the presence of dissipation leading to decoherence of rotational wave packets was investigated in refs. [512, 513]. It is worth noting, that the first signatures of the post-pulse alignment were observed in birefringence of CS2 vapor back in 1975 [514], furthermore, nonadiabatic excitation of rotational wavepackets had been widely used for rotational coherence spectroscopy [515]. However, the first experiment on nonadiabatic alignment of molecules in beams was performed in 2001 by Rosca-Pruna and Vrakking [516–520], who observed revivals of the alignment of I2 and Br2 molecules. Miyazaki et al. [521] observed field-free alignment of molecules using high-order harmonic generation. Later, field-free alignment of deuterium by femtosecond pulses was demonstrated [522]. Sussman et al. [523] proposed to align molecules by rapidly truncating a long laser pulse. Very soon after the experiments with linear molecules, nonadiabatic alignment of symmetric top molecules (methyliodide and tert-butyliodide) by short laser pulses was demonstrated in Ref. [524]. Nonadiabatic alignment
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and rotational revivals of asymmetric top molecules was demonstrated for the case of iodobenzene and iodopentafluorobenzene [525–527]. Field-free one-dimensional alignment of an asymmetric top molecule C2H4 was studied in refs. [528, 529]. Control of rotational wave-packet dynamics in asymmetric top molecules was demonstrated in Ref. [530]. Pentlehner et al. studied nonadiabatic alignment of CH3I molecules dissolved in helium nanodroplets [531]. Three-dimensional field-free alignment of ethylene was theoretically investigated by Underwood et al. [532]. Experimentally, field-free three-dimensional alignment of polyatomic molecules was demonstrated be Lee et al. [533] for the case of SO2. Viftrup et al. [534] demonstrated an interesting technique for controlling 3D rotations of polyatomic molecules. In this method a long linearly polarized (nanosecond) pulse strongly aligns the most polarizable axis of an asymmetric top molecule along its polarization axis while an orthogonally polarized, short (femtosecond) pulse puts the molecules into controlled rotation about the axis of alignment. A laser-field method to control rotation of asymmetric top molecules in 3D, based on combined long and short laser pulses, was described in Ref. [535]. A number of more sophisticated techniques were developed to achieve better control over the rotational motion of molecules. For example, Bisgaard et al. [536, 537] proposed a technique to enhance molecular alignment by using two consecutive laser pulses. Poulsen et al. [538] demonstrated enhancement of alignment using two temporally overlapping laser pulses. A method for enhanced orientation of linear dipolar molecules using a half-cycle pulse combined with a delayed laser pulse inducing molecular anti-alignment was discussed in refs. [539, 540]. Improved alignment by shaped laser pulses was demonstrated in refs. [541–543]. It was shown theoretically and experimentally that a pair of linearly polarized fs pulses can orient rotational angular momentum on a ps timescale [544]. Leibscher et al. [545, 546] showed that the degree of alignment achievable with a single pulse is limited, and proposed a technique to improve it using trains of short laser pulses. The possibility to achieve post-pulse molecular orientation in the presence of a weak electrostatic field and a short laser pulse was considered by Cai et al. [100]. Field-free molecular orientation in combined fields was first demonstrated for the case of OCS in Ref. [547], also see refs. [548, 549]. Holmegaard et al. [550] demonstrated laser-induced alignment and orientation of iodobenzene molecules in low-lying quantum states, preselected by electric field deflection. Laserinduced 3D alignment and orientation of large state-selected molecules was demonstrated in refs. [551, 552]. Nielsen et al. [99] provided a recipe for achieving the best molecular orientation using combined fields, with the underlying theory presented in Ref. [98]. The first proposal to use half-cycle pulses in order to generate molecular orientation as opposed to alignment was formulated in Ref. [553]. The possibility of spatial orientation by a half-cycle laser pulse and a series of fs pulses to manipulate the vibrational dynamics of OHF− was studied theoretically in Ref. [554]. An alternative way to achieve orientation using laser fields was proposed and experimentally realized by the group of Sakai [555, 556]. They used two-color laser fields interacting with molecular anisotropic hyperpolarizability and anisotropic polarizability (without permanent-dipole moment interactions involved). Different mechanisms of field-free molecular orientation induced by two-color lasers were theoretically studied in refs. [557, 558]. We note that nonadiabatic rotational dynamics and field-free orientation can also be studied by rapidly switching an electrostatic field, as discussed by Sa´nchez-Moreno et al. [559]. De et al. [560] reported the first experimental observation of nonadiabatic field-free orientation of a heteronuclear diatomic molecule (CO) induced by an intense two-color (800 and 400 nm) femtosecond laser field. Field-free molecular orientation by nonresonant and quasiresonant two-color laser pulses was studied in Ref. [561]. Gu´erun et al. [562] showed that a laser pulse designed as an adiabatic ramp followed by a kick allows one to reach a perfect postpulse molecular alignment, free of saturation. Ghafur et al. [563] demonstrated post-pulse alignment and orientation of hexapole state-selected NO molecules using an electrostatic field and fs laser pulses. Nonadiabatic molecular orientation by polarization-gated ultrashort laser pulses was theoretically studied by Chen et al. [564]. Daems et al. [565] showed that a combination of a half-cycle pulse and a short nonresonant laser pulse produces a strongly enhanced post-pulse orientation. Baek et al. [566] studied the field-free dynamics of benzene aligned by two consecutive short laser pulses, while the interaction of rotationally excited molecules with short laser pulses was studied by Owschimikow et al. [567–569]. Yun et al. [570] analyzed the time evolution of the quantum phases of the rotational states contributing to the rotational wave packet which provided new insights into the post-pulse alignment dynamics. It was also shown that THz pulses are capable of exciting rotational wavepackets that exhibit revivals, which opens up a prospect for rotational spectroscopy [571–573] and the studies of molecular orientation [574–576]. Kitano et al. [577] proposed to apply an intense fs pulse creating a rotational wave packet and then a delayed THz pulse that resonantly couples opposite parity states resulting in field-free orientation. Yu et al. [578] proposed to use two modulated few-cycle THz pulses to achieve long lived post-pulse molecular orientation. Since laser pulses can be tailored and modulated in many ways, one can design feedback control loops in order to prepare molecules in states of maximal alignment or orientation. For example, Suzuki et al. [579] demonstrated an optimal control technique for nonadiabatic alignment of N2 using shaped fs pulses with the feedback of the degree of alignment measured via ion imaging. With the development of high-intensity XUV sources, such as free-electron lasers, it became possible to probe the field-free molecular alignment via ionization and dissociation of molecules,optical trapping of YO molecules in two dimensions [303]. However, the range of molecules amenable to the laser cooling technique demonstrated by Stuhl, Shuman, Hummon, and their coworkers remains rather narrow. The development of a general laser cooling method applicable to any diatomic as well as polyatomic molecule is a challenging problem currently researched by many groups. Most notably, it was suggested that the detrimental decay processes can be damped by coupling a molecule to an optical or microwave cavity, which might allow for cavity cooling of external and internal molecular motion [618–623]. Averbukh and Prior [624, 625] proposed an alternative method for laser cooling of molecules by an optical shaker – a standing wave of far-off-resonant light that exhibits sudden phase jumps, whose value is controlled by the feedback loop. In such a way the cooling scheme combines the principles of Sisyphus [626] and stochastic [627] cooling. Vilensky et al. proposed to use a bistable optical cavity for a Sisyphus-type cooling, where the cavity undergoes sudden transitions between two energy states [628]. These proposals are currently awaiting experimental realization. Optical pumping is routinely used to prepare atoms in a particular quantum state. Extending this technique to molecules is impeded by the same problem of multi-level structure that has haunted the development of laser cooling of molecules. Only recently, it was shown that diatomic molecules can be cooled, vibrationally and rotationally, to the ground rovibrational level using optical pumping [629–631]. These experiments exploit broadband lasers, generating femtosecond pulses shaped to remove the frequency band that would excite the ground state. Without this frequency, the laser pulses redistribute the population leading to efficient accumulation of population in the ground state. In a remarkable recent work, an opto-electrical method of cooling molecules was proposed and realized by Zeppenfeld et al. [282, 632]. Closely related to the idea of single-photon molecular cooling [633], this method combines the techniques of Stark deceleration and laser cooling by applying an electric-field potential that generates substantially different Stark shifts in two molecular states. The energy is removed by letting the molecules climb the field gradient in the state with a bigger Stark shift and return in a state with a smaller Stark shift. The entropy is removed by a cycling transition between the states, involving spontaneous emission. Due to the difference in the Stark shifts, the cycling transition leads to a large Sisyphus effect, with much kinetic energy taken away in each cycle. This allows for cooling using only a few instances of the spontaneous emission, bypassing the population leakage problem mentioned above. Dissipation due to the near-resonant scattering of light can be turned into a useful resource for quantum state preparation [634–637]. Lemeshko and Weimer showed that using engineered dissipation it is possible to generate metastable bonds between atoms or molecules, thereby extending the notion of ‘bonding’ from purely conservative to dissipative forces. The bond arises due to the interaction-dependent coherent population trapping and manifests itself as a stationary state of the scattering dynamics that confines the atoms or molecules at a fixed distance from each other. Remarkably, the dissipative bonding appears possible even for atoms and molecules interacting purely repulsively [638].
VII. CONTROLLED MOLECULAR COLLISIONS
A. Towards ultracold molecules
Using electromagnetic fields to control intermolecular interactions is a long-standing goal in molecular physics. Of particular importance to chemical physics has been the effort directed towards external field control of molecular collisions, whether elastic, inelastic, or chemically reactive. At ambient temperatures, molecules reside in a manifold of internal states and move with a wide range of velocities and angular momenta. It is this wide distribution of accessible internal and motional states, each generally leading to different reaction events, that makes external field control of bi-molecular interactions in a thermal molecular gas extremely difficult, if not impossible. These complications are removed when molecules are cooled to subKelvin temperatures. The experiments on cooling molecules and producing ultracold molecules from ultracold atoms have thus opened another research avenue in molecular physics, exploiting controlled few-molecule dynamics. When cooled to sufficiently low temperatures, molecules can be confined in magnetic, electric or optical traps [32], as described in Section IV. This effectively prepares molecular ensembles in a single (or a small number of) fielddressed states in a non-perturbative regime, where the molecule-field interactions are more significant than the energy of the translational motion. When the first experiment on magnetic trapping of a molecular radical CaH was reported [258], little was known about the interaction properties of molecules in this regime of molecule-field interactions.
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The experiments on cooling molecules – and the promise of marvelous applications described in Ref. [32] – spurred intense research on binary molecular interactions in strong dc fields. Most of this research was motivated by three general questions: Are molecules in a particular field-dressed state stable against collisional interactions? If not all molecules are, which are and which are not? To what extent do external fields affect intermolecular interactions at low temperatures? These questions are particularly relevant for experiments with molecules in dc magnetic or electric traps, because dc fields, by the Earnshaw’s theorem [53, 54], always confine particles in excited Zeeman or Stark levels, leaving an opportunity for molecules to decay to lower energy levels and exit the trap. The figure of merit used to quantify the answer to the first question is the ratio of cross sections for elastic scattering (responsible for translational energy thermalization within a trap) to cross sections summed over all possible inelastic and reactive scattering channels (leading to trap loss). This elastic-to-inelastic ratio, usually denoted by γ, indicates if a molecular ensemble can be cooled in an external field trap (γ > 1000) or not (γ < 100). In a zealous effort to find mechanisms for enhancing γ to large values, multiple theoretical studies explored the possibility for modifying elastic, inelastic, and reactive collisions of molecules by external fields. The pioneering study of Volpi and Bohn [639] showed that Zeeman transitions (or Stark transitions, for that matter) in collisions of ultracold molecules must be suppressed at low external fields. The suppression occurs because any Zeeman or Stark transition in ultracold s-wave collisions must be accompanied by a change of orbital angular momentum for the relative motion of the colliding molecules, which leads to centrifugal barriers in outgoing collision channels. This phenomenon can also be interpreted in terms of the energy dependence of the cross sections for Zeeman or Stark transitions in the limit of zero external field [75]. These results imply that any (chemically non-reactive) molecules, if cooled to a low enough temperature to be trappable in a vanishingly shallow trap, must be stable. This is encouraging because it indicates that any molecules that do not chemically react can be cooled by evaporation in a dc magnetic or electric trap, if the starting temperature of the molecular ensemble is cold enough. However, the problem is that several calculations [80, 640–642] showed that large values of γ can generally be reached only when the trapping fields are so small that the starting temperature must be very low (< 1 µK is a good ballpark limit). As described in Section III , there are several different experimental techniques that can be used to prepare molecules at temperatures about 1 mK. However, bridging the gap between 1 mK and 1µK has proven difficult. A number of authors [75–79, 81, 83, 639, 642–665] researched the dynamics of molecular collisions in this temperature interval in order to understand the prospects for cooling molecules from mK temperatures to ultracold temperatures below 1 µK. Many of the early studies were focussed on the dynamics of molecules in a helium gas [75, 76, 78, 639, 643– 647]. Partially motivated by the successful experiments on magnetic trapping of molecules in a helium buffer gas [81, 258, 262, 263, 666–670], these papers also argued that if collisions with weakly interacting helium atoms are sufficiently strong to destroy trapped samples, evaporative cooling of molecules in the absence of a buffer gas must be impossible. The results predicted that diatomic molecules in Σ electronic states with large rotational constants should be stable in a magnetic traps in the environment of He buffer gas and that molecules in non-Σ electronic states must prefer to undergo inelastic scattering generally leading to low values of γ. While the former prediction was confirmed in a number of experiments [81, 262, 263, 669, 670], the latter was – fortunately! – proven incorrect in a recent startling experiment by Stuhl et al. [671]. As the experiments of Ref. [671] and the theory by Bohn and coworkers [101–105] show, there is a general mechanism that may suppress inelastic collisions of molecules with a Λ-doubled structure placed in superimposed electric and magnetic fields. Combined with large cross sections for elastic scattering [103], this may make the creation of a Bose-Einstein Condensate of Π-state molecules possible! Another possibility for bridging the 1 mK – 1 µK temperature gap is to immerse a gas of molecules into a buffer gas of already ultracold atoms. The calculations by Hutson and coworkers [649, 657, 658] demonstrated that alkalineearth metal atoms, being structureless and therefore weakly interacting, can be used for sympathetic cooling of molecules such as NH. Interestingly, Tscherbul and coworkers [672] have recently found that sympathetic cooling may work even with alkali metal atoms, such as Li, despite their propensity to generate strongly attractive and anisotropic interactions with molecules. This implies that certain molecules, particularly Σ-state open-shell molecules with weak fine-structure interactions, may be generally amenable to sympathetic cooling at T ∼ 1 mK, which was confirmed by preliminary calculations for NH–NH scattering in magnetic field [653]. Following the theoretical work by Zuchowski and Hutson [648], Parazzoli et al. [673] reported an experimental study of the effects of electric fields on low temperature collisions of ND3 molecules with Rb atoms. Unfortunately, the results reveal high probability of inelastic scattering of molecules in the low-field seeking states, indicating that sympathetic cooling of symmetric top molecules in a buffer gas of alkali metal atoms is likely unfeasible. Following the accurate calculation of the global potential energy surface for the NH–NH collision system in the quintet spin state [674], several authors performed quantum scattering calculations for NH–NH collisions in a magnetic field [83, 653]. The results ignoring non-adiabatic couplings to lower spin states of the two-molecule complex suggested that inelastic scattering in collisions of NH molecules must be generally insignificant due to the small magnitude of the spin-spin interaction in the molecule. However, a more refined calculation by Janssen, van der Avoird and Groenenboom [675] indicated that the nonadiabatic couplings may preclude the evaporative cooling. Other, highly promising methods for cooling molecules to
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ultracold temperatures have been recently proposed and demonstrated. For example, the groups of Zoller and Bu¨chler showed that the translational energy of molecules can be removed by coupling the molecular ensemble to a gas of Rydberg atoms and tuning the atom-molecule interactions with external fields [676, 677]. Zeppenfeld and coworkers showed that electrically trapped molecules can be efficiently cooled by a combination of optical and electric field forces [282, 632]. It is thus foreseeable that a great variety of diatomic, and perhaps polyatomic, molecules can be cooled to ultracold temperatures directly from a thermal gas in a near future [678]. At present, the experiments with ultracold molecules are limited to diatomic molecules produced from ultracold atoms. While looking for mechanisms to enhance γ, the theoretical studies have found several mechanisms for controlling molecular interactions at both cold (< 1 K) and ultracold (< 1 mK) temperatures. For example, Tscherbul and coworkers [78, 79, 645] found that the dynamics of magnetic Zeeman relaxation in collisions of 2Σ and 3Σ molecules is very sensitive to external electric fields, which affect the rotational structure and modify the fine-structure interactions inducing spin-changing transitions. Combined electric and magnetic fields can also be used to create molecules near avoided crossings between Zeeman levels arising from rotational states of different symmetry, making them extremely sensitive to small variations of external (magnetic or electric) fields [73, 74]. Molecules in a 2Π electronic state exhibit an interesting dependence of the collision cross sections on the electric field strength, resulting from the shifts of the asymptotic collision channels and other, less understood, phenomena [82]. As pointed out by Bohn and coworkers [101–105], dipole-dipole interactions lead to the appearance of avoided crossings in the interaction potential of the molecule-molecule collision complex. These avoided crossings can be tuned by an external electric field, leading to dramatic changes in the collision dynamics at ultracold temperatures. By changing the internal structure of molecules, external fields induce molecule-molecule scattering resonances [80, 101–104]. Stuhl et al. experimentally studied the avoided crossing in an OH molecule in combined electric and magnetic fields [679] which ultimately allowed to evaporatively cool OH [671]. In a remarkable paper [680], Ticknor showed that two-body scattering properties of dipolar species in the limit of strong dipole-dipole interactions and at ultracold temperatures are universal functions of the dipole moment, mass of the colliding species and collision energy. Bohn, Cavagnero and Ticknor [681] showed that the universality extends to a wider range of energies and studied the deviations from universality, which can provide information about the short-range part of the intermolecular interaction potentials.
B. Towards controlled chemistry
Chemical dynamics of molecules in external fields was first studied in a rigorous quantum calculation by Tscherbul and Krems [645]. Beyond demonstrating the feasibility of such calculations, this work showed that the probabilities for chemically reactive events, just like the cross sections for elastic and inelastic scattering, may be quite sensitive to external electric fields. Controlling chemical interactions of molecules at subKelvin temperatures can be used as a tool to study the role of fine and hyperfine interactions as well as non-adiabatic effects in elementary chemical processes. For example, confining molecules in a magnetic trap leads to co-alignment of their magnetic moments, which restricts the adiabatic interaction between the molecules to the maximum spin state. Since large spin states are usually characterized by significantly repulsive exchange interactions, chemical reactions of spin-aligned molecules are generally very slow, especially at low temperatures [237]. The non-adiabatic interactions may serve to enhance the chemical reactivity by inducing transitions to lower spin states of the reaction complex [675]. Tuning the nonadiabatic interactions with external fields, for example as suggested in Ref. [78], can be used as a tool to quantify the non-adiabatic interactions. Molecular beam technique can serve as a basis to study cold reactive and nonreactive collisions [682]. Van de Meerakker and coworkers studied rotationally inelastic scattering of state-selected and velocity controlled OH molecules with D2 molecules and a wide range of rare-gas atoms [683–688], as well as with state-selected NO molecules [689]. Eyles et al. performed detailed studies of differential cross sections in rotationally inelastic NO–Ar collisions [690]. Strebel et al. studied elastic collisions of a beam of SF6, decelerated using a rotating nozzle, with trapped ultracold Li atoms [691]. Ohoyama and coworkers studied collisions between polyatomic molecules oriented by an electric hexapole with molecules and atoms aligned by a magnetic hexapole [692–694]. The efforts to study cold collisions have long been frustrated by the need to create two slow beams of high enough intensity. An alternative technique, based on merged molecular beams, allows one to study cold collisions between molecules moving fast in the laboratory frame, provided the velocity distribution in the beams is narrow enough. Henson et al. used the merged-beam technique to study the Penning-ionization reaction He∗+H2 → He+H+ 2 at sub-Kelvin temperatures [695]. Scheffield et al. developed a pulsed rotating supersonic source for use with merged molecular beams [696]. Wei et al. discussed the prospects of the merged beam technique in Ref. [697]. Another way to study cold collisions is to confine one or both of the collision partners in a trap. Sawyer et al. studied collisions of trapped OH molecules with supersonic beams of He and D2 [268], and with a velocity selected beam of ND3 [283]. Parazzoli et al. [673] merged separately trapped ND3 molecules and Rb atoms, in order to study
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the electric field effect on the cross sections. In a contribution to this special issue Stuhl et al. studied the effect of an electric field on rotationally inelastic scattering of OH molecules [13]. Ultracold chemistry has become real with the creation of a dense ensemble of ultracold KRb molecules [292, 698]. By measuring the trap loss of KRb molecules, the experiments demonstrated many unique features of chemical reactions in the limit of zero temperature, such as the effect of quantum statistics and external electric fields on chemical encounters [110, 294, 295]. While exciting, ultracold reactions are also detrimental to the progress of experiments aimed at the creation of a quantum degenerate gas of ultracold molecules. The experimental studies were therefore accompanied by many calculations seeking to suppress chemical reactivity of ultracold molecules by external fields [699–707]. One possibility, it was found, is to confine molecules in low dimensions by optical lattices and apply an electric field. Following the pioneering work of Petrov and coworkers [708], the effects of dimensionality on inelastic collisions and chemical reactions was studied by Li and Krems [709]. The results showed that confining molecules in a quasi-2D geometry leads to enhanced values of γ. The work reported in Refs. [110, 294, 295] showed that for polar molecules in a quasi-2D gas this enhancement can be dramatically increased by applying an electric field perpendicular to the plane of confinement. The electric field serves to align the molecules, thereby creating long-range repulsive barriers stimulated by the dipole-dipole interactions. Chemical reactions in such a gas are determined by the rate of tunneling through the long-range barriers [710], which as shown earlier by Bohn and coworkers, is sensitive to external fields. Even more effectively, the long-range repulsive barriers can also be created by dressing molecules with a combination of dc electric and microwave fields [107, 108], and far-off resonant laser fields [95, 109]. As was shown in refs. [106– 108, 711], this technique can be used to create a gas of molecules with repulsive long-range interactions that completely preclude the molecules from penetrating to the region of short-range interactions, which, under appropriate conditions, can lead to the formation of self-assembled dipolar crystals and other interesting many-body effects discussed in the following section. Trapped ions represent a new paradigm in the study of cold chemistry [712–716]. Atomic or molecular ions bombarded by neutral species, coming, for example, from controlled molecular beams, allow for an extremely long interrogation time. This opens the possibility of measuring the reactions of a single ion [717–719] or reactions with very low rates. Since ions are trapped, external field control of molecular beams can be used to study ion-molecule chemistry with high energy resolution, as was attempted in experiments on inelastic collisions of molecules in Stark decelerated beams with trapped atoms [205, 720]. The advantage of using ions is that the charged products of a chemical reaction can also be trapped, which allows one to measure the reaction product state distributions [716]. Chemical dynamics of molecules at ambient temperatures can also, in principle, be controlled by aligning molecules or by preparing molecules in superpositions of different electronic states. Although studying molecular collisions in fields at elevated temperatures is of a substantial interest due to chemical applications [721], quantum mechanical treatment of such collisions is challenging due to a large number of states involved in the dynamics. A quasiclassical trajectory method has been used to elucidate the effect of pendular orientation of DCl on its reaction with H atoms [722] and the effect of an intense infrared laser field on the H+H2 exchange reaction rate [723]. On the other hand, simple analytic models of molecular collisions, essential for understanding the underlying physics, are scarce and mostly limited to the Wigner regime of very low kinetic energy [724]. Lemeshko and Friedrich developed an analytic model of molecular collisions in fields and applied it to the study of the scattering dynamics [84, 725–727] and stereodynamics [728, 729] at thermal collision energies, as well as to multiple scattering of matter waves [730]. The model’s accuracy increases with collision energy; it has no fitting parameters and remains analytic in the presence of external fields.
VIII. CONTROLLING MANY-BODY PHENOMENA
The exquisite control over the internal and motional dynamics of molecules at low temperatures paves the way for creating unique many-body systems with interesting properties [106, 731–734]. For example, several studies, exploiting the analogy with optical shielding of interactions in ultracold atomic gases [735], showed that the dipole-dipole interactions between polar molecules confined in a quasi-2D geometry by an optical lattice and subjected to microwave fields can be made repulsive [106, 107, 731, 736]. This leads to the formation of self-assembled dipolar crystals. Molecular dipolar crystals have been proposed as high-fidelity quantum memory for hybrid quantum computing involving an interface of a solid-state device and trapped molecules [737]. Bu¨chler and coworkers extended this work to show that a suitable combination of microwave and dc electric fields can be used to engineer three-body interactions in a molecular gas [738], which, when trapped on an optical lattice, realizes the Hubbard model with strong three-body interactions. The possibility to form fermonic molecules in an optical lattice and spectroscopy of such a system has been theoretically investigated in refs. [739, 740]. Trapping ultracold non-polar and polar molecules in an optical lattice, recently demonstrated in a number of
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experiments [297–300], is a major step towards quantum simulators of condensed matter models. Several recent papers showed that ultracold molecules confined on an optical lattice can be used to realize a wide range of model many-body Hamiltonians [733, 734, 741–754], including extended Hubbard models with long range interactions [755– 759], a variety of lattice spin models [9, 24, 126, 760–768], and polaron models [769, 770]. Yao et al. proposed a scheme to realize topological flatbands [771] and fractional Chern insulators [772] in dipolar gases; Kestner et al. predicted a topological Haldane liquid phase in a lattice with cold molecules [773]. These studies exploit the rich structure of molecules enabled by the rotational, spin and hyperfine states and the possibility of tuning the couplings between these degrees of freedom as well as the dipole-dipole interactions between molecules by externally applied fields. In many instances, it is possible to apply a combination of dc and microwave fields such that the individual molecules exhibit isolated field-dressed states with particular features identical to those of the spin degrees of freedom in lattice-spin Hamiltonians. The external fields can then be tuned to explore the phase diagram of the many-body system on the lattice. Of particular interest is the possibility of creating quantum phases with topological order [754], resilient vis a vis perturbations preserving the topology. Recently Yan et al. reported the first experimental realization of a spin model with KRb molecules on a 3D optical lattice [774]. A significant focus of research with ultracold atomic gases in the past decade has been on emergent phenomena, such as solitons, rotons, vortices, spin waves, and polarons. Molecules offer new degrees of freedom that can be used to explore new regimes of collective phenomena [124, 125, 756, 759, 775–788]. The possibility of mixing different parity states with moderate electric fields enables new interactions that give rise to unique features of collective dynamics in many-body molecular systems. For example, collective rotational excitations of molecules trapped in an optical lattice can pair up forming Frenkel biexcitons [789], something that cannot occur in natural solid-state systems with inversion symmetry. The ability to control intermolecular interactions can also be used to engineer many-body, nanoscopic systems allowing for controlled energy transport [790], as well as open quantum systems with tunable coupling to the bath [769]. While most of the work mentioned above is focused on polar molecules with tunable dipole-dipole interactions, the many-body behaviour of non-polar molecules can also be controlled by tuning the quadrupole-quadrupole interactions. The peculiar symmetry and broad tunability of the quadrupolequadrupole couplings results in a rich phase diagram featuring unconventional BCS and charge density wave phases, and opens up the prospect to create a topological superfluid [114]. Quadrupolar particles, such as homonuclear molecules or metastable alkaline-earth atoms are currently available in experiments at higher densities compared to polar molecules. The coldest of the currently available molecules, Cs2, can be prepared in optical lattices close to unit filling at temperatures significantly below the photon recoil energy of 30 nK [299, 791].
IX. ENTANGLEMENT OF MOLECULES AND DIPOLE ARRAYS
Applications of the concepts of quantum information theory are usually related to the quantum mechanical effects of superposition, interference, and entanglement [792–795]. For decades, theoretical chemists have encountered and analyzed these quantum effects from the point of view of bonding. Combining results and insights of quantum information science with those of chemical physics may shed new light on the dynamics of the chemical bond. Researchers from the quantum information and chemistry communities are already converging upon several questions. As an example, recent ultrafast experiments on excitonic migration in photosynthetic complexes and polymers have shown long-lived coherences on the order of hundreds of femtoseconds [796]. Since the original proposal by DeMille [797], arrays of ultracold polar molecules have been counted among the most promising platforms for the implementation of a quantum computer [798, 799]. The qubit of such an array is realized by a single dipolar molecule entangled with the rest of the array’s molecules via the dipole-dipole interaction. Polar-molecule arrays appear as scalable to a large number of qubits as neutral-atom arrays do, however the dipoledipole interaction furnished by polar molecules offers a faster entanglement, one resembling that mediated by the Coulomb interaction for ions. At the same time, cold and trapped polar molecules exhibit similar coherence times as those encountered for trapped atoms or ions. The first complete scheme proposed for quantum computing with polar molecules was based on an ensemble of ultracold polar molecules trapped in a one-dimensional optical lattice, combined with an inhomogeneous electrostatic field. Such qubits are individually addressable, due to the Stark shift which is different for each qubit in the inhomogeneous electric field [800]. A subsequent proposal has shown that it should be possible to couple polar molecules into a quantum circuit using superconducting wires [801]. The capacitive, electrodynamic coupling to transmission line resonators was proposed in analogy with coupling to Rydberg atoms and Cooper pair boxes [802]. Compatibility with the microwave circuits is ensured by the frequencies of the transitions between molecular Stark states, which occur typically in the rf range. The coupling of polar molecules to microwave striplines carries along the following advantages: first, it allows for detection
20
of single molecules by remote sensing of transmission line potentials as well as for efficient quantum-state readout; second, the molecules can be further cooled by microwave spontaneous emission into on-chip transmission lines; and finally, the coupling to the strip-line entangles the molecules and thus enables nonlocal operations. Addressability is achieved by local gating with electrostatic fields and single-bit manipulations can be accomplished by using local modulated electric fields. A pure state of a pair of quantum systems is called entangled if it is unfactorizable, as for example, the singlet state of two spin-1/2 particles, a mixed state is entangled if it cannot be represented as a mixture of factorizable pure states [794]. Study of entanglement can be done by calculating the pairwise concurrence [803], which is a good measure of entanglement, for one, two, and three-dimensional arrays of trapped dipoles, mutually coupled by the dipole-dipole interaction and subject to an external electric field. Quantum entanglement can also be studied using trapped polar molecules. Arrays of polar molecules can be prepared in optical lattices with full control over the internal states including the hyperfine structure. Recently, Qi et al. considered using rotational states of polar linear [804, 805] and symmetric-top [806] molecules as qubits and evaluated entanglement of the pendular qubit states for two linear dipoles, characterized by pairwise concurrence, as a function of the molecular dipole moment and rotational constant, strengths of the external field and the dipole-dipole coupling, and ambient temperature. In principle, such weak entanglement can be sufficient for operation of logic gates, provided the resolution is high enough to detect the state shifts unambiguously [804]. In practice, however, for many candidate polar molecules it appears a challenging task to attain adequate resolution. In a subsequent study, the authors considered symmetric top molecules. The latter offer advantages resulting from a first-order Stark effect, which renders the effective dipole moments nearly independent of the field strength. For a particular choice of qubits, the electric dipole interactions become isomorphous with NMR systems for which many techniques enhancing logic gate operations have been developed [807]. Entanglement can be found in strongly interacting atomic and molecular gases, however it is challenging to generate highly entangled states between weakly interacting particles in a scalable way. Based on the work of Lemeshko and Friedrich [95, 109], Herrera et al. [808] recently described a one-step method to generate entanglement between polar molecules in the absence of dc electric fields. They showed that alignment-mediated entanglement in a molecular array is long-lived and discussed applications for quantum information processing and quantum metrology. Manipulating and controlling entanglement for molecules in external fields continue to be of great interest in quantum information and quantum computing. Lee et al. experimentally explored the possibility to use rotational wavepackets created with a short laser pulse for quantum information processing [809] (also see Ref. [810]). Schemes for robust quantum computation with polar molecules and experimental feasibility thereof have been analyzed by Yelin, Kuznetsova, and coauthors [811, 812]. Kuznetsova et al. proposed a platform based on polar molecules and neutral atoms for quantum information processing [813, 814]. They also proposed a scheme for cluster state generation using van der Waals and dipole-dipole interactions between atoms and molecules in an optical lattice [815]. The same group also proposed to use Rydberg atoms to mediate interactions between polar molecules as a tool for creating quantum gates and achieving individual addressability [816]. Mur-Petit et al. discussed the possibility to use trapped molecular ions as a qubit [817], and realize quantum phase gates based on polar molecules coupled to atomic ions [818]. De Vivie-Riedle and coworkers developed schemes for quantum computation with vibrationally excited molecules [819–822].
X. STABILITY OF ATOMIC AND MOLECULAR SYSTEMS IN HIGH-FREQUENCY SUPER-INTENSE LASER FIELDS
Stability of atomic and molecular systems in external electric, magnetic and laser fields is of fundamental importance in atomic and molecular physics and has attracted considerable experimental and theoretical attention over the past decades. It was recently shown that superintense radiation fields of sufficiently high frequency can have large effects on the structure, stability, and ionization of atoms and molecules [823–828]. One of the most intriguing results of Gavrila and coworkers is the possibility to stabilize multiply charged negative ions of hydrogen by superintense laser fields [829]. This kind of stabilization phenomena has not yet been observed experimentally, due to the challenges of preparing and measuring such systems. There are, however, experiments demonstrating light-induced stabilization against photoionization when atoms are initially prepared in a Rydberg state [830]. Recently Eichmann et al. [831] demonstrated the high survival probability of Rydberg atoms in laser fields with intensities above 1015 W/cm2 experimentally, using a direct detection technique. A classical interpretation for the stabilization, which enables an atom to bind many additional electrons, has been given by Vorobeichik et al. [832]. They showed that for a sufficiently large value of the parameter α0 = E0/ω2, where E0 and ω are the amplitude and frequency of the laser field, the frequency associated with the motion of the particle in the time-averaged potential, V0, is much smaller than the laser frequency and therefore the mean-field approach is applicable. Moiseyev and Cederbaum have shown that the stabilization effect takes place at increasing field strengths
21
when, first, the photoionization rate decreases, and, second, the electron correlation and hence autoionization is suppressed [833]. For one-electron systems, Pont et al. [834] have shown that by increasing α0, the electronic eigenfunctions of the “dressed” potential of an atom in high-intensity laser field and the corresponding charge densities are split into two lobes, localized around the end points of the nuclear charge, which is smeared along a line. This phenomenon has been termed a dichotomy of the atom [834]. A system of N electrons and one nucleus with charge Z placed in a monochromatic laser field E(t) = E0(e1 cosωt+ e2 tanδsinωt) can be described within the high-frequency Floquet theory by the following Schr¨odinger equation [824]:
N X i=1
 
1 2
P2 i + V0(ri,α0) +
i−1 X j=1
1 |ri −rj|
 Φ = ǫ(α0)Φ (13)
where the “dressed” Coulomb potential is given by V0(r,α0) = − Z 2π R2π 0
dξ |r+α(ξ/ω)|, with α(t) = E(t)/(meω2). This equation can be solved self-consistently in order to obtain the ground state energy and wave function of the system and find the critical value of α0 for binding N electrons [835]. As long as ǫ(N)(α0) > ǫ(N−1)(α0), one of the electrons on the N-electron ion auto-detaches. This is always the case for multiply-charged negative ions in the absence of laser fields, therefore negative ions carrying the charge of −2 or more are usually unstable [836, 837]. In order to determine the conditions for the stability of an multiply charged negative ions, one can use the condition D(N)(α0) = ǫ(N−1)(α0)−ǫ(N)(α0) = 0. This gives the critical value of α0 = ˜ α0. For values of α0 greater than the ˜ α0, there is no auto-detachment, and the N-electron multiply charged negative ion supports a bound state. Using finite size scaling method with elliptical basis functions, Wei and coworkers calculated all the critical parameters needed for stability of H− , H−−, He− , and He−− atomic anions [838–840]. The solutions of Eq. (13) provide information on the properties of atomic systems in the presence of an intense laser field. For experimental implementations, it is necessary to consider the dynamical evolution of the system as the laser field is applied [841]. The dynamical information can be obtained by solving the time-dependent Schr¨odinger equation, as was done numerically to explore the dynamical stabilization of the ground state hydrogen atom in superintense laser pulses [842]. In order to explore the dynamics of ion stability, one can use frequency-dependent potentials to describe the laser-driven atomic and molecular systems. Unlike the High-Frequency Floquet theory, where the dressed potential depends on the characteristic parameter α0 = √I/ω2, given by the ratio of the field intensity and frequency, this approach provides a time averaged potential that depends explicitly on both I and ω. It was shown that this potential provides a more accurate description than the dressed potential V0 [843], yielding a modified equation
N X i=1
 
1 2
P2 i + V0(ri,α0(t)) +
1 2ω2 X n6=0
fnfn−1 n2
+
i−1 X j=1
1 |ri −rj|
 Φ(t) = ǫ(α0,ω)Φ(t) (14)
where V0 = − Z 2π Rπ −π
dξ |r+α(t+ξ/ω)|, fn(r,t) = −∂Vn ∂z , and Vn = − Z 2π Rπ −π
e−inξdξ |r+α(t+ξ/ω)|. The wave functions and eigenvalues as a function of α0(t) can be obtained numerically by time-dependent self-consistent field methods. It was shown that for the laser frequency ω = 5 eV, the laser intensity needed for stabilization is I = 9·1015 W/cm2 and the maximal detachment energy is 1.0 eV [843]. This analysis can be extended to complex atoms and molecules using the dimensional scaling theory [844], which provides a natural means to examine electron localization in super-intense laser fields. In the large-dimension limit, D → ∞, in a suitably scaled space, electrons become fixed along the direction of the polarized laser filed. Because of the symmetry of polarization, it is convenient to work with cylindrical coordinates in D-dimensions. Herschbach and coworkers [844, 845] have shown how to generalize the Schr¨odinger equation for a few elections to D-dimensions using cylindrical coordinates. The method is general and provides a systematic procedure to construct large-D limit effective Hamiltonians that are internally modified to reflect major finite-D effects [846–848]. These functions are obtained by scaling the kinetic terms represented by generalized centrifugal potentials in the D → ∞ limit. As applied to atoms and molecules, it was generalized to N-electron systems in a superintense laser field [839, 840, 849]. Results on the stability using the dimensional scaling are remarkably close to the three-dimensional results from both non-relativistic [839, 840] and relativistic [849] calculations. The dimensional scaling theory can also be used to examine the effect of superintense laser fields on the binding energy of molecules, in particular, diatomic molecules [850–853]. Results obtained from dimensional scaling with the high-frequency Floquet theory were used to evaluate the stability of simple diatomic molecules in the gas phase, such as H+ 2 , H2 He2, and H− 2 in superintense laser fields [840]. The large-D limit provides a simple model that captures the main physics of the problem, which imposes electron localization along the polarization direction of the laser
22
field. This localization markedly reduces the ionization probability and can enhance chemical bonding when the laser strength becomes sufficiently strong. The lack of experimental evidence for suppression of ionization in a high-frequency superintense laser field looms in marked contrast with the abundance of theoretical work affirming and elucidating stabilization. We expect that the dimensional scaling method will aid the search to identify molecular systems amenable to experimental observation of stabilization.
XI. OUTLOOK
Molecules, coming in a great variety of forms, offer a great platform for fundamental and applied research. New breakthroughs are expected if complete control is achieved over the rotational, fine-structure, hyperfine, and translational degrees of freedom of molecules. As this article illustrates, tremendous progress has already been made towards this goal. However, there are still challenges that must be met. Cooling molecules to ultracold temperatures, required to harness the translational motion, remains the greatest challenge. As of now, there is still no general technique for the production of molecules at ultracold temperatures and the experiments with ultracold molecules are mostly limited to alkali metal dimers. Achieving high-density samples of cold polyatomic molecules still represents a challenge for current experiments. It is not clear whether quantum degenerate gases of complex molecules will be stable. When cooled to ultracold temperatures, molecules can be loaded onto optical lattices. If done with high fidelity, this will produce ideal systems for quantum simulation and scalable quantum information processing. Trapped polar molecules are particularly interesting due to long-range interactions that couple long-lived molecular states. In order to exploit these systems for quantum simulation and quantum computing, it is necessary to develop methods for addressing molecules at individual lattice sites. In addition, it is necessary to develop robust global entanglement measures relevant to these experiments, which remains an interesting open problem. In order to realize a variety of many-body Hamiltonians, one needs to develop versatile techniques to manipulate the strength and symmetry of twoand many-body interactions between ultracold molecules using static and radiative fields. Preparing molecules in a single internal quantum state, particularly a state with high angular momentum, remains a great challenge. This limits the studies exploring the effects of internal degrees of freedom and molecular orientation or alignment on chemical dynamics. This also limits the possibility of using molecular gases for sensitive mapping of electromagnetic fields. The experimental work with molecules in electromagnetic fields requires the development of adequate theory. Rigorous quantum calculations of collision cross sections for molecules in external fields are highly demanding and, at present, can only be performed for collisions at low translational energies. Quantum theory of reactive scattering in external fields is a notoriously difficult problem due to the large number of states that need to be taken into account. Theoretical simulations of experiments at ultracold temperatures are impeded by the lack of numerical methods to produce intermolecular potentials with sufficient accuracy. It is necessary to develop approaches for inverting the scattering problem in order to fit intermolecular potentials, with sufficient accuracy, using the experimentally observed scattering properties of ultracold molecules. Superintense laser fields of sufficiently high frequency might have significant effects on the structure, stability, ionization and dissociation of molecules. Of particular interest is the possibility of using these effects for laser-induced formation of exotic atomic and molecular systems, such as chemically bound He dimers. This direction of research might open up a new field of engineering artificial atomic and molecular systems. However, there is a great need for an experimental evidence of suppression of ionization in high-frequency superintense laser fields. In order to use molecules for practical applications, such as quantum computing, it is desirable to integrate molecular systems with solid-state devices. Such hybrid devices have been considered in a number of publications, however their implementation remains an extremely difficult task. In general, the effects of dissipation on the dynamics of molecules are not well understood. While it is now possible to engineer open quantum systems with controlled coupling to the environment, the possibility of using controlled dissipation as a useful resource for engineering coherent molecular states is yet to be investigated.
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XII. ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS
We are grateful to (in alphabetical order) Rick Bethlem, Hans Peter Bu¨chler, Wes Campbell, Lincoln Carr, Lorenz Cederbaum, Daniel Comparat, Bretislav Friedrich, Rosario Gonz´alez F´erez, Alexey Gorshkov, Gerrit Groenenboom, Kaden Hazzard, Dudley Herschbach, Steven Hoekstra, Emil Kirilov, Christiane Koch, Jochen Ku¨pper, J¨orn Manz, Bas van de Meerakker, Gerard Meijer, Valery Milner, Robert Moszynski, Hanns-Christoph Na¨gerl, Ed Narevicius, Andreas Osterwalder, Guido Pupillo, Ana Maria Rey, Peter Reynolds, Hirofumi Sakai, Peter Schmelcher, Burkhard Schmidt, Melanie Schnell, Evgeny Shapiro, Alkwin Slenczka, Tim Softley, Henrik Stapelfeldt, Frank Stienkemeier, Steven Stolte, William Stwalley, Michael Tarbutt, Peter Toennies, Nicolas Vanhaecke, Michael Wall, Hendrik Weimer, Stefan Willitsch, Jun Ye, and Martin Zeppenfeld for comments on the manuscript. This work was supported by NSF through a grant for the Institute for Theoretical Atomic, Molecular, and Optical Physics at Harvard University and Smithsonian Astrophysical Observatory, a grant to the NSF CCI center “Quantum Information for Quantum Chemistry”, and by NSERC of Canada. M.L. and R.V.K. thank KITP for hospitality.
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Averbukh and Prior [624, 625] proposed an alternative method for laser cooling of molecules by an optical shaker – a standing wave of far-off-resonant light that exhibits sudden phase jumps, whose value is controlled by the feedback loop. In such a way the cooling scheme combines the principles of Sisyphus [626] and stochastic [627] cooling. Vilensky et al. proposed to use a bistable optical cavity for a Sisyphus-type cooling, where the cavity undergoes sudden transitions between two energy states [628]. These proposals are currently awaiting experimental realization. Optical pumping is routinely used to prepare atoms in a particular quantum state. Extending this technique to molecules is impeded by the same problem of multi-level structure that has haunted the development of laser cooling of molecules. Only recently, it was shown that diatomic molecules can be cooled, vibrationally and rotationally, to the ground rovibrational level using optical pumping [629–631]. These experiments exploit broadband lasers, generating femtosecond pulses shaped to remove the frequency band that would excite the ground state. Without this frequency, the laser pulses redistribute the population leading to efficient accumulation of population in the ground state. In a remarkable recent work, an opto-electrical method of cooling molecules was proposed and realized by Zeppenfeld et al. [282, 632]. Closely related to the idea of single-photon molecular cooling [633], this method combines the techniques of Stark deceleration and laser cooling by applying an electric-field potential that generates substantially different Stark shifts in two molecular states. The energy is removed by letting the molecules climb the field gradient in the state with a bigger Stark shift and return in a state with a smaller Stark shift. The entropy is removed by a cycling transition between the states, involving spontaneous emission. Due to the difference in the Stark shifts, the cycling transition leads to a large Sisyphus effect, with much kinetic energy taken away in each cycle. This allows for cooling using only a few instances of the spontaneous emission, bypassing the population leakage problem mentioned above. Dissipation due to the near-resonant scattering of light can be turned into a useful resource for quantum state preparation [634–637]. Lemeshko and Weimer showed that using engineered dissipation it is possible to generate metastable bonds between atoms or molecules, thereby extending the notion of ‘bonding’ from purely conservative to dissipative forces. The bond arises due to the interaction-dependent coherent population trapping and manifests itself as a stationary state of the scattering dynamics that confines the atoms or molecules at a fixed distance from each other. Remarkably, the dissipative bonding appears possible even for atoms and molecules interacting purely repulsively [638]. VII. CONTROLLED MOLECULAR COLLISIONS A. Towards ultracold molecules Using electromagnetic fields to control intermolecular interactions is a long-standing goal in molecular physics. Of particular importance to chemical physics has been the effort directed towards external field control of molecular collisions, whether elastic, inelastic, or chemically reactive. At ambient temperatures, molecules reside in a manifold of internal states and move with a wide range of velocities and angular momenta. It is this wide distribution of accessible internal and motional states, each generally leading to different reaction events, that makes external field control of bi-molecular interactions in a thermal molecular gas extremely difficult, if not impossible. These complications are removed when molecules are cooled to subKelvin temperatures. The experiments on cooling molecules and producing ultracold molecules from ultracold atoms have thus opened another research avenue in molecular physics, exploiting controlled few-molecule dynamics. When cooled to sufficiently low temperatures, molecules can be confined in magnetic, electric or optical traps [32], as described in Section IV. This effectively prepares molecular ensembles in a single (or a small number of) fielddressed states in a non-perturbative regime, where the molecule-field interactions are more significant than the energy of the translational motion. When the first experiment on magnetic trapping of a molecular radical CaH was reported [258], little was known about the interaction properties of molecules in this regime of molecule-field interactions. 16 The experiments on cooling molecules – and the promise of marvelous applications described in Ref. [32] – spurred intense research on binary molecular interactions in strong dc fields. Most of this research was motivated by three general questions: Are molecules in a particular field-dressed state stable against collisional interactionsborisblog26borisblog27borisblog29.pngborisblog28borisblog30

AFGANISTAN

Afghanistan – Wikipedia

Afghanistan Listeni/æfˈɡænstæn/ (Pashto/Dari: افغانستان, Afġānistān), officially the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan, is a landlocked country located within South Asia and Central Asia.[9][10] It has a population of approximately 32 million, making it the 42nd most populous country in the world. It is bordered by Pakistan in the south and east; Iran in the west; Turkmenistan, Uzbekistan, and Tajikistan in the north; and China in the far northeast. Its territory covers 652,000 km2 (252,000 sq mi), making it the 41st largest country in the world.

Human habitation in Afghanistan dates back to the Middle Paleolithic Era, and the country’s strategic location along the Silk Road connected it to the cultures of the Middle East and other parts of Asia. Through the ages the land has been home to various peoples and witnessed numerous military campaigns; notably by Alexander the Great, Mauryas, Muslim Arabs, Mongols, British, Soviet, and in the modern-era by Western powers. The land also served as the source from which the Kushans, Hephthalites, Samanids, Saffarids, Ghaznavids, Ghorids, Khiljis, Mughals, Hotaks, Durranis, and others have risen to form major empires.[11]

The political history of the modern state of Afghanistan began with the Hotak and Durrani dynasties in the 18th century. In the late 19th century, Afghanistan became a buffer state in the “Great Game” between British India and the Russian Empire. Following the Third Anglo-Afghan War in 1919, King Amanullah unsuccessfully attempted to modernize the country. It remained peaceful during Zahir Shah‘s forty years of monarchy. A series of coups in the 1970s was followed by a series of civil wars that devastated much of Afghanistan and continues to this day.

Etymology

Main article: Name of Afghanistan

The name Afghānistān (Pashto |افغانستان) is believed to be as old as the ethnonym Afghan, which is documented in the 10th-century geography book Hudud ul-‘alam. The root name “Afghan” was used historically in reference to a member of the ethnic Pashtuns, and the suffix-stan” means “place of” in Persian. Therefore, Afghanistan translates to land of the Afghans or, more specifically in a historical sense, to land of the Pashtuns. However, the modern Constitution of Afghanistan states that “[t]he word Afghan shall apply to every citizen of Afghanistan.”[12]

History

Excavations of prehistoric sites by Louis Dupree and others suggest that humans were living in what is now Afghanistan at least 50,000 years ago, and that farming communities in the area were among the earliest in the world. An important site of early historical activities, many believe that Afghanistan compares to Egypt in terms of the historical value of its archaeological sites.[13][14]

The country sits at a unique nexus point where numerous civilizations have interacted and often fought. It has been home to various peoples through the ages, among them the ancient Iranian peoples who established the dominant role of Indo-Iranian languages in the region. At multiple points, the land has been incorporated within large regional empires, among them the Achaemenid Empire, the Macedonian Empire, the Indian Maurya Empire, and the Islamic Empire.[15]

Many empires and kingdoms have also risen to power in Afghanistan, such as the Greco-Bactrians, Kushans, Hephthalites, Kabul Shahis, Saffarids, Samanids, Ghaznavids, Ghurids, Khiljis, Kartids, Timurids, Mughals, and finally the Hotak and Durrani dynasties that marked the political origins of the modern state.[16]

Pre-Islamic period

Bilingual (Greek and Aramaic) edict by Emperor Ashoka from the 3rd century BCE discovered in the southern city of Kandahar

Archaeological exploration done in the 20th century suggests that the geographical area of Afghanistan has been closely connected by culture and trade with its neighbors to the east, west, and north. Artifacts typical of the Paleolithic, Mesolithic, Neolithic, Bronze, and Iron ages have been found in Afghanistan. Urban civilization is believed to have begun as early as 3000 BCE, and the early city of Mundigak (near Kandahar in the south of the country) may have been a colony of the nearby Indus Valley Civilization. More recent findings established that the Indus Valley Civilisation stretched up towards modern-day Afghanistan, making the ancient civilisation today part of Pakistan, Afghanistan and India. In more detail, it extended from what today is northwest Pakistan to northwest India and northeast Afghanistan. An Indus Valley site has been found on the Oxus River at Shortugai in northern Afghanistan.[17][18] There are several smaller IVC colonies to be found in Afghanistan as well.

One of the Buddhas of Bamiyan. Buddhism was widespread before the Islamic conquest of Afghanistan.

After 2000 BCE, successive waves of semi-nomadic people from Central Asia began moving south into Afghanistan; among them were many Indo-European-speaking Indo-Iranians. These tribes later migrated further into South Asia, Western Asia, and toward Europe via the area north of the Caspian Sea. The region at the time was referred to as Ariana.[13][19][20]

The religion Zoroastrianism is believed by some to have originated in what is now Afghanistan between 1800 and 800 BCE, as its founder Zoroaster is thought to have lived and died in Balkh. Ancient Eastern Iranian languages may have been spoken in the region around the time of the rise of Zoroastrianism. By the middle of the 6th century BCE, the Achaemenids overthrew the Medes and incorporated Arachosia, Aria, and Bactria within its eastern boundaries. An inscription on the tombstone of Darius I of Persia mentions the Kabul Valley in a list of the 29 countries that he had conquered.[21]

Alexander the Great and his Macedonian forces arrived to Afghanistan in 330 BCE after defeating Darius III of Persia a year earlier in the Battle of Gaugamela. Following Alexander’s brief occupation, the successor state of the Seleucid Empire controlled the region until 305 BCE, when they gave much of it to the Maurya Empire as part of an alliance treaty. The Mauryans controlled the area south of the Hindu Kush until they were overthrown in about 185 BCE. Their decline began 60 years after Ashoka‘s rule ended, leading to the Hellenistic reconquest by the Greco-Bactrians. Much of it soon broke away from them and became part of the Indo-Greek Kingdom. They were defeated and expelled by the Indo-Scythians in the late 2nd century BCE.[22][23]

During the first century BCE, the Parthian Empire subjugated the region, but lost it to their Indo-Parthian vassals. In the mid-to-late first century CE the vast Kushan Empire, centered in Afghanistan, became great patrons of Buddhist culture, making Buddhism flourish throughout the region. The Kushans were overthrown by the Sassanids in the 3rd century CE, though the Indo-Sassanids continued to rule at least parts of the region. They were followed by the Kidarite who, in turn, were replaced by the Hephthalites. By the 6th century CE, the successors to the Kushans and Hepthalites established a small dynasty called Kabul Shahi. Much of the northeastern and southern areas of the country remained dominated by Buddhist culture.[24]

Islamization and Mongol invasion

The Friday Mosque of Herat is one of the oldest mosques in Afghanistan. (March 1962 photo)

Arab Muslims brought Islam to Herat and Zaranj in 642 CE and began spreading eastward; some of the native inhabitants they encountered accepted it while others revolted. The land was collectively recognized by the Arabs as al-Hind due to its cultural connection with Greater India. Before Islam was introduced, people of the region were mostly Buddhists and Zoroastrians, but there were also Surya and Nana worshipers, Jews, and others. The Zunbils and Kabul Shahi were first conquered in 870 CE by the Saffarid Muslims of Zaranj. Later, the Samanids extended their Islamic influence south of the Hindu Kush. It is reported that Muslims and non-Muslims still lived side by side in Kabul before the Ghaznavids rose to power in the 10th century.[25][26][27]

By the 11th century, Mahmud of Ghazni defeated the remaining Hindu rulers and effectively Islamized the wider region, with the exception of Kafiristan. Afghanistan became one of the main centers in the Muslim world during this Islamic Golden Age. The Ghaznavid dynasty was overthrown by the Ghurids, who expanded and advanced the already powerful Islamic empire.

In 1219 AD, Genghis Khan and his Mongol army overran the region. His troops are said to have annihilated the Khorasanian cities of Herat and Balkh as well as Bamyan.[28] The destruction caused by the Mongols forced many locals to return to an agrarian rural society.[29] Mongol rule continued with the Ilkhanate in the northwest while the Khilji dynasty administered the Afghan tribal areas south of the Hindu Kush until the invasion of Timur, who established the Timurid Empire in 1370.

In the early 16th century, Babur arrived from Fergana and captured Kabul from the Arghun dynasty. In 1526, he invaded Delhi in India to replace the Lodi dynasty with the Mughal Empire. Between the 16th and 18th century, the Khanate of Bukhara, Safavids, and Mughals ruled parts of the territory. Before the 19th century, the northwestern area of Afghanistan was referred to by the regional name Khorasan. Two of the four capitals of Khorasan (Herat and Balkh) are now located in Afghanistan, while the regions of Kandahar, Zabulistan, Ghazni, Kabulistan, and Afghanistan formed the frontier between Khorasan and Hindustan.[30][31][32]

Hotak dynasty and Durrani Empire

Main articles: Hotak dynasty and Durrani Empire

In 1709, Mirwais Hotak, a local Ghilzai tribal leader, successfully rebelled against the Safavids. He defeated Gurgin Khan and made Afghanistan independent.[33] Mirwais died of a natural cause in 1715 and was succeeded by his brother Abdul Aziz, who was soon killed by Mirwais’ son Mahmud for treason. Mahmud led the Afghan army in 1722 to the Persian capital of Isfahan, captured the city after the Battle of Gulnabad and proclaimed himself King of Persia.[33] The Afghan dynasty was ousted from Persia by Nader Shah after the 1729 Battle of Damghan.

In 1738, Nader Shah and his forces captured Kandahar, the last Hotak stronghold, from Shah Hussain Hotak, at which point the incarcerated 16-year-old Ahmad Shah Durrani was freed and made the commander of an Afghan regiment. Soon after the Persian and Afghan forces invaded India. By 1747, the Afghans chose Durrani as their head of state.[34] Durrani and his Afghan army conquered much of present-day Afghanistan, Pakistan, the Khorasan and Kohistan provinces of Iran, and Delhi in India.[35] He defeated the Indian Maratha Empire, and one of his biggest victories was the 1761 Battle of Panipat.

In October 1772, Durrani died of a natural cause and was buried at a site now adjacent to the Shrine of the Cloak in Kandahar. He was succeeded by his son, Timur Shah, who transferred the capital of Afghanistan from Kandahar to Kabul in 1776. After Timur’s death in 1793, the Durrani throne passed down to his son Zaman Shah, followed by Mahmud Shah, Shuja Shah and others.[36]

The Afghan Empire was under threat in the early 19th century by the Persians in the west and the Sikh Empire in the east. Fateh Khan, leader of the Barakzai tribe, had installed 21 of his brothers in positions of power throughout the empire. After his death, they rebelled and divided up the provinces of the empire between themselves. During this turbulent period, Afghanistan had many temporary rulers until Dost Mohammad Khan declared himself emir in 1826.[37] The Punjab region was lost to Ranjit Singh, who invaded Khyber Pakhtunkhwa and in 1834 captured the city of Peshawar.[38] In 1837, during the Battle of Jamrud near the Khyber Pass, Akbar Khan and the Afghan army failed to capture the Jamrud fort from the Sikh Khalsa Army, but killed Sikh Commander Hari Singh Nalwa, thus ending the Afghan-Sikh Wars. By this time the British were advancing from the east and the first major conflict during the “Great Game” was initiated.[39]

Western influence

British and allied forces at Kandahar after the 1880 Battle of Kandahar, during the Second Anglo-Afghan War. The large defensive wall around the city was removed in the early 1930s by the order of King Nadir.

In 1838, the British marched into Afghanistan and arrested Dost Mohammad, sent him into exile in India and replaced him with the previous ruler, Shah Shuja.[40][41] Following an uprising, the 1842 retreat from Kabul of British-Indian forces, and the Battle of Kabul that led to its recapture, the British placed Dost Mohammad Khan back into power and withdrew their military forces from Afghanistan. In 1878, the Second Anglo-Afghan War was fought over perceived Russian influence, Abdur Rahman Khan replaced Ayub Khan, and Britain gained controlled Afghanistan’s foreign relations as part of the Treaty of Gandamak of 1879. In 1893, Mortimer Durand made Amir Abdur Rahman Khan sign a controversial agreement in which the ethnic Pashtun and Baloch territories were divided by the Durand Line. This was a standard divide and rule policy of the British and would lead to strained relations, especially with the later new state of Pakistan.

Zahir Shah, the last king of Afghanistan, who reigned from 1933 to 1973.

After the Third Anglo-Afghan War and the signing of the Treaty of Rawalpindi on 19 August 1919, King Amanullah Khan declared Afghanistan a sovereign and fully independent state. He moved to end his country’s traditional isolation by establishing diplomatic relations with the international community and, following a 1927–28 tour of Europe and Turkey, introduced several reforms intended to modernize his nation. A key force behind these reforms was Mahmud Tarzi, an ardent supporter of the education of women. He fought for Article 68 of Afghanistan’s 1923 constitution, which made elementary education compulsory. The institution of slavery was abolished in 1923.[42]

Some of the reforms that were actually put in place, such as the abolition of the traditional burqa for women and the opening of a number of co-educational schools, quickly alienated many tribal and religious leaders. Faced with overwhelming armed opposition, Amanullah Khan was forced to abdicate in January 1929 after Kabul fell to rebel forces led by Habibullah Kalakani. Prince Mohammed Nadir Shah, Amanullah’s cousin, in turn defeated and killed Kalakani in November 1929, and was declared King Nadir Shah. He abandoned the reforms of Amanullah Khan in favor of a more gradual approach to modernisation but was assassinated in 1933 by Abdul Khaliq, a Hazara school student.

Mohammed Zahir Shah, Nadir Shah’s 19-year-old son, succeeded to the throne and reigned from 1933 to 1973. Until 1946, Zahir Shah ruled with the assistance of his uncle, who held the post of Prime Minister and continued the policies of Nadir Shah. Another of Zahir Shah’s uncles, Shah Mahmud Khan, became Prime Minister in 1946 and began an experiment allowing greater political freedom, but reversed the policy when it went further than he expected. He was replaced in 1953 by Mohammed Daoud Khan, the king’s cousin and brother-in-law. Daoud Khan sought a closer relationship with the Soviet Union and a more distant one towards Pakistan. Afghanistan remained neutral and was neither a participant in World War II nor aligned with either power bloc in the Cold War. However, it was a beneficiary of the latter rivalry as both the Soviet Union and the United States vied for influence by building Afghanistan’s main highways, airports, and other vital infrastructure. On per capita basis, Afghanistan received more Soviet development aid than any other country. In 1973, while King Zahir Shah was on an official overseas visit, Daoud Khan launched a bloodless coup and became the first President of Afghanistan. In the meantime, Zulfikar Ali Bhutto got neighboring Pakistan involved in Afghanistan. Some experts suggest that Bhutto paved the way for the April 1978 Saur Revolution.[43]

Marxist revolution and Soviet war

Outside the Arg Presidential Palace in Kabul, a day after the April 1978 Marxist revolution in which President Daoud Khan was assassinated along with his entire family.

In April 1978, the communist People’s Democratic Party of Afghanistan (PDPA) seized power in Afghanistan in the Saur Revolution. Within months, opponents of the communist government launched an uprising in eastern Afghanistan that quickly expanded into a civil war waged by guerrilla mujahideen against government forces countrywide. The Pakistani government provided these rebels with covert training centers, while the Soviet Union sent thousands of military advisers to support the PDPA government.[44] Meanwhile, increasing friction between the competing factions of the PDPA — the dominant Khalq and the more moderate Parcham — resulted in the dismissal of Parchami cabinet members and the arrest of Parchami military officers under the pretext of a Parchami coup.

In September 1979, Nur Muhammad Taraki was assassinated in a coup within the PDPA orchestrated by fellow Khalq member Hafizullah Amin, who assumed the presidency. Distrusted by the Soviets, Amin was assassinated by Soviet special forces in December 1979. A Soviet-organized government, led by Parcham’s Babrak Karmal but inclusive of both factions, filled the vacuum. Soviet troops were deployed to stabilize Afghanistan under Karmal in more substantial numbers, although the Soviet government did not expect to do most of the fighting in Afghanistan. As a result, however, the Soviets were now directly involved in what had been a domestic war in Afghanistan.[45] The PDPA prohibited usury, declared equality of the sexes,[46] and introduced women to political life.[46]

The United States had been supporting anti-Soviet Afghan mujahideen and foreign “Afghan Arab” fighters through Pakistan’s ISI as early as mid-1979 (see CIA activities in Afghanistan).[47] Billions in cash and weapons, which included over two thousand FIM-92 Stinger surface-to-air missiles, were provided by the United States and Saudi Arabia to Pakistan.[48][49]

During the Soviet war in Afghanistan, Soviet forces and their proxies committed a genocide against the Afghan people and killed up to 2 million Afghans,[50][51][52][53][54][55][56] and also displaced about 6 million people who subsequently fled Afghanistan, mainly to Pakistan and Iran.[57] Pakistan’s North-West Frontier Province functioned as an organisational and networking base for the anti-Soviet Afghan resistance, with the province’s influential Deobandi ulama playing a major supporting role in promoting the ‘jihad’.[58] Faced with mounting international pressure and numerous casualties, the Soviets withdrew in 1989 but continued to support Afghan President Mohammad Najibullah until 1992.[59]

Civil war

From 1989 until 1992, Najibullah’s government tried to solve the ongoing civil war with economic and military aid, but without Soviet troops on the ground. Pakistan’s spy agency (ISI), headed by Hamid Gul at the time, was interested in a trans-national Islamic revolution which would cover Pakistan, Afghanistan and Central Asia. For this purpose Pakistan masterminded an attack on Jalalabad for the Mujahideen to establish their own government in Afghanistan.[60] Najibullah tried to build support for his government by portraying his government as Islamic, and in the 1990 constitution the country officially became an Islamic state and all references of communism were removed. Nevertheless, Najibullah did not win any significant support, and with the dissolution of the Soviet Union in December 1991, he was left without foreign aid. This, coupled with the internal collapse of his government, led to his ousting from power in April 1992. After the fall of Najibullah’s government in 1992, the post-communist Islamic State of Afghanistan was established by the Peshawar Accord, a peace and power-sharing agreement under which all the Afghan parties were united in April 1992, except for the Pakistani supported Hezb-e Islami of Gulbuddin Hekmatyar. Hekmatyar started a bombardment campaign against the capital city Kabul, which marked the beginning of a new phase in the war.[61]

Saudi Arabia and Iran supported different Afghan militias[62][63][64] and instability quickly developed.[65] The conflict between the two militias soon escalated into a full-scale war.

A section of Kabul during the civil war in 1993

Due to the sudden initiation of the war, working government departments, police units, and a system of justice and accountability for the newly created Islamic State of Afghanistan did not have time to form. Atrocities were committed by individuals of the different armed factions while Kabul descended into lawlessness and chaos.[63][66] Because of the chaos, some leaders increasingly had only nominal control over their (sub-)commanders.[67] For civilians there was little security from murder, rape, and extortion.[67] An estimated 25,000 people died during the most intense period of bombardment by Hekmatyar’s Hezb-i Islami and the Junbish-i Milli forces of Abdul Rashid Dostum, who had created an alliance with Hekmatyar in 1994.[66] Half a million people fled Afghanistan.[67]

Southern and eastern Afghanistan were under the control of local commanders such as Gul Agha Sherzai and others. In 1994, the Taliban (a movement originating from Jamiat Ulema-e-Islam-run religious schools for Afghan refugees in Pakistan) also developed in Afghanistan as a political-religious force.[68] The Taliban first took control of southern Afghanistan in 1994 and forced the surrender of dozens of local Pashtun leaders.[67]

In late 1994, forces of Ahmad Shah Massoud held on to Kabul.[69] Rabbani’s government took steps to reopen courts, restore law and order, and initiate a nationwide political process with the goal of national consolidation and democratic elections. Massoud invited Taliban leaders to join the process but they refused.[70]

Taliban Emirate and Northern Alliance

Map of the situation in Afghanistan in late 1996; Massoud (red), Dostum (green) and Taliban (yellow) territories.

The Taliban’s early victories in late 1994 were followed by a series of defeats that resulted in heavy losses. The Taliban attempted to capture Kabul in early 1995 but were repelled by forces under Massoud. In September 1996, as the Taliban, with military support from Pakistan[71] and financial support from Saudi Arabia, prepared for another major offensive, Massoud ordered a full retreat from Kabul.[72] The Taliban seized Kabul in the same month and established the Islamic Emirate of Afghanistan. They imposed a strict form of Sharia, similar to that found in Saudi Arabia. According to Physicians for Human Rights (PHR), “no other regime in the world has methodically and violently forced half of its population into virtual house arrest, prohibiting them on pain of physical punishment from showing their faces, seeking medical care without a male escort, or attending school”[73] (this statement, though, was made in 1998, long before the advent of ISIS which has imposed even tougher and more violent sharia controls).

After the fall of Kabul to the Taliban, Massoud and Dostum formed the Northern Alliance. The Taliban defeated Dostum’s forces during the Battles of Mazar-i-Sharif (1997–98). Pakistan’s Chief of Army Staff, Pervez Musharraf, began sending thousands of Pakistanis to help the Taliban defeat the Northern Alliance.[70][71][74][75][76][77] From 1996 to 2001, the al-Qaeda network of Osama bin Laden and Ayman al-Zawahiri was also operating inside Afghanistan.[78] This and the fact that around one million Afghans were internally displaced made the United States worry.[74][79] From 1990 to September 2001, around 400,000 Afghans died in the internal mini-wars.[80]

On 9 September 2001, Massoud was assassinated by two Arab suicide attackers in Panjshir province of Afghanistan. Two days later, the September 11 attacks were carried out in the United States. The US government suspected Osama bin Laden as the perpetrator of the attacks, and demanded that the Taliban hand him over.[81] After refusing to comply, the October 2001 Operation Enduring Freedom was launched. The majority of Afghans supported the American invasion of their country.[82][83] During the initial invasion, US and UK forces bombed al-Qaeda training camps. The United States began working with the Northern Alliance to remove the Taliban from power.[84]

Recent history (2002–present)

Collage showing foreign armed force and US diplomat visits to Afghanistan

In December 2001, after the Taliban government was overthrown and the new Afghan government under President Hamid Karzai was formed, the International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) was established by the UN Security Council to help assist the Karzai administration and provide basic security.[85][86] Taliban forces also began regrouping inside Pakistan, while more coalition troops entered Afghanistan and began rebuilding the war-torn country.[87][88]

Shortly after their fall from power, the Taliban began an insurgency to regain control of Afghanistan. Over the next decade, ISAF and Afghan troops led many offensives against the Taliban but failed to fully defeat them. Afghanistan remains one of the poorest countries in the world due to a lack of foreign investment, government corruption, and the Taliban insurgency.[89][90]

Meanwhile, the Afghan government was able to build some democratic structures, and the country changed its name to the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan. Attempts were made, often with the support of foreign donor countries, to improve the country’s economy, healthcare, education, transport, and agriculture. ISAF forces also began to train the Afghan National Security Forces. In the decade following 2002, over five million Afghans were repatriated, including some who were forcefully deported from Western countries.[91][92]

By 2009, a Taliban-led shadow government began to form in parts of the country.[93] In 2010, President Karzai attempted to hold peace negotiations with the Taliban leaders, but the rebel group refused to attend until mid-2015 when the Taliban supreme leader finally decided to back the peace talks.[94]

After the May 2011 death of Osama bin Laden in Pakistan, many prominent Afghan figures were assassinated.[95] Afghanistan–Pakistan border skirmishes intensified and many large scale attacks by the Pakistan-based Haqqani Network also took place across Afghanistan. The United States blamed rogue elements within the Pakistani government for the increased attacks.[96][97] The U.S. government spent tens of billions of dollars on development aid over 15 years and over a trillion dollars on military expenses during the same period. Corruption by Western defense and development contractors and associated Afghans reached unprecedented levels in a country where the national GDP was often only a small fraction of the U.S. government’s annual budget for the conflict.[98]

Following the 2014 presidential election President Karzai left power and Ashraf Ghani became President in September 2014.[99] The US war in Afghanistan (America’s longest war) officially ended on 28 December 2014. However, thousands of US-led NATO troops have remained in the country to train and advise Afghan government forces.[100] The 2001–present war has resulted in over 90,000 direct war-related deaths, which includes insurgents, Afghan civilians and government forces. Over 100,000 have been injured.[101]

Geography

Afghanistan map of Köppen climate classification.

Topography

A landlocked mountainous country with plains in the north and southwest, Afghanistan is located within South Asia[10][102] and Central Asia.[103] It is part of the US-coined Greater Middle East Muslim world, which lies between latitudes 29° N and 39° N, and longitudes 60° E and 75° E. The country’s highest point is Noshaq, at 7,492 m (24,580 ft) above sea level. It has a continental climate with harsh winters in the central highlands, the glaciated northeast (around Nuristan), and the Wakhan Corridor, where the average temperature in January is below −15 °C (5 °F), and hot summers in the low-lying areas of the Sistan Basin of the southwest, the Jalalabad basin in the east, and the Turkestan plains along the Amu River in the north, where temperatures average over 35 °C (95 °F) in July.

Despite having numerous rivers and reservoirs, large parts of the country are dry. The endorheic Sistan Basin is one of the driest regions in the world.[104] Aside from the usual rainfall, Afghanistan receives snow during the winter in the Hindu Kush and Pamir Mountains, and the melting snow in the spring season enters the rivers, lakes, and streams.[105][106] However, two-thirds of the country’s water flows into the neighboring countries of Iran, Pakistan, and Turkmenistan. The state needs more than US$2 billion to rehabilitate its irrigation systems so that the water is properly managed.[107]

The northeastern Hindu Kush mountain range, in and around the Badakhshan Province of Afghanistan, is in a geologically active area where earthquakes may occur almost every year.[108] They can be deadly and destructive sometimes, causing landslides in some parts or avalanches during the winter.[109] The last strong earthquakes were in 1998, which killed about 6,000 people in Badakhshan near Tajikistan.[110] This was followed by the 2002 Hindu Kush earthquakes in which over 150 people were killed and over 1,000 injured. A 2010 earthquake left 11 Afghans dead, over 70 injured, and more than 2,000 houses destroyed.

The country’s natural resources include: coal, copper, iron ore, lithium, uranium, rare earth elements, chromite, gold, zinc, talc, barites, sulfur, lead, marble, precious and semi-precious stones, natural gas, and petroleum, among other things.[111][112] In 2010, US and Afghan government officials estimated that untapped mineral deposits located in 2007 by the US Geological Survey are worth between $900 bn and $3 trillion.[113]

At 652,230 km2 (251,830 sq mi),[114] Afghanistan is the world’s 41st largest country,[115] slightly bigger than France and smaller than Burma, about the size of Texas in the United States. It borders Pakistan in the south and east; Iran in the west; Turkmenistan, Uzbekistan, and Tajikistan in the north; and China in the far east.

Demographics

As of 2015[update], the population of Afghanistan is around 32,564,342,[9] which includes the roughly 2.7 million Afghan refugees still living in Pakistan and Iran. As of 2013 46% of Afghanistan’s population are under 15 years of age and 74% of the population live in rural areas.[116] The average woman gave birth to five children during her life and 6.8% of all babies died in child-birth or infancy.[116] Life expectancy in 2013 was 60 years and only .1% of the population between ages 15 and 49 had HIV.[116]

Like many of its neighboring countries, Afghanistan has an ethnically, linguistically and religiously diverse population. According to cartographer Michael Izady there “is precious little correspondence between language and ethnic or group identity in Afghanistan. Connections such as tribe (e.g. Pashtuns, Aimaqs), religion (e.g. the Shia Hazaras, Sayyids, Kizilbash), group memory (e.g. Arabs and Monghols/Mongols) or life style (e.g. Parsiwans) are far more important markers of group identity than language has ever been. Only Turkmens (totally) and Uzbeks (mostly) are to be identified with languages that they speak. This has been so since the inception of the state in AD 1747.”[117]

Afghanistan has experienced a gradual urbanization since the late 1990s but the country remains one of the world’s least urban societies. In 1999 around 79% of the country’s population lived in rural areas compared to around 74% in 2014.[116] The only city with over a million residents is its capital, Kabul. Other large cities in the country are, in order of population size, Kandahar, Herat, Mazar-i-Sharif, Kunduz, Jalalabad, Lashkar Gah, Taloqan, Khost, Sheberghan, and Ghazni. According to the Population Reference Bureau, the Afghan population is estimated to increase to 82 million by 2050.[118]

Ethnic groups

Ethnolinguistic groups of Afghanistan

Afghanistan is a multiethnic society, and its historical status as a crossroads has contributed significantly to its diverse ethnic makeup. The population of the country is divided into a wide variety of ethnolinguistic groups. Because a systematic census has not been held in the nation in decades, exact figures about the size and composition of the various ethnic groups are unavailable. An approximate distribution of the ethnic groups is shown in the chart below:

Ethnic groups in Afghanistan
Ethnic group 2004–2014 estimate[120] Pre-2004 estimate[121][122][123][124]
Pashtun 42% 38–55%
Tajik 27% 26% (of this 1% are Qizilbash)
Hazara 8% 9–10%
Uzbek 9% 6–8%
Aimaq 4% 500,000 to 800,000
Turkmen 3% 2.5%
Baloch 2% 100,000
Others (Pashayi, Nuristani, Arab, Brahui, Pamiri, Gurjar, etc.) 4% 6.9%

Languages

Spoken languages of Afghanistan[9][22]
Dari (Afghan Persian)
50%
Pashto
35%
Uzbek and Turkmen
11%
Balochi
2%
30 others including Arabic
4%

Pashto and Dari are the official languages of Afghanistan; bilingualism is very common.[1] Both are Indo-European languages from the Iranian languages sub-family. Dari (Afghan Persian) has long been the prestige language and a lingua franca for inter-ethnic communication. It is the native tongue of the Tajiks, Hazaras, Aimaks, and Kizilbash.[125] Pashto is the native tongue of the Pashtuns, although many Pashtuns often use Dari and some non-Pashtuns are fluent in Pashto.

Other languages, including Uzbek, Arabic, Turkmen, Balochi, Pashayi, and Nuristani languages (Ashkunu, Kamkata-viri, Vasi-vari, Tregami, and Kalasha-ala), are the native tongues of minority groups across the country and have official status in the regions where they are widely spoken. Minor languages also include Pamiri (Shughni, Munji, Ishkashimi, and Wakhi), Brahui, Hindko, and Kyrgyz. A small percentage of Afghans are also fluent in Urdu, English, and other languages.

Gender

Afghanistan was listed in 2002 as one of the most dangerous countries in the world to be born a woman according to a global survey due to some of the highest maternal mortality rates in the world, where half a million die annually in childbirth. The high rate is caused by the healthcare system having been destroyed by warfare and the Taliban.[126]

Religions

Religion in Afghanistan[127]
Sunni Islam
70.0%
Imamiyyah
25.0%
Ismāʿīlism
4.5%
Other religion
0.5%

Over 99% of the Afghan population is Muslim; up to 90% are from the Sunni branch, 7–19% are Shia.[9][22][128]

Until the 1890s, the region around Nuristan was known as Kafiristan (land of the kafirs (unbelievers)) because of its non-Muslim inhabitants, the Nuristanis, an ethnically distinct people whose religious practices included animism, polytheism, and shamanism.[129] Thousands of Afghan Sikhs and Hindus are also found in the major cities.[130][131] There was a small Jewish community in Afghanistan who had emigrated to Israel and the United States by the end of the twentieth century; only one Jew, Zablon Simintov, remained by 2005.[132]

Governance

Current military situation, as of 27 February 2016.

  Under control of the Afghan Government, NATO, and Allies
  Under control of the Taliban, Al-Qaeda, and Allies
  Under control of the Islamic State

Afghanistan is an Islamic republic consisting of three branches, the executive, legislative, and judicial. The nation is led by President Ashraf Ghani with Abdul Rashid Dostum and Sarwar Danish as vice presidents. Abdullah Abdullah serves as the chief executive officer (CEO). The National Assembly is the legislature, a bicameral body having two chambers, the House of the People and the House of Elders. The Supreme Court is led by Chief Justice Said Yusuf Halem, the former Deputy Minister of Justice for Legal Affairs.[133][134]

A January 2010 report published by the United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime revealed that bribery consumed an amount equal to 23% of the GDP of the nation.[135] A number of government ministries are believed to be rife with corruption, and while President Karzai vowed to tackle the problem in late 2009 by stating that “individuals who are involved in corruption will have no place in the government”,[136] top government officials were stealing and misusing hundreds of millions of dollars through the Kabul Bank. According to Transparency International‘s 2014 corruption perceptions index results, Afghanistan was ranked as the fourth most corrupt country in the world.[137]

Elections and parties

The 2004 Afghan presidential election was relatively peaceful, in which Hamid Karzai won in the first round with 55.4% of the votes. However, the 2009 presidential election was characterized by lack of security, low voter turnout, and widespread electoral fraud.[138] The vote, along with elections for 420 provincial council seats, took place in August 2009, but remained unresolved during a lengthy period of vote counting and fraud investigation.

Two months later, under international pressure, a second round run-off vote between Karzai and remaining challenger Abdullah was announced, but a few days later Abdullah announced that he would not participate in 7 November run-off because his demands for changes in the electoral commission had not been met. The next day, officials of the election commission cancelled the run-off and declared Hamid Karzai as President for another five-year term.[138]

In the 2005 parliamentary election, among the elected officials were former mujahideen, Islamic fundamentalists, warlords, communists, reformists, and several Taliban associates.[139] In the same period, Afghanistan reached to the 30th highest nation in terms of female representation in parliament.[140] The last parliamentary election was held in September 2010, but due to disputes and investigation of fraud, the swearing-in ceremony took place in late January 2011. The 2014 presidential election ended with Ashraf Ghani winning by 56.44% votes.

Administrative divisions

Afghanistan is administratively divided into 34 provinces (wilayats), with each province having its own capital and a provincial administration. The provinces are further divided into about 398 smaller provincial districts, each of which normally covers a city or a number of villages. Each district is represented by a district governor.

The provincial governors are appointed by the President of Afghanistan and the district governors are selected by the provincial governors. The provincial governors are representatives of the central government in Kabul and are responsible for all administrative and formal issues within their provinces. There are also provincial councils that are elected through direct and general elections for a period of four years.[141] The functions of provincial councils are to take part in provincial development planning and to participate in the monitoring and appraisal of other provincial governance institutions.

According to article 140 of the constitution and the presidential decree on electoral law, mayors of cities should be elected through free and direct elections for a four-year term. However, due to huge election costs, mayoral and municipal elections have never been held. Instead, mayors have been appointed by the government. In the capital city of Kabul, the mayor is appointed by the President of Afghanistan.

The following is a list of all the 34 provinces in alphabetical order:

Afghanistan is divided into 34 provinces, and every province is further divided into a number of districts

Foreign relations and military

Soldiers of the Afghan National Army, including the ANA Commando Battalion standing in the front

The Afghan Ministry of Foreign Affairs is in charge of maintaining the foreign relations of Afghanistan. The state has been a member of the United Nations since 1946. It enjoys strong economic relations with a number of NATO and allied states, particularly the United States, United Kingdom, Germany and Turkey. In 2012, the United States designated Afghanistan as a major non-NATO ally and created the U.S.–Afghanistan Strategic Partnership Agreement. Afghanistan also has friendly diplomatic relations with neighboring Pakistan, Iran, Turkmenistan, Uzbekistan, Tajikistan, and China, and with regional states such as India, Bangladesh, Nepal, Kazakhstan, Russia, the UAE, Saudi Arabia, Iraq, Egypt, Japan, and South Korea. It continues to develop diplomatic relations with other countries around the world.

United Nations Assistance Mission in Afghanistan (UNAMA) was established in 2002 under United Nations Security Council Resolution 1401 in order to help the country recover from decades of war. Today, a number of NATO member states deploy about 38,000 troops in Afghanistan as part of the International Security Assistance Force (ISAF).[142] Its main purpose is to train the Afghan National Security Forces (ANSF). The Afghan Armed Forces are under the Ministry of Defense, which includes the Afghan National Army (ANA) and the Afghan Air Force (AAF). The ANA is divided into 7 major Corps, with the 201st Selab (“Flood”) in Kabul followed by the 203rd in Gardez, 205th Atul (“Hero”) in Kandahar, 207th in Herat, 209th in Mazar-i-Sharif, and the 215th in Lashkar Gah. The ANA also has a commando brigade, which was established in 2007. The Afghan Defense University (ADU) houses various educational establishments for the Afghan Armed Forces, including the National Military Academy of Afghanistan.[143]

Law enforcement

The National Directorate of Security (NDS) is the nation’s domestic intelligence agency, which operates similar to that of the United States Department of Homeland Security (DHS) and has between 15,000 and 30,000 employees. The nation also has about 126,000 national police officers, with plans to recruit more so that the total number can reach 160,000.[144] The Afghan National Police (ANP) is under the Ministry of the Interior and serves as a single law enforcement agency all across the country. The Afghan National Civil Order Police is the main branch of the ANP, which is divided into five Brigades, each commanded by a Brigadier General. These brigades are stationed in Kabul, Gardez, Kandahar, Herat, and Mazar-i-Sharif. Every province has an appointed provincial Chief of Police who is responsible for law enforcement throughout the province.

The police receive most of their training from Western forces under the NATO Training Mission-Afghanistan. According to a 2009 news report, a large proportion of police officers were illiterate and accused of demanding bribes.[145] Jack Kem, deputy to the commander of NATO Training Mission Afghanistan and Combined Security Transition Command Afghanistan, stated that the literacy rate in the ANP would rise to over 50% by January 2012. What began as a voluntary literacy program became mandatory for basic police training in early 2011.[144] Approximately 17% of them tested positive for illegal drug use. In 2009, President Karzai created two anti-corruption units within the Interior Ministry.[146] Former Interior Minister Hanif Atmar said that security officials from the US (FBI), Britain (Scotland Yard), and the European Union will train prosecutors in the unit.

All parts of Afghanistan are considered dangerous due to militant activities. Hundreds of Afghan police are killed in the line of duty each year. Kidnapping and robberies are also reported. The Afghan Border Police (ABP) are responsible for protecting the nation’s airports and borders, especially the disputed Durand Line border, which is often used by members of criminal organizations and terrorists for their illegal activities. A report in 2011 suggested that up to 3 million people were involved in the illegal drug business in Afghanistan. Attacks on government employees may be ordered by powerful mafia groups who reside inside and outside the country. Drugs from Afghanistan are exported to neighboring countries and then to other countries. The Afghan Ministry of Counter Narcotics is tasked to deal with these issues by bringing to justice major drug traffickers.[147]

Women may be tried and convicted for breaking social norms, such as running away from a forced marriage or abusive husband. Victims of rape may be jailed for having had sex outside of marriage.[148]

Economy

Workers processing pomegranates (anaar), which Afghanistan is famous for in Asia

Afghan women at a textile factory in Kabul

Afghanistan is an impoverished least developed country, one of the world’s poorest because of decades of war and lack of foreign investment. As of 2014[update], the nation’s GDP stands at about $60.58 billion with an exchange rate of $20.31 billion, and the GDP per capita is $1,900. The country’s exports totaled $2.7 billion in 2012. Its unemployment rate was reported in 2008 at about 35%.[9] According to a 2009 report, about 42% of the population lives on less than $1 a day.[149] The nation has less than $1.5 billion in external debt.[9]

The Afghan economy has been growing at about 10% per year in the last decade, which is due to the infusion of over $50 billion in international aid and remittances from Afghan expats.[9] It is also due to improvements made to the transportation system and agricultural production, which is the backbone of the nation’s economy.[150] The country is known for producing some of the finest pomegranates, grapes, apricots, melons, and several other fresh and dry fruits, including nuts.[151] Many sources indicate that as much as 11% or more of Afghanistan’s economy is derived from the cultivation and sale of opium, and Afghanistan is widely considered the world’s largest producer of opium despite Afghan government and international efforts to eradicate the crop.[152]

While the nation’s current account deficit is largely financed with donor money, only a small portion is provided directly to the government budget. The rest is provided to non-budgetary expenditure and donor-designated projects through the United Nations system and non-governmental organizations. The Afghan Ministry of Finance is focusing on improved revenue collection and public sector expenditure discipline. For example, government revenues increased 31% to $1.7 billion from March 2010 to March 2011.

Afghanistan, Trends in the Human Development Index, 1970–2010

Da Afghanistan Bank serves as the central bank of the nation and the “Afghani” (AFN) is the national currency, with an exchange rate of about 47 Afghanis to 1 US dollar. Since 2003, over 16 new banks have opened in the country, including Afghanistan International Bank, Kabul Bank, Azizi Bank, Pashtany Bank, Standard Chartered Bank, and First Micro Finance Bank.

One of the main drivers for the current economic recovery is the return of over 5 million expatriates, who brought with them fresh energy, entrepreneurship and wealth-creating skills as well as much needed funds to start up businesses. For the first time since the 1970s, Afghans have involved themselves in construction, one of the largest industries in the country.[153] Some of the major national construction projects include $35 billion New Kabul City next to the capital, Ghazi Amanullah Khan City near Jalalabad, and Aino Mena in Kandahar.[154][155][156] Similar development projects have also begun in Herat, Mazar-e-Sharif, and other cities.[157]

In addition, a number of companies and small factories began operating in different parts of the country, which not only provide revenues to the government but also create new jobs. Improvements to the business environment have resulted in more than $1.5 billion in telecom investment and created more than 100,000 jobs since 2003.[158] Afghan rugs are becoming popular again, allowing many carpet dealers around the country to hire more workers.

Afghanistan is a member of WTO, SAARC, ECO, and OIC. It holds an observer status in SCO. Foreign Minister Zalmai Rassoul told the media in 2011 that his nation’s “goal is to achieve an Afghan economy whose growth is based on trade, private enterprise and investment”.[159] Experts believe that this will revolutionize the economy of the region. Opium production in Afghanistan soared to a record in 2007 with about 3 million people reported to be involved in the business,[160] but then declined significantly in the years following.[161] The government started programs to help reduce poppy cultivation, and by 2010 it was reported that 24 out of the 34 provinces were free from poppy growing. In June 2012, India advocated for private investments in the resource rich country and the creation of a suitable environment therefor.[162]

Mining

Main article: Mining in Afghanistan

Michael E. O’Hanlon of the Brookings Institution estimated that if Afghanistan generates about $10 bn per year from its mineral deposits, its gross national product would double and provide long-term funding for Afghan security forces and other critical needs.[163] The United States Geological Survey (USGS) estimated in 2006 that northern Afghanistan has an average 2.9 billion (bn) barrels (bbl) of crude oil, 15.7 trillion cubic feet (440 bn m3) of natural gas, and 562 million bbl of natural gas liquids.[164] In 2011, Afghanistan signed an oil exploration contract with China National Petroleum Corporation (CNPC) for the development of three oil fields along the Amu Darya river in the north.[165]

The country has significant amounts of lithium, copper, gold, coal, iron ore, and other minerals.[111][112][166] The Khanashin carbonatite in Helmand Province contains 1,000,000 metric tons (1,100,000 short tons) of rare earth elements.[167] In 2007, a 30-year lease was granted for the Aynak copper mine to the China Metallurgical Group for $3 billion,[168] making it the biggest foreign investment and private business venture in Afghanistan’s history.[169] The state-run Steel Authority of India won the mining rights to develop the huge Hajigak iron ore deposit in central Afghanistan.[170] Government officials estimate that 30% of the country’s untapped mineral deposits are worth between $900 bn and $3 trillion.[113] One official asserted that “this will become the backbone of the Afghan economy” and a Pentagon memo stated that Afghanistan could become the “Saudi Arabia of lithium”.[171] In a 2011 news story, the CSM reported, “The United States and other Western nations that have borne the brunt of the cost of the Afghan war have been conspicuously absent from the bidding process on Afghanistan’s mineral deposits, leaving it mostly to regional powers.”[172]

Transport

Air

Air transport in Afghanistan is provided by the national carrier, Ariana Afghan Airlines (AAA), and by private companies such as Afghan Jet International, East Horizon Airlines, Kam Air, Pamir Airways, and Safi Airways. Airlines from a number of countries also provide flights in and out of the country. These include Air India, Emirates, Gulf Air, Iran Aseman Airlines, Pakistan International Airlines, and Turkish Airlines.

The country has four international airports: Hamid Karzai International Airport (formerly Kabul International Airport), Kandahar International Airport, Herat International Airport, and Mazar-e Sharif International Airport. There are also around a dozen domestic airports with flights to Kabul and other major cities.

Rail

As of 2014[update], the country has only two rail links, one a 75 km line from Kheyrabad to the Uzbekistan border and the other a 10 km long line from Toraghundi to the Turkmenistan border. Both lines are used for freight only and there is no passenger service as of yet. There are various proposals for the construction of additional rail lines in the country.[173] In 2013, the presidents of Afghanistan, Turkmenistan, and Uzbekistan attended the groundbreaking ceremony for a 225 km line between Turkmenistan-AndkhvoyMazar-i-SharifKheyrabad. The line will link at Kheyrabad with the existing line to the Uzbekistan border.[174] Plans exist for a rail line from Kabul to the eastern border town of Torkham, where it will connect with Pakistan Railways.[175] There are also plans to finish a rail line between Khaf, Iran and Herat, Afghanistan.[176]

Roads

Further information: Highway 1 (Afghanistan)

Traveling by bus in Afghanistan remains dangerous due to militant activities.[177] The buses are usually older model Mercedes-Benz and owned by private companies. Serious traffic accidents are common on Afghan roads and highways, particularly on the Kabul–Kandahar and the Kabul–Jalalabad Road.[178]

Newer automobiles have recently become more widely available after the rebuilding of roads and highways. They are imported from the United Arab Emirates through Pakistan and Iran. As of 2012[update], vehicles more than 10 years old are banned from being imported into the country. The development of the nation’s road network is a major boost for the economy due to trade with neighboring countries. Postal services in Afghanistan are provided by the publicly owned Afghan Post and private companies such as FedEx, DHL, and others.

Communication

Telecommunication services in the country are provided by Afghan Wireless, Etisalat, Roshan, MTN Group, and Afghan Telecom. In 2006, the Afghan Ministry of Communications signed a $64.5 million agreement with ZTE for the establishment of a countrywide optical fiber cable network. As of 2011[update], Afghanistan had around 17 million GSM phone subscribers and over 1 million internet users, but only had about 75,000 fixed telephone lines and a little over 190,000 CDMA subscribers.[179] 3G services are provided by Etisalat and MTN Group. In 2014, Afghanistan leased a space satellite from Eutelsat, called AFGHANSAT 1.[180]

Health

Main article: Health in Afghanistan

Opening ceremony at a public health institute in Kandahar.

According to the Human Development Index, Afghanistan is the 15th least developed country in the world. The average life expectancy is estimated to be around 60 years for both sexes.[181] The country has one of the highest maternal mortality rate in the world as well as the highest infant mortality rate in the world (deaths of babies under one year), estimated in 2015 to be 115.08 deaths/1,000 live births.[9] The Ministry of Public Health plans to cut the infant mortality rate to 400 for every 100,000 live births before 2020.[182] The country currently has more than 3,000 midwives, with an additional 300 to 400 being trained each year.[183]

A number of hospitals and clinics have been built over the last decade, with the most advanced treatments being available in Kabul. The French Medical Institute for Children and Indira Gandhi Childrens Hospital in Kabul are the leading children’s hospitals in the country. Some of the other main hospitals in Kabul include the 350-bed Jamhuriat Hospital and the Jinnah Hospital, which is still under construction. There are also a number of well-equipped military-controlled hospitals in different regions of the country.

It was reported in 2006 that nearly 60% of the population lives within a two-hour walk of the nearest health facility, up from 9% in 2002.[184] The latest surveys show that 57% of Afghans say they have good or very good access to clinics or hospitals.[183] The nation has one of the highest incidences of people with disabilities, with around a million people affected.[185] About 80,000 people are missing limbs; most of these were injured by landmines.[186][187] Non-governmental charities such as Save the Children and Mahboba’s Promise assist orphans in association with governmental structures.[188] Demographic and Health Surveys is working with the Indian Institute of Health Management Research and others to conduct a survey in Afghanistan focusing on maternal death, among other things.[189]

In Afghanistan, vitamin D deficiency affects 73.1% of the population.[190]

Education

Education in the country includes K–12 and higher education, which is supervised by the Ministry of Education and the Ministry of Higher Education.[191] The nation’s education system was destroyed due to the decades of war, but it began reviving after the Karzai administration came to power in late 2001. More than 5,000 schools were built or renovated in the last decade, with more than 100,000 teachers being trained and recruited.[192] More than seven million male and female students are enrolled in schools,[192] with about 100,000 being enrolled in different universities around the country; at least 35% of these students are female. As of 2013[update], there are 16,000 schools across Afghanistan. Education Minister Ghulam Farooq Wardak stated that another 8,000 schools are required to be constructed for the remaining 3 million children who are deprived of education.[193]

Kabul University reopened in 2002 to both male and female students. In 2006, the American University of Afghanistan was established in Kabul, with the aim of providing a world-class, English-language, co-educational learning environment in Afghanistan. The capital of Kabul serves as the learning center of Afghanistan, with many of the best educational institutions being based there. Major universities outside of Kabul include Kandahar University in the south, Herat University in the northwest, Balkh University and Kunduz University in the north, Nangarhar University and Khost University in the east. The National Military Academy of Afghanistan, modeled after the United States Military Academy at West Point, is a four-year military development institution dedicated to graduating officers for the Afghan Armed Forces. The $200 million Afghan Defense University is under construction near Qargha in Kabul. The United States is building six faculties of education and five provincial teacher training colleges around the country, two large secondary schools in Kabul, and one school in Jalalabad.[192]

The literacy rate of the entire population has been very low but is now rising because more students go to schools.[194] In 2010, the United States began establishing a number of Lincoln learning centers in Afghanistan. They are set up to serve as programming platforms offering English language classes, library facilities, programming venues, Internet connectivity, and educational and other counseling services. A goal of the program is to reach at least 4,000 Afghan citizens per month per location.[195][196] The Afghan National Security Forces are provided with mandatory literacy courses.[194] In addition to this, Baghch-e-Simsim (based on the American Sesame Street) was launched in late 2011 to help young Afghan children learn.

In 2009 and 2010, a 5,000 OLPC – One Laptop Per Child schools deployment took place in Kandahar with funding from an anonymous foundation.[197] The OLPC team seeks local support to undertake larger deployment.[198][199]

Culture

The Afghan culture has been around for over two millennia, tracing back to at least the time of the Achaemenid Empire in 500 BCE.[200][201] It is mostly a nomadic and tribal society, with different regions of the country having their own traditions, reflecting the multi-cultural and multi-lingual character of the nation. In the southern and eastern region the people live according to the Pashtun culture by following Pashtunwali, which is an ancient way of life that is still preserved.[202] The remainder of the country is culturally Persian and Turkic. Some non-Pashtuns who live in proximity with Pashtuns have adopted Pashtunwali[203] in a process called Pashtunization (or Afghanization), while some Pashtuns have been Persianized. Millions of Afghans who have been living in Pakistan and Iran over the last 30 years have been influenced by the cultures of those neighboring nations.

Men wearing traditional Afghan dress in the southern city of Kandahar

Afghans display pride in their culture, nation, ancestry, and above all, their religion and independence. Like other highlanders, they are regarded with mingled apprehension and condescension, for their high regard for personal honor, for their tribe loyalty and for their readiness to use force to settle disputes.[204] As tribal warfare and internecine feuding has been one of their chief occupations since time immemorial, this individualistic trait has made it difficult for foreigners to conquer them. Tony Heathcote considers the tribal system to be the best way of organizing large groups of people in a country that is geographically difficult, and in a society that, from a materialistic point of view, has an uncomplicated lifestyle.[204] There are an estimated 60 major Pashtun tribes,[205] and the Afghan nomads are estimated at about 2–3 million.[206]

The nation has a complex history that has survived either in its current cultures or in the form of various languages and monuments. However, many of its historic monuments have been damaged in recent wars.[207] The two famous Buddhas of Bamiyan were destroyed by the Taliban, who regarded them as idolatrous. Despite that, archaeologists are still finding Buddhist relics in different parts of the country, some of them dating back to the 2nd century.[208][209][210] This indicates that Buddhism was widespread in Afghanistan. Other historical places include the cities of Herat, Kandahar, Ghazni, Mazar-i-Sharif, and Zarang. The Minaret of Jam in the Hari River valley is a UNESCO World Heritage site. A cloak reputedly worn by Islam’s prophet Muhammad is kept inside the Shrine of the Cloak in Kandahar, a city founded by Alexander and the first capital of Afghanistan. The citadel of Alexander in the western city of Herat has been renovated in recent years and is a popular attraction for tourists. In the north of the country is the Shrine of Hazrat Ali, believed by many to be the location where Ali was buried. The Afghan Ministry of Information and Culture is renovating 42 historic sites in Ghazni until 2013, when the province will be declared as the capital of Islamic civilization.[211] The National Museum of Afghanistan is located in Kabul.

Although literacy is low, classic Persian and Pashto poetry plays an important role in the Afghan culture. Poetry has always been one of the major educational pillars in the region, to the level that it has integrated itself into culture. Some notable poets include Rumi, Rabi’a Balkhi, Sanai, Jami, Khushal Khan Khattak, Rahman Baba, Khalilullah Khalili, and Parween Pazhwak.[212]

Media and entertainment

Main article: Media of Afghanistan

Farhad Darya performing at the Serena Hotel in Kabul.

The Afghan mass media began in the early 20th century, with the first newspaper published in 1906. By the 1920s, Radio Kabul was broadcasting local radio services. Afghanistan National Television was launched in 1974 but was closed in 1996 when the media was tightly controlled by the Taliban.[213] Since 2002, press restrictions have been gradually relaxed and private media diversified. Freedom of expression and the press is promoted in the 2004 constitution and censorship is banned, although defaming individuals or producing material contrary to the principles of Islam is prohibited. In 2008, Reporters Without Borders ranked the media environment as 156 out of 173 countries, with the 1st being the most free. Around 400 publications were registered, at least 15 local Afghan television channels, and 60 radio stations.[214] Foreign radio stations, such as Voice of America, BBC World Service, and Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty (RFE/RL) broadcast into the country.

The city of Kabul has been home to many musicians who were masters of both traditional and modern Afghan music. Traditional music is especially popular during the Nowruz (New Year) and National Independence Day celebrations. Ahmad Zahir, Nashenas, Ustad Sarahang, Sarban, Ubaidullah Jan, Farhad Darya, and Naghma are some of the notable Afghan musicians, but there are many others.[215] Most Afghans are accustomed to watching Indian Bollywood films and listening to its filmi hit songs. Many major Bollywood film stars have roots in Afghanistan, including Salman Khan, Saif Ali Khan, Shah Rukh Khan (SRK), Aamir Khan, Feroz Khan, Kader Khan, Naseeruddin Shah, Zarine Khan and Celina Jaitly. In addition, several Bollywood films, such as Dharmatma, Khuda Gawah, Escape from Taliban, and Kabul Express have been shot inside Afghanistan.

Sports

Main article: Sport in Afghanistan

The Afghanistan national football team (in red uniforms) before its first win over India (in blue) during the 2011 SAFF Championship.

In recent years, Afghan sports teams have increasingly celebrated titles at international events. Afghanistan’s basketball team won the first team sports title at the 2010 South Asian Games. Later that year, the country’s cricket team followed as it won the 2010 ICC Intercontinental Cup.[216] In 2012, the country’s 3×3 basketball team won the gold medal at the 2012 Asian Beach Games,[217] in 2013, Afghanistan’s football team followed as it won the SAFF Championship.

Cricket is the country’s most popular sport, followed by association football.[218] The Afghan national cricket team, which was formed in the last decade, participated in the 2009 ICC World Cup Qualifier, 2010 ICC World Cricket League Division One and the 2010 ICC World Twenty20. It won the ACC Twenty20 Cup in 2007, 2009, 2011 and 2013. The team eventually made it to play in the 2015 Cricket World Cup. The Afghanistan Cricket Board (ACB) is the official governing body of the sport and is headquartered in Kabul. The Ghazi Amanullah Khan International Cricket Stadium serves as the nation’s main cricket stadium, followed by the Kabul National Cricket Stadium. Several other stadiums are under construction.[219] Domestically, cricket is played between teams from different provinces.

The Afghanistan national football team has been competing in international football since 1941. The national team plays its home games at the Ghazi Stadium in Kabul, while football in Afghanistan is governed by the Afghanistan Football Federation. The national team has never competed or qualified for the FIFA World Cup, but has recently won an international football trophy in 2013. The country also has a national team in the sport of futsal, a 5-a-side variation of football.

Other popular sports in Afghanistan include basketball, volleyball, taekwondo, and bodybuilding.[220] Buzkashi is a traditional sport, mainly among the northern Afghans. It is similar to polo, played by horsemen in two teams, each trying to grab and hold a goat carcass. The Afghan Hound (a type of running dog) originated in Afghanistan and was originally used in hunting.

See also

Notes

  1. Jump up ^ Other terms that have been used as demonyms are Afghani[2] and Afghanistani.[3]

References

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    See also: Mullah Omar: Taliban leader ‘died in Pakistan in 2013’
    See also: Afghanistan says Taliban leader Mullah Omar died 2 years ago
    So the question remains: If Omar died in 2013, who from the Taliban sanctioned peace talks in 2015 in Omar’s name?
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Further reading

Books

Articles

  • Meek, James. Worse than a Defeat. London Review of Books, Vol. 36, No. 24, December 2014, pages 3–10

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War in Afghanistan (2001–2014)

From Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia
This article is about the war in Afghanistan from 2001 to 2014. For the previous conflicts, see History of Afghanistan § Contemporary era (1973–present). For other phases of the conflict, see War in Afghanistan. For the phase of the same conflict following the end of ISAF in 2014, see War in Afghanistan (2015–present).
“Afghanistan invasion” redirects here. For other invasions of Afghanistan, see Invasions of Afghanistan.
War in Afghanistan
Part of the War in Afghanistan, and
the Global War on Terrorism
2001 War in Afghanistan collage 3.jpg
Clockwise from top-left: British Royal Marines take part in the clearance of Nad-e Ali District of Helmand Province; two F/A-18 strike fighters conduct combat missions over Afghanistan; an anti-Taliban fighter during an operation to secure a compound in Helmand Province; A French chasseur alpin patrols a valley in Kapisa Province; U.S. Marines prepare to board buses shortly after arriving in southern Afghanistan; Taliban fighters in a cave hideout; U.S. soldiers prepare to fire a mortar during a mission in Paktika Province, U.S. troops disembark from a helicopter, a MEDCAP centre in Khost Province.
Date 7 October 2001– 28 December 2014
(13 years, 2 months and 3 weeks)
Location Afghanistan
Result
Belligerents
Afghanistan Afghanistan Government

  • start of the Taliban insurgency after the fall of the Taliban regime

Coalition:

Afghanistan Taliban


Allied groups


Taliban splinter groups

2001 invasion:
Afghanistan Northern Alliance

Coalition:
 United States
 United Kingdom
Canada Canada
 Australia
 Germany

2001 invasion:
Afghanistan Islamic Emirate of Afghanistan

Flag of Jihad.svg al-Qaeda

Commanders and leaders
Afghanistan Hamid Karzai
Afghanistan Ashraf Ghani

Coalition:
United States George W. Bush
United States Barack Obama
United Kingdom Tony Blair
United Kingdom Gordon Brown
United Kingdom David Cameron
Canada Jean Chrétien
Canada Paul Martin
Canada Stephen Harper
Australia John Howard
Australia Kevin Rudd
Australia Julia Gillard
Australia Tony Abbott
Germany Gerhard Schröder
Germany Angela Merkel
John F. Campbell
List of former ISAF Commanders

Afghanistan Mohammed Omar(Deceased, non-combat)
Afghanistan Akhtar Mansoor 
Afghanistan Abdul Ghani Baradar (POW)[4]
Afghanistan Hibatullah Akhundzada[2]
Afghanistan Jalaluddin Haqqani
Afghanistan Obaidullah Akhund [4]
Afghanistan Dadullah Akhund [4]
Gulbuddin Hekmatyar
Flag of Jihad.svg Osama bin Laden  
Flag of Jihad.svg Ayman al-Zawahiri


Haji Najibullah[5]

Strength
Afghanistan Afghan National Security Forces: 352,000[6]
ISAF: 18,000+[7]

Military Contractors: 20,000+[7]

Afghanistan Taliban: 60,000
(tentative estimate)[8]

HIG: 1,500 – 2,000+[12]
Flag of Jihad.svg al-Qaeda: 50–100[13][14] ~ 3,000 in 2001[15]


Fidai Mahaz: 8,000[5]

Casualties and losses
Afghan security forces:
21,950 killed[16]
Northern Alliance:
200 killed[17][18][19][20]
Coalition
Dead: 3,486 (all causes)
2,807 (hostile causes)
(United States: 2,356, United Kingdom: 454,[21]Canada: 158, France: 89, Germany: 57, Italy: 53, Others: 321)[22]
Wounded: 22,773 (United States: 19,950, United Kingdom: 2,188, Canada: 635)[23][24][25]
Contractors
Dead: 1,582[26][27]
Wounded: 15,000+[26][27]

Total killed: 27,018

Total killed: 25,500–40,500[8][28]
Civilians killed: 26,270 (2001–2014)[16]

The war in Afghanistan (or the American war in Afghanistan)[29][30] was the period in which the United States invaded Afghanistan after the September 11 attacks.[31] The majority of Afghans supported the American invasion of their country.[32][33] Supported initially by close allies, they were later joined by NATO beginning in 2003. Its public aims were to dismantle al-Qaeda and to deny it a safe base of operations in Afghanistan by removing the Taliban from power.[34] Key allies, including the United Kingdom, supported the U.S. from the start to the end of the phase. This phase of the war is the longest war in United States history.[35][36][37][38][39]

In 2001, U.S. President George W. Bush demanded that the Taliban hand over Osama bin Laden and expel al-Qaeda; bin Laden had already been wanted by the United Nations since 1999. The Taliban declined to extradite him unless given what they deemed convincing evidence of his involvement in the 9/11 attacks[40] and declined demands to extradite other terrorism suspects apart from bin Laden. The request was dismissed by the U.S. as a delaying tactic, and on 7 October 2001 it launched Operation Enduring Freedom with the United Kingdom. The two were later joined by other forces, including the Northern Alliance which was fighting the Taliban in the prior Civil War from 1996 to 2001.[41][42] In December 2001, the United Nations Security Council established the International Security Assistance Force (ISAF), to assist the Afghan interim authorities with securing Kabul. At the Bonn Conference in December 2001, Hamid Karzai was selected to head the Afghan Interim Administration, which after a 2002 loya jirga in Kabul became the Afghan Transitional Administration. In the popular elections of 2004, Karzai was elected president of the country, now named the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan.[43]

NATO became involved as an alliance in August 2003, taking the helm of the International Security Assistance Force (ISAF), and later that year assumed leadership of ISAF with troops from 43 countries. NATO members provided the core of the force.[44] One portion of U.S. forces in Afghanistan operated under NATO command; the rest remained under direct U.S. command. Taliban leader Mullah Omar reorganized the movement, and in 2003, launched an insurgency against the government and ISAF.[45][46] Though outgunned and outnumbered, insurgents from the Taliban, Haqqani Network, Hezb-e-Islami Gulbuddin and other groups have waged asymmetric warfare with guerilla raids and ambushes in the countryside, suicide attacks against urban targets and turncoat killings against coalition forces. The Taliban exploited weaknesses in the Afghan government, among the most corrupt in the world, to reassert influence across rural areas of southern and eastern Afghanistan. In the initial years there was little warfare, but starting 2006 the Taliban made significant gains and inreasingly committed atrocities against civilians. ISAF responded in 2006 by increasing troops for counterinsurgency operations to “clear and hold” villages and “nation building” projects to “win hearts and minds“.[47][48] Violence sharply escalated from 2007 to 2009.[49] While ISAF continued to battle the Taliban insurgency, fighting crossed into neighboring North-West Pakistan.[50]

On 2 May 2011, United States Navy SEALs killed Osama bin Laden in Abbotabad, Pakistan. In May 2012, NATO leaders endorsed an exit strategy for withdrawing their forces. UN-backed peace talks have since taken place between the Afghan government and the Taliban.[51] In May 2014, the United States announced that “[its] combat operations [would] end in 2014, [leaving] just a small residual force in the country until the end of 2016”.[52] As of 2015, tens of thousands of people have been killed in the war. Over 4,000 ISAF soldiers and civilian contractors as well as over 15,000 Afghan national security forces members have been killed, as well as nearly 20 thousand civilians. In October 2014, British forces handed over the last bases in Helmand to the Afghan military, officially ending their combat operations in the war.[53] On 28 December 2014, NATO formally ended combat operations in Afghanistan and transferred full security responsibility to the Afghan government, via a ceremony in Kabul.[54][55]

Before the start of war[edit]

Origins of Afghanistan’s civil war[edit]

Soviet troops in 1986, during the Soviet war in Afghanistan

Afghanistan’s political order began to break down with the overthrow of King Zahir Shah by his cousin Mohammed Daoud Khan in a bloodless 1973 coup. Daoud Khan had served as prime minister since 1953 and promoted economic modernization, emancipation of women, and Pashtun nationalism. This was threatening to neighboring Pakistan, faced with its own restive Pashtun population. In the mid-1970s, Pakistani Prime Minister Zulfikar Ali Bhutto began to encourage Afghan Islamic leaders such as Burhanuddin Rabbani and Gulbuddin Hekmatyar, to fight against the regime. In 1978, Daoud Khan was killed in a coup by Afghan’s Communist Party, his former partner in government, known as the People’s Democratic Party of Afghanistan (PDPA). PDPA pushed for a socialist transformation by abolishing arranged marriages, promoting mass literacy and reforming land ownership. This undermined the traditional tribal order and provoked opposition from Islamic leaders across rural areas. The PDPA’s crackdown was met with open rebellion, including Ismail Khan‘s Herat Uprising. The PDPA was beset by internal leadership differences and was weakened by an internal coup on 11 September 1979 when Hafizullah Amin ousted Nur Muhammad Taraki. The Soviet Union, sensing PDPA weakness, intervened militarily three months later, to depose Amin and install another PDA faction led by Babrak Karmal.

The entry of the Soviet Union into Afghanistan in December 1979 prompted its Cold War rivals, the United States, Pakistan, Saudi Arabia and China to support rebels fighting against the Soviet-backed Democratic Republic of Afghanistan. In contrast to the secular and socialist government, which controlled the cities, religiously motivated mujahideen held sway in much of the countryside. Beside Rabbani, Hekmatyar, and Khan, other mujahideen commanders included Jalaluddin Haqqani. The CIA worked closely with Pakistan’s Inter-Service Intelligence to funnel foreign support for the mujahideen. The war also attracted Arab volunteers, known as “Afghan Arabs“, including Osama bin Laden.

After the withdrawal of the Soviet military from Afghanistan in May 1989, the PDPA regime under Najibullah held on until 1992, when the collapse of the Soviet Union deprived the regime of aid, and the defection of Uzbek general Abdul Rashid Dostum cleared the approach to Kabul. With the political stage cleared of Afghan socialists, the remaining Islamic warlords vied for power. By then, Bin Laden had left the country. The United States’ interest in Afghanistan also diminished.

Warlord rule (1992–1996)[edit]

Ahmad Shah Massoud (right) with Pashtun anti-Taliban leader and later Vice-President of the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan Haji Abdul Qadir

In 1992, Rabbani officially became president of the Islamic State of Afghanistan, but had to battle other warlords for control of Kabul. In late 1994, Rabbani’s defense minister, Ahmad Shah Massoud defeated Hekmatyr in Kabul and ended ongoing bombardment of the capital.[56][57][58] Massoud tried to initiate a nationwide political process with the goal of national consolidation. Other warlords, including Ismail Khan in the west and Dostum in the north maintained their fiefdoms.

In 1994, Mohammed Omar, a mujahideen member who taught at a Pakistani madrassa, returned to Kandahar and formed the Taliban movement. His followers were religious students, known as the Talib and they sought to end warlordism through strict adherence to Islamic law. By November 1994, the Taliban had captured all of Kandahar Province. They declined the government’s offer to join in a coalition government and marched on Kabul in 1995.[59]

Taliban Emirate vs Northern Alliance[edit]

The Taliban’s early victories in 1994 were followed by a series of costly defeats.[60] Pakistan provided strong support to the Taliban.[61][62] Analysts such as Amin Saikal described the group as developing into a proxy force for Pakistan’s regional interests, which the Taliban denied.[61] The Taliban started shelling Kabul in early 1995, but were driven back by Massoud.[57][63]

On 27 September 1996, the Taliban, with military support by Pakistan and financial support from Saudi Arabia, seized Kabul and founded the Islamic Emirate of Afghanistan.[64] They imposed their fundamentalist interpretation of Islam in areas under their control, issuing edicts forbidding women to work outside the home, attend school, or to leave their homes unless accompanied by a male relative.[65] According to the Pakistani expert Ahmed Rashid, “between 1994 and 1999, an estimated 80,000 to 100,000 Pakistanis trained and fought in Afghanistan” on the side of the Taliban.[66][67]

Massoud and Dostum, former arch-enemies, created a United Front against the Taliban, commonly known as the Northern Alliance.[68] In addition to Massoud’s Tajik force and Dostum’s Uzbeks, the United Front included Hazara factions and Pashtun forces under the leadership of commanders such as Abdul Haq and Haji Abdul Qadir. Abdul Haq also gathered a limited number of defecting Pashtun Taliban.[69] Both agreed to work together with the exiled Afghan king Zahir Shah.[67] International officials who met with representatives of the new alliance, which the journalist Steve Coll referred to as the “grand Pashtun-Tajik alliance”, said, “It’s crazy that you have this today … Pashtuns, Tajiks, Uzbeks, Hazara … They were all ready to buy in to the process … to work under the king’s banner for an ethnically balanced Afghanistan.”[70][71] The Northern Alliance received varying degrees of support from Russia, Iran, Tajikistan and India.

The Taliban captured Mazar-i-Sharif in 1998 and drove Dostum into exile.

The conflict was brutal. According to the United Nations (UN), the Taliban, while trying to consolidate control over northern and western Afghanistan, committed systematic massacres against civilians. UN officials stated that there had been “15 massacres” between 1996 and 2001. The Taliban especially targeted the Shiite Hazaras.[72][73] In retaliation for the execution of 3,000 Taliban prisoners by Uzbek general Abdul Malik Pahlawan in 1997, the Taliban executed about 4,000 civilians after taking Mazar-i-Sharif in 1998.[74][75]

Bin Laden’s so-called 055 Brigade was responsible for mass-killings of Afghan civilians.[76] The report by the United Nations quotes eyewitnesses in many villages describing “Arab fighters carrying long knives used for slitting throats and skinning people”.[72][73]

By 2001, the Taliban controlled as much as 90% of the country, with the Northern Alliance confined to the country’s northeast corner. Fighting alongside Taliban forces were some 28,000–30,000 Pakistanis and 2,000–3,000 Al-Qaeda militants.[59][76][77][78] Many of the Pakistanis were recruited from madrassas.[76] A 1998 document by the U.S. State Department confirmed that “20–40 percent of [regular] Taliban soldiers are Pakistani.” The document said that many of the parents of those Pakistani nationals “know nothing regarding their child’s military involvement with the Taliban until their bodies are brought back to Pakistan”. According to the U.S. State Department report and reports by Human Rights Watch, other Pakistani nationals fighting in Afghanistan were regular soldiers, especially from the Frontier Corps, but also from the army providing direct combat support.[62][79]

Al-Qaeda[edit]

In August 1996, Bin Laden was forced to leave Sudan and arrived in Jalalabad, Afghanistan. He had founded Al-Qaeda in the late 1980s to support the mujahideen’s war against the Soviets, but became disillusioned by infighting among warlords. He grew close to Mullah Omar and moved Al-Qaeda’s operations to eastern Afghanistan.

The 9/11 Commission in the U.S. reported found that under the Taliban, al-Qaeda was able to use Afghanistan as a place to train and indoctrinate fighters, import weapons, coordinate with other jihadists, and plot terrorist actions.[80] While al-Qaeda maintained its own camps in Afghanistan, it also supported training camps of other organizations. An estimated 10,000 and 20,000 men passed through these facilities before 9/11, most of whom were sent to fight for the Taliban against the United Front. A smaller number were inducted into al-Qaeda.[81]

After the August 1998 U.S. Embassy bombings were linked to bin Laden, President Bill Clinton ordered missile strikes on militant training camps in Afghanistan. U.S. officials pressed the Taliban to surrender bin Laden. In 1999, the international community imposed sanctions on the Taliban, calling for bin Laden to be surrendered. The Taliban repeatedly rebuffed these demands.

Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) Special Activities Division paramilitary teams were active in Afghanistan in the 1990s in clandestine operations to locate and kill or capture Osama bin Laden. These teams planned several operations, but did not receive the order to proceed from President Clinton. Their efforts built relationships with Afghan leaders that proved essential in the 2001 invasion.[82]

Change in U.S. policy toward Afghanistan[edit]

During the Clinton administration, the U.S. tended to favor Pakistan and until 1998–1999 had no clear policy toward Afghanistan. In 1997, for example, the U.S. State Department’s Robin Raphel told Massoud to surrender to the Taliban. Massoud responded that, as long as he controlled an area the size of his hat, he would continue to defend it from the Taliban.[59] Around the same time, top foreign policy officials in the Clinton administration flew to northern Afghanistan to try to persuade the United Front not to take advantage of a chance to make crucial gains against the Taliban. They insisted it was the time for a cease-fire and an arms embargo. At the time, Pakistan began a “Berlin-like airlift to resupply and re-equip the Taliban”, financed with Saudi money.[83]

U.S. policy toward Afghanistan changed after the 1998 U.S. embassy bombings. Subsequently, Osama bin Laden was indicted for his involvement in the embassy bombings. In 1999 both the U.S. and the United Nations enacted sanctions against the Taliban via United Nations Security Council Resolution 1267, which demanded the Taliban surrender Osama bin Laden for trial in the U.S. and close all terrorist bases in Afghanistan.[84] The only collaboration between Massoud and the US at the time was an effort with the CIA to trace bin Laden following the 1998 bombings.[85] The U.S. and the European Union provided no support to Massoud for the fight against the Taliban.

By 2001 the change of policy sought by CIA officers who knew Massoud was underway.[86] CIA lawyers, working with officers in the Near East Division and Counter-terrorist Center, began to draft a formal finding for President George W. Bush‘s signature, authorizing a covert action program in Afghanistan. It would be the first in a decade to seek to influence the course of the Afghan war in favor of Massoud.[64] Richard A. Clarke, chair of the Counter-Terrorism Security Group under the Clinton administration, and later an official in the Bush administration, allegedly presented a plan to incoming Bush National Security Adviser Condoleezza Rice in January 2001.

A change in US policy was effected in August 2001.[64] The Bush administration agreed on a plan to start supporting Massoud. A meeting of top national security officials agreed that the Taliban would be presented with an ultimatum to hand over bin Laden and other al-Qaeda operatives. If the Taliban refused, the US would provide covert military aid to anti-Taliban groups. If both those options failed, “the deputies agreed that the United States would seek to overthrow the Taliban regime through more direct action.”[87]

Northern Alliance on the eve of 9/11[edit]

Ahmad Shah Massoud was the only leader of the United Front in Afghanistan. In the areas under his control, Massoud set up democratic institutions and signed the Women’s Rights Declaration.[88] As a consequence, many civilians had fled to areas under his control.[89][90] In total, estimates range up to one million people fleeing the Taliban.[91]

In late 2000, Ahmad Shah Massoud, a Tajik nationalist and leader of the Northern Alliance, invited several other prominent Afghan tribal leaders to a jirga in northern Afghanistan “to settle political turmoil in Afghanistan”.[92] Among those in attendance were Pashtun nationalists, Abdul Haq and Hamid Karzai.[93][94]

In early 2001, Massoud and several other Afghan leaders addressed the European Parliament in Brussels, asking the international community to provide humanitarian help. The Afghan envoy asserted that the Taliban and al-Qaeda had introduced “a very wrong perception of Islam” and that without the support of Pakistan and Osama bin Laden, the Taliban would not be able to sustain their military campaign for another year. Massoud warned that his intelligence had gathered information about an imminent, large-scale attack on U.S. soil.[95]

On 9 September 2001, two French-speaking Algerians posing as journalists killed Massoud in a suicide attack in Takhar Province of Afghanistan. The two perpetrators were later alleged to be members of al-Qaeda. They were interviewing Massoud before detonating a bomb hidden in their video camera.[96][97] Both of the alleged al-Qaeda men were subsequently killed by Massoud’s guards.

September 11, 2001 attacks[edit]

Main article: September 11 attacks

Ground Zero in New York following the attacks of 11 September 2001

On the morning of 11 September 2001, a total of 19 Arab men carried out four coordinated attacks in the United States. Four commercial passenger jet airliners were hijacked.[98][99] The hijackers – members of al-Qaeda’s Hamburg cell[100] intentionally crashed two of the airliners into the Twin Towers of the World Trade Center in New York City, killing everyone on board and more than 2000 people in the buildings. Both buildings collapsed within two hours from damage related to the crashes, destroying nearby buildings and damaging others. The hijackers crashed a third airliner into the Pentagon in Arlington, Virginia, just outside Washington, D.C.. The fourth plane crashed into a field near Shanksville, in rural Pennsylvania, after some of its passengers and flight crew attempted to retake control of the plane, which the hijackers had redirected toward Washington, D.C., to target the White House, or the U.S. Capitol. No one aboard the flights survived. According to the New York State Health Department, the death toll among responders including firefighters and police was 836 as of June 2009.[101] Total deaths were 2996, including the 19 hijackers.[101]

U.S. invasion of Afghanistan[edit]

U.S. Army Special Forces and U.S. Air Force Combat Controllers with Northern Alliance troops on horseback

The United States invasion of Afghanistan occurred after the September 11 attacks in late 2001,[102] supported by allies including the United Kingdom.

U.S. President George W. Bush demanded that the Taliban hand over Osama bin Laden and expel al-Qaeda from Afghanistan. Bin Laden had been wanted by the U.N. since 1999 for the prior attack on the World Trade Center. The Taliban declined to extradite him unless the United States provided convincing evidence of his involvement in the 9/11 attacks.[40] They ignored U.S. demands to shut down terrorist bases and hand over other terrorist suspects. The request for proof of bin Laden’s involvement was dismissed by the U.S. as a meaningless delaying tactic.

General Tommy Franks, then-commanding general of Central Command (CENTCOM), initially proposed immediately after the 9/11 attacks to President George W. Bush and Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld that the U.S. invade Afghanistan using a conventional force of 60,000 troops, preceded by six months of preparation. Rumsfield and Bush feared that a conventional invasion of Afghanistan could bog down as had happened to the Soviets and the British.[103] Rumsfield rejected Frank’s plan, saying “I want men on the ground now!” Franks returned the next day with a plan utilizing Special Forces.[104] On September 26, 2001, fifteen days after the 9/11 attack, the U.S. covertly inserted members of the CIA’s Special Activities Division led by Gary Schroen as part of team Jawbreaker into Afghanistan, forming the Northern Afghanistan Liaison Team.[105][106][107] They linked up with the Northern Alliance as part of Task Force Dagger.[108]

Two weeks later, Operational Detachment Alpha (ODA) 555 and 595, both 12-man Green Beret teams from 5th Special Forces Group, plus Air Force combat controllers, were airlifted by helicopter from the Karshi-Khanabad Air Base in Uzbekistan[109] more than 300 kilometers (190 mi) across the 16,000 feet (4,900 m) Hindu Kush mountains in zero-visibility conditions by two SOAR MH-47E Chinook helicopters. The Chinooks were refueled in-flight three times during the 11-hour mission, establishing a new world record for combat rotorcraft missions at the time. They linked up with the CIA and Northern Alliance. Within a few weeks the Northern Alliance, with assistance from the U.S. ground and air forces, captured several key cities from the Taliban.[105][110]

American and British special forces operators at Tora Bora, 2001.

The U.S. officially launched Operation Enduring Freedom on 7 October 2001 with the assistance of the United Kingdom. The two were later joined by other countries.[41][42] The U.S. and its allies drove the Taliban from power and built military bases near major cities across the country. Most al-Qaeda and Taliban were not captured, escaping to neighboring Pakistan or retreating to rural or remote mountainous regions.[citation needed]

On 20 December 2001, the United Nations authorized an International Security Assistance Force (ISAF), with a mandate to help the Afghans maintain security in Kabul and surrounding areas. It was initially established from the headquarters of the British 3rd Mechanised Division under Major General John McColl, and for its first years numbered no more that 5,000.[111] Its mandate did not extend beyond the Kabul area for the first few years.[112]Eighteen countries were contributing to the force in February 2002.

At the Bonn Conference in December 2001, Hamid Karzai was selected to head the Afghan Interim Administration, which after a 2002 loya jirga in Kabul became the Afghan Transitional Administration. In the popular elections of 2004, Karzai was elected president of the country, now named the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan.[43]

In August 2003, NATO became involved as an alliance, taking the helm of the International Security Assistance Force.[44] One portion of U.S. forces in Afghanistan operated under NATO command; the rest remained under direct U.S. command. Taliban leader Mullah Omar reorganized the movement, and in 2003, launched an insurgency against the government and ISAF.[45][46]

An insurgency gains strength[edit]

Map detailing the spread of the Neotaliban-Insurgency in Afghanistan 2002–2006

A U.S. Navy Corpsman searches for Taliban fighters in the spring of 2005.

A number of 1.25lb M112 Demolition Charges, consisting of a C-4 compound, sit atop degraded weaponry scheduled for destruction.

After evading coalition forces throughout mid-2002, Taliban remnants gradually regained confidence and prepared to launch the Taliban insurgency that Omar had promised.[113] During September, Taliban forces began a jihad recruitment drive in Pashtun areas in Afghanistan and Pakistan. Pamphlets distributed in secret appeared in many villages in southeastern Afghanistan called for jihad.[114]

Small mobile training camps were established along the border to train recruits in guerrilla warfare.[115] Most were drawn from tribal area madrassas in Pakistan. Bases, a few with as many as 200 fighters, emerged in the tribal areas by the summer of 2003. Pakistani will to prevent infiltration was uncertain, while Pakistani military operations proved of little use.[116]

US troops board a helicopter

The Taliban gathered into groups of around 50 to launch attacks on isolated outposts, and then breaking up into groups of 5–10 to evade counterattacks. Coalition forces were attacked indirectly, through rocket attacks on bases and improvised explosive devices.

To coordinate the strategy, Omar named a 10-man leadership council, with himself as its leader.[116] Five operational zones were assigned to Taliban commanders such as Dadullah, who took charge in Zabul province.[116] Al-Qaeda forces in the east had a bolder strategy of attacking Americans using elaborate ambushes. The first sign of the strategy came on 27 January 2003, during Operation Mongoose, when a band of fighters were assaulted by U.S. forces at the Adi Ghar cave complex 25 km (15 mi) north of Spin Boldak.[117] 18 rebels were reported killed with no U.S. casualties. The site was suspected to be a base for supplies and fighters coming from Pakistan. The first isolated attacks by relatively large Taliban bands on Afghan targets also appeared around that time.

An Apache helicopter provides protection from the air, October 2005

As the summer continued, Taliban attacks gradually increased in frequency. Dozens of Afghan government soldiers, NGO humanitarian workers, and several U.S. soldiers died in the raids, ambushes and rocket attacks. Besides guerrilla attacks, Taliban fighters began building up forces in the district of Dai Chopan in Zabul Province. The Taliban decided to make a stand there. Over the course of the summer, up to 1,000 guerrillas moved there. Over 220 people, including several dozen Afghan police, were killed in August 2003. In late August 2005, Afghan government forces attacked, backed by U.S. troops with air support. After a one-week battle, Taliban forces were routed with up to 124 fighters killed.

On 11 August 2003, NATO assumed control of ISAF.[112] On 31 July 2006, ISAF assumed command of the south of the country, and by 5 October 2006, of the east.[118] Once this transition had taken place, ISAF grew to a large coalition involving up to 46 countries, under a U.S. commander.

2006: Southern Afghanistan[edit]

Further information: 2006 in Afghanistan

A U.S. Army soldier from 10th Mountain Division, patrols Aranas, Afghanistan

From January 2006, a multinational ISAF contingent started to replace U.S. troops in southern Afghanistan. The British 16th Air Assault Brigade (later reinforced by Royal Marines) formed the core of the force, along with troops and helicopters from Australia, Canada and the Netherlands. The initial force consisted of roughly 3,300 British,[119] 2,300 Canadian,[120]1,963 Dutch, 300 Australian,[121] 290 Danish[122] and 150 Estonian troops.[123] Air support was provided by U.S., British, Dutch, Norwegian and French combat aircraft and helicopters.

In January 2006, NATO’s focus in southern Afghanistan was to form Provincial Reconstruction Teams with the British leading in Helmand while the Netherlands and Canada would lead similar deployments in Orūzgān and Kandahar, respectively. Local Taliban figures pledged to resist.[124]

Swedish Army medic in the Mazar-e Sharif region.

Southern Afghanistan faced in 2006 the deadliest violence since the Taliban’s fall. NATO operations were led by British, Canadian and Dutch commanders. Operation Mountain Thrust was launched on 17 May 2006, with. In July, Canadian Forces, supported by U.S., British, Dutch and Danish forces, launched Operation Medusa.

A combined force of Dutch and Australians launched a successful offensive between late April to mid July 2006 to push the Taliban out of the Chora and Baluchi areas.

On 18 September 2006 Italian special forces of Task Force 45 and airborne troopers of the ‘Trieste’ infantry regiment of the Rapid Reaction Corps composed of Italian and Spanish forces, took part in ‘Wyconda Pincer’ operation in the districts of Bala Buluk and Pusht-i-Rod, in Farah province. Italian forces killed at least 70 Taliban. The situation in RC-W then deteriorated. Hotspots included Badghis in the very north and Farah in the southwest.

Further NATO operations included the Battle of Panjwaii, Operation Mountain Fury and Operation Falcon Summit. NATO achieved tactical victories and area denial, but the Taliban were not completely defeated. NATO operations continued into 2007.

2007: Coalition offensive[edit]

Further information: 2007 in Afghanistan

US and British troops during a patrol in Helmand Province

In January and February 2007, British Royal Marines mounted Operation Volcano to clear insurgents from firing-points in the village of Barikju, north of Kajaki.[125] Other major operations during this period included Operation Achilles (March–May) and Operation Lastay Kulang. The UK Ministry of Defence announced its intention to bring British troop levels in the country up to 7,700 (committed until 2009).[126] Further operations, such as Operation Silver and Operation Silicon, took place to keep up the pressure on the Taliban in the hope of blunting their expected spring offensive.[127][128]

A US Soldier conducts a mountain patrol in Nuristan Province.

In February 2007, Combined Forces Command-Afghanistan inactivated. Combined Joint Task Force 76, a two-star U.S. command headquartered on Bagram Airfield, assumed responsibility as the National Command Element for U.S. forces in Afghanistan.[129] Combined Security Transition Command-Afghanistan, or CSTC-A, the other two-star U.S. command, was charged with training and mentoring the Afghan National Security Forces.

On 4 March 2007, U.S. Marines killed at least 12 civilians and injured 33 in Shinwar district, Nangrahar,[130] in a response to a bomb ambush. The event became known as the “Shinwar massacre“.[131] The 120 member Marine unit responsible for the attack were ordered to leave the country by Army Major General Frank Kearney, because the incident damaged the unit’s relations with the local Afghan population.[132]

Chinooks transporting troops to Bagram

Later in March 2007, the US added more than 3,500 troops.

On 12 May 2007, ISAF forces killed Mullah Dadullah. Eleven other Taliban fighters died in the same firefight.

During the summer, NATO forces achieved tactical victories at the Battle of Chora in Orūzgān, where Dutch and Australian ISAF forces were deployed.

US Army paratroopers navigate to Observation Post Chuck Norris in Dangam.

On 16 August, eight civilians including a pregnant woman and a baby died when Polish soldiers shelled the village of Nangar Khel, Paktika Province. Seven soldiers have been charged with war crimes.

On 28 October about 80 Taliban fighters were killed in a 24-hour battle in Helmand.[133]

Western officials and analysts estimated the strength of Taliban forces at about 10,000 fighters fielded at any given time. Of that number, only 2,000 to 3,000 were highly motivated, full-time insurgents. The rest were part-timers, made up of alienated, young Afghans, angered by bombing raids or responding to payment. In 2007, more foreign fighters came than ever before, according to officials. Approximately 100 to 300 full-time combatants are foreigners, usually from Pakistan, Uzbekistan, Chechnya, various Arab countries and perhaps even Turkey and western China. They were reportedly more fanatical and violent, often bringing superior video-production or bombmaking expertise.[134]

On 2 November security forces killed a top-ranking militant, Mawlawi Abdul Manan, after he was caught crossing the border. The Taliban confirmed his death.[135] On 10 November the Taliban ambushed a patrol in eastern Afghanistan. This attack brought the U.S. death toll for 2007 to 100, making it the Americans’ deadliest year in Afghanistan.[136]

The Battle of Musa Qala took place in December. Afghan units were the principal fighting force, supported by British forces.[137] Taliban forces were forced out of the town.

Reassessment and renewed commitment from 2008[edit]

Further information: 2008 in Afghanistan

Development of ISAF troop strength

A U.S. Army Special Forces medic in Kandahar Province in September 2008.

Admiral Mike Mullen, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, said that while the situation in Afghanistan is “precarious and urgent”, the 10,000 additional troops needed there would be unavailable “in any significant manner” unless withdrawals from Iraq are made. The priority was Iraq first, Afghanistan second.[138]

In the first five months of 2008, the number of U.S. troops in Afghanistan increased by over 80% with a surge of 21,643 more troops, bringing the total from 26,607 in January to 48,250 in June.[139] In September 2008, President Bush announced the withdrawal of over 8,000 from Iraq and a further increase of up to 4,500 in Afghanistan.[140]

In June 2008, British prime minister Gordon Brown announced the number of British troops serving in Afghanistan would increase to 8,030 – a rise of 230.[141] The same month, the UK lost its 100th serviceman.[142]

US troops burn a suspected Taliban safe house

On 13 June, Taliban fighters demonstrated their ongoing strength, liberating all prisoners in Kandahar jail. The operation freed 1200 prisoners, 400 of whom were Taliban, causing a major embarrassment for NATO.[143]

On 13 July 2008, a coordinated Taliban attack was launched on a remote NATO base at Wanat in Kunar province. On 19 August, French troops suffered their worst losses in Afghanistan in an ambush.[144] Later in the month, an airstrike targeted a Taliban commander in Herat province and killed 90 civilians.

Late August saw one of NATO’s largest operations in Helmand, Operation Eagle’s Summit, aiming to bring electricity to the region.[145]

On 3 September, commandos, believed to be U.S. Army Special Forces, landed by helicopter and attacked three houses close to a known enemy stronghold in Pakistan. The attack killed between seven and twenty people. Local residents claimed that most of the dead were civilians. Pakistan condemned the attack, calling the incursion “a gross violation of Pakistan’s territory”.[146][147]

Burning hashish seized in Operation Albatross, a combined operation of Afghan officials, NATO and the DEA.

On 6 September, in an apparent reaction, Pakistan announced an indefinite disconnection of supply lines.[148]

On 11 September, militants killed two U.S. troops in the east. This brought the total number of U.S. losses to 113, more than in any prior year.[149] Several European countries set their own records, particularly the UK, who suffered 108 casualties.[22]

Taliban attacks on supply lines[edit]

In November and December 2008, multiple incidents of major theft, robbery, and arson attacks afflicted NATO supply convoys in Pakistan.[150][151][152] Transport companies south of Kabul were extorted for money by the Taliban.[152][153] These incidents included the hijacking of a NATO convoy carrying supplies in Peshawar,[151] the torching of cargo trucks and Humvees east of the Khyber pass[154] and a half-dozen raids on NATO supply depots near Peshawar that destroyed 300 cargo trucks and Humvees in December 2008.[155]

Issues with Pakistan[edit]

Barack Obama with Afghan President Hamid Karzai and Pakistani President Asif Ali Zardari in 2009

An unnamed senior Pentagon official told the BBC that at some point between 12 July and 12 September 2008, President Bush issued a classified order authorizing raids against militants in Pakistan. Pakistan said it would not allow foreign forces onto its territory and that it would vigorously protect its sovereignty.[156] In September, the Pakistan military stated that it had issued orders to “open fire” on U.S. soldiers who crossed the border in pursuit of militant forces.[157]

On 25 September 2008, Pakistani troops fired on ISAF helicopters. This caused confusion and anger in the Pentagon, which asked for a full explanation into the incident and denied that U.S. helicopters were in Pakistani airspace.

A further split occurred when U.S. troops apparently landed on Pakistani soil to carry out an operation against militants in the Khyber Pakhtunkhwa Province. Pakistanis reacted angrily to the action, saying that 20 innocent villagers had been killed by US troops.[158] However, despite tensions, the U.S. increased the use of remotely piloted drone aircraft in Pakistan’s border regions, in particular the Federally Administered Tribal Regions (FATA) and Balochistan; as of early 2009, drone attacks were up 183% since 2006.[159]

By the end of 2008, the Taliban apparently had severed remaining ties with al-Qaeda.[160] According to senior U.S. military intelligence officials, perhaps fewer than 100 members of al-Qaeda remained in Afghanistan.[161]

In a meeting with General Stanley McChrystal, Pakistani military officials urged international forces to remain on the Afghan side of the border and prevent militants from fleeing into Pakistan. Pakistan noted that it had deployed 140,000 soldiers on its side of the border to address militant activities, while the coalition had only 100,000 soldiers to police the Afghanistan side.[162]

2009: Southern Afghanistan[edit]

A U.S. Army soldier with 1st Battalion, 32nd Infantry Regiment, 10th Mountain Division, fires his weapon during a battle with insurgent forces in Barge Matal, during Operation Mountain Fire in 2009.

Northern Distribution Network[edit]

A US soldier and an Afghan interpreter in Zabul, 2009.

In response to the increased risk of sending supplies through Pakistan, work began on the establishment of a Northern Distribution Network (NDN) through Russia and Central Asian republics. Initial permission to move supplies through the region was given on 20 January 2009, after a visit to the region by General David Petraeus.[163] The first shipment along the NDN route left on 20 February from Riga, Latvia, then traveled 5,169 km (3,212 mi) to the Uzbek town of Termez on the Afghanistan border.[164] In addition to Riga, other European ports included Poti, Georgia and Vladivostok, Russia.[165] U.S. commanders hoped that 100 containers a day would be shipped along the NDN.[164] By comparison, 140 containers a day were typically shipped through the Khyber Pass.[166] By 2011, the NDN handled about 40% of Afghanistan-bound traffic, versus 30% through Pakistan.[165]

On 11 May 2009, Uzbekistan president Islam Karimov announced that the airport in Navoi (Uzbekistan) was being used to transport non-lethal cargo into Afghanistan. Due to the still unsettled relationship between Uzbekistan and the U.S. following the 2005 Andijon massacre and subsequent expulsion of U.S. forces from Karshi-Khanabad airbase, U.S. forces were not involved in the shipments. Instead, South Korea’s Korean Air, which overhauled Navoi’s airport, officially handled logistics.[167]

US soldiers fire mortars in Zabul.

Originally only non-lethal resources were allowed on the NDN. In July 2009, however, shortly before a visit by new President Barack Obama to Moscow, Russian authorities announced that U.S. troops and weapons could use the country’s airspace to reach Afghanistan.[168]

Human rights advocates were (as of 2009) concerned that the U.S. was again working with the government of Uzbekistan, which is often accused of violating human rights.[169] U.S. officials promised increased cooperation with Uzbekistan, including further assistance to turn Navoi into a regional distribution center for both military and civilian ventures.[170][171]

2009 Increase in U.S. troops[edit]

U.S. Army soldiers patrol the Korangal Valley in Kunar province.

In January 2009, about 3,000 U.S. soldiers from the 3rd Brigade Combat Team of the 10th Mountain Division moved into the provinces of Logar and Wardak. Afghan Federal Guards fought alongside them. The troops were the first wave of an expected surge of reinforcements originally ordered by President Bush and increased by President Obama.[172]

U.S. Army soldiers fire mortar rounds at suspected Taliban fighting positions in Nuristan province.

In mid-February 2009, it was announced that 17,000 additional troops would be deployed in two brigades and support troops; the 2nd Marine Expeditionary Brigade of about 3,500 and the 5th Brigade, 2nd Infantry Division, a Stryker Brigade with about 4,000.[173] ISAF commander General David McKiernan had called for as many as 30,000 additional troops, effectively doubling the number of troops.[174] On 23 September, a classified assessment by General McChrystal included his conclusion that a successful counterinsurgency strategy would require 500,000 troops and five years.[175]

In November 2009, Ambassador Karl W. Eikenberry sent two classified cables to Washington expressing concerns about sending more troops before the Afghan government demonstrates that it is willing to tackle the corruption and mismanagement that has fueled the Taliban’s rise. Eikenberry, a retired three-star general who in 2006–2007 commanded U.S. troops in Afghanistan, also expressed frustration with the relative paucity of funds set aside for development and reconstruction.[176] In subsequent cables, Eikenberry repeatedly cautioned that deploying sizable American reinforcements would result in “astronomical costs” – tens of billions of dollars – and would only deepen the Afghan government’s dependence on the United States.

U.S. Army soldiers watch the surrounding hills for insurgents during a three-hour gun battle in Kunar province.

On 26 November 2009, Karzai made a public plea for direct negotiations with the Taliban leadership. Karzai said there is an “urgent need” for negotiations and made it clear that the Obama administration had opposed such talks. There was no formal US response.[177][178]

On 1 December, Obama announced at the U.S. Military Academy in West Point that the U.S. would send 30,000 more troops.[179] Antiwar organizations in the U.S. responded quickly, and cities throughout the U.S. saw protests on 2 December.[180] Many protesters compared the decision to deploy more troops in Afghanistan to the expansion of the Vietnam War under the Johnson administration.[181]

Kunduz airstrike[edit]

Main article: 2009 Kunduz airstrike

On 4 September, during the Kunduz Province Campaign a devastating NATO air raid was conducted 7 kilometres southwest of Kunduz where Taliban fighters had hijacked civilian supply trucks, killing up to 179 people, including over 100 civilians.[182]

Operation Khanjar and Operation Panther’s Claw[edit]

On 25 June US officials announced the launch of Operation Khanjar (“strike of the sword”).[183] About 4000 U.S. Marines from the 2nd Marine Expeditionary Brigade[184] and 650 Afghan soldiers[185] participated. Khanjar followed a British-led operation named Operation Panther’s Claw in the same region.[186] Officials called it the Marines’ largest operation since the 2004 invasion of Fallujah, Iraq.[184] Operation Panther’s Claw was aimed to secure various canal and river crossings to establish a long-term ISAF presence.[187]

US soldiers conduct an operation.

Initially, Afghan and American soldiers moved into towns and villages along the Helmand River[184] to protect the civilian population. The main objective was to push into insurgent strongholds along the river. A secondary aim was to bring security to the Helmand Valley in time for presidential elections, set to take place on 20 August.

A soldier on patrol.

Taliban gains[edit]

Former Taliban fighters return weapons as part of a reintegration program

According to a 22 December briefing by Major General Michael T. Flynn, the top U.S. intelligence officer in Afghanistan, “The Taliban retains [the] required partnerships to sustain support, fuel legitimacy and bolster capacity.”[188] The 23-page briefing states that “Security incidents [are] projected to be higher in 2010.” Those incidents were already up by 300 percent since 2007 and by 60 percent since 2008, according to the briefing.[189] NATO intelligence at the time indicated that the Taliban had as many as 25,000 dedicated soldiers, almost as many as before 9/11 and more than in 2005.[190]

On 10 August McChrystal, newly appointed as U.S. commander in Afghanistan, said that the Taliban had gained the upper hand. In a continuation of the Taliban’s usual strategy of summer offensives,[191] the militants aggressively spread their influence into north and west Afghanistan and stepped up their attack in an attempt to disrupt presidential polls.[192] Calling the Taliban a “very aggressive enemy”, he added that the U.S. strategy was to stop their momentum and focus on protecting and safeguarding Afghan civilians, calling it “hard work”.[193]

The Taliban’s claim that the over 135 violent incidents disrupting elections was largely disputed. However, the media was asked to not report on any violent incidents.[194] Some estimates reported voter turn out as much less than the expected 70 percent. In southern Afghanistan where the Taliban held the most power, voter turnout was low and sporadic violence was directed at voters and security personnel. The chief observer of the European Union election mission, General Philippe Morillon, said the election was “generally fair” but “not free”.[195]

Western election observers had difficulty accessing southern regions, where at least 9 Afghan civilians and 14 security forces were killed in attacks intended to intimidate voters. The Taliban released a video days after the elections, filming on the road between Kabul and Kandahar, stopping vehicles and asking to see their fingers. The video went showed ten men who had voted, listening to a Taliban militant. The Taliban pardoned the voters because of Ramadan.[196] The Taliban attacked towns with rockets and other indirect fire. Amid claims of widespread fraud, both top contenders, Hamid Karzai and Abdullah Abdullah, claimed victory. Reports suggested that turnout was lower than in the prior election.[197]

After Karzai’s alleged win of 54 per cent, which would prevent a runoff, over 400,000 Karzai votes had to be disallowed after accusations of fraud. Some nations criticized the elections as “free but not fair”.[198]

In December, an attack on Forward Operating Base Chapman, used by the CIA to gather information and to coordinate drone attacks against Taliban leaders, killed at least six CIA officers.

2010: American–British offensive and Afghan peace initiative[edit]

A U.S. Marine Corps sergeant exits an Italian Army CH-47 Chinook helicopter, 30 November 2010

soldiers beside a mud wall

U.S. Marines with Bravo Company, 1st Battalion, 6th Marine Regiment return fire on Taliban forces in Marjeh in February 2010

Marines beside a mud wall as an explosion goes off behind it

U.S. Marines with Explosive Ordnance Disposal (EOD) destroy an Improvised Explosive Device (IED) cache in Southern Shorsurak, Helmand province in June 2010.

U.K. service members of the Royal Air Force Regiment stop on a road while conducting a combat mission near Kandahar Airfield, Afghanistan, 2 January 2010

Australian and Afghan soldiers patrol the poppy fields in the Baluchi Valley Region, April 2010

Main article: 2010 in Afghanistan

In public statements U.S. officials had previously praised Pakistan’s military effort against militants during its offensive in South Waziristan in November 2009.[199] Karzai started peace talks with Haqqani network groups in March 2010,[200] and there were other peace initiatives including the Afghan Peace Jirga 2010. In July 2010, a U.S. Army report read: “It seems to always be this way when we go there [to meet civilians]. No one wants anything to do with us.” A report on meeting up with school representatives mentioned students throwing rocks at soldiers and not welcoming their arrival, as had been reported on several occasions elsewhere.[201] President Zardari said that Pakistan had spent over 35 billion U.S. dollars during the previous eight years fighting against militancy.[202] According to the Afghan government, approximately 900 Taliban were killed in operations conducted during 2010.[203] Due to increased use of IEDs by insurgents the number of injured coalition soldiers, mainly Americans, significantly increased.[204] Beginning in May 2010 NATO special forces began to concentrate on operations to capture or kill specific Taliban leaders. As of March 2011, the U.S. military claimed that the effort had resulted in the capture or killing of more than 900 low- to mid-level Taliban commanders.[205][206] Overall, 2010 saw the most insurgent attacks of any year since the war began, peaking in September at more than 1,500. Insurgent operations increased “dramatically” in two-thirds of Afghan provinces.[207]

Troop surge[edit]

Deployment of additional U.S. troops continued in early 2010, with 9,000 of the planned 30,000 in place before the end of March and another 18,000 expected by June, with the 101st Airborne Division as the main source. U.S. troops in Afghanistan outnumbered those in Iraq for the first time since 2003.[208]

The CIA, following a request by General McChrystal, planned to increase teams of operatives, including elite SAD officers, with U.S. military special operations forces. This combination worked well in Iraq and was largely credited with the success of that surge.[209] The CIA also increased its campaign using Hellfire missile strikes on Al-Qaeda in Pakistan. The number of strikes in 2010, 115, more than doubled the 50 drone attacks that occurred in 2009.[210]

The surge in troops supported a sixfold increase in Special Forces operations.[211] 700 airstrikes occurred in September 2010 alone versus 257 in all of 2009. From July 2010 to October 2010, 300 Taliban commanders and 800-foot soldiers were killed.[212] Hundreds more insurgent leaders were killed or captured as 2010 ended.[211] Petraeus said, “We’ve got our teeth in the enemy’s jugular now, and we’re not going to let go.”[213]

The CIA created Counter-terrorism Pursuit Teams (CTPT) staffed by Afghans at the war’s beginning.[214][215] This force grew to over 3,000 by 2010 and was considered one of the “best Afghan fighting forces”. Firebase Lilley was one of SAD’s nerve centers.[215] These units were not only effective in operations against the Taliban and al-Qaeda forces in Afghanistan,[216]but have expanded their operations into Pakistan.[217] They were also important factors in both the “counterterrorism plus” and the full “counter-insurgency” options discussed by the Obama administration in the December 2010 review.[218]

WikiLeaks disclosure[edit]

On 25 July 2010, the release of 91,731 classified documents from the WikiLeaks organization was made public. The documents cover U.S. military incident and intelligence reports from January 2004 to December 2009.[219]Some of these documents included sanitised, and “covered up”, accounts of civilian casualties caused by Coalition Forces. The reports included many references to other incidents involving civilian casualties like the Kunduz airstrike and Nangar Khel incident.[220] The leaked documents also contain reports of Pakistan collusion with the Taliban. According to Der Spiegel, “the documents clearly show that the Pakistani intelligence agency Inter-Services Intelligence (usually known as the ISI) is the most important accomplice the Taliban has outside of Afghanistan.”[221]

Pakistan and U.S. tensions[edit]

Tensions between Pakistan and the U.S. were heightened in late September after several Pakistan Frontier Corps soldiers were killed and wounded. The troops were attacked by a U.S. piloted aircraft that was pursuing Taliban forces near the Afghan-Pakistan border, but for unknown reasons opened fire on two Pakistan border posts. In retaliation for the strike, Pakistan closed the Torkham ground border crossing to NATO supply convoys for an unspecified period. This incident followed the release of a video allegedly showing uniformed Pakistan soldiers executing unarmed civilians.[222] After the Torkham border closing, Pakistani Taliban attacked NATO convoys, killing several drivers and destroying around 100 tankers.[223]

2011: U.S. and NATO drawdown[edit]

Soldiers prepare for operation

U.S. Army soldiers return fire during a firefight with Taliban forces in Kunar Province, 31 March 2011

U.S. Army National Guard soldiers patrol the villages in the Bagram Security Zone, 23 March 2011

Soldiers from 34th Infantry Division, Task Force Red Bulls, discuss plans to maneuver into Pacha Khak village, Kabul Province, while conducting a dismounted patrol, 7 April 2011

An Australian service light armored vehicle drives through Tangi Valley, 29 March 2011

Battle of Kandahar[edit]

Main article: Battle of Kandahar

The Battle of Kandahar was part of an offensive named after the Battle of Bad’r that took place on 13 March 624, between Medina and Mecca. The Battle followed a 30 April announcement that the Taliban would launch their Spring offensive.[224]

On 7 May the Taliban launched a major offensive on government buildings in Kandahar. The Taliban said their goal was to take control of the city. At least eight locations were attacked: the governor’s compound, the mayor’s office, the NDS headquarters, three police stations and two high schools.[225] The battle continued onto a second day. The BBC‘s Bilal Sarwary called it “the worst attack in Kandahar province since the fall of the Taliban government in 2001, and a embarrassment for the Western-backed Afghan government.”[226]

Death of Osama bin Laden[edit]

On 2 May U.S. officials announced that al-Qaeda leader Osama bin Laden had been killed in Operation Neptune Spear, conducted by the CIA and U.S. Navy SEALs, in Pakistan. Crowds gathered outside the White House chanting “USA, USA” after the news emerged.[227]

Withdrawal[edit]

On 22 June President Obama announced that 10,000 troops would be withdrawn by the end of 2011 and an additional 23,000 troops would return by the summer of 2012. After the withdrawal of 10,000 U.S. troops, only 80,000 remained.[228] In July 2011 Canada withdrew its combat troops, transitioning to a training role.

Following suit, other NATO countries announced troop reductions. The United Kingdom stated that it would gradually withdraw its troops, however it did not specify numbers or dates.[229]France announced that it would withdraw roughly 1,000 soldiers by the end of 2012, with 3,000 soldiers remaining. Hundreds would come back at the end of 2011 and in the beginning of 2012, when the Afghan National Army took control of Surobi district. The remaining troops would continue to operate in Kapisa. Their complete withdrawal was expected by the end of 2014 or earlier given adequate security.[230]

Belgium announced that half of their force would withdraw starting in January 2012.[231] Norway announced it had started a withdrawal of its near 500 troops and would be completely out by 2014.[232] Equally, the Spanish Prime Minister announced the withdrawal of troops beginning in 2012, including up to 40 percent by the end of the first half of 2013, and complete withdrawal by 2014.[233]

2011 U.S.–NATO attack in Pakistan[edit]

After Neptune Spear, ISAF forces accidentally attacked Pakistan’s armed forces on 26 November, killing 24 Pakistani soldiers. Pakistan blocked NATO supply lines and ordered Americans to leave Shamsi Airfield. NATO Secretary General Anders Fogh Rasmussen said the attack was ‘tragic’ and ‘unintended’. “This (regret) is not good enough. We strongly condemn the attacks and reserve the right to take action,” said DG ISPR Major GeneralAthar Abbas. “This could have serious consequences in the level and extent of our cooperation.[234]

2012: Strategic agreement[edit]

Main article: 2012 in Afghanistan

Taliban attacks continued at the same rate as they did in 2011, around 28,000 attacks.[235] In September 2012, the surge of American personnel that began in late 2009 ended.[236]

Reformation of the United Front (Northern Alliance)[edit]

Ahmad Zia Massoud (left), former Vice-President of Afghanistan, shaking hands with a U.S. Provincial Reconstruction Team at the ceremony for a new road.

In late 2011 the National Front of Afghanistan (NFA) was created by Ahmad Zia Massoud, Abdul Rashid Dostum and Haji Mohammad Mohaqiq in what many analysts have described as a reformation of the military wing of the United Front (Northern Alliance) to oppose a return of the Taliban to power.[237] Meanwhile, much of the political wing reunited under the National Coalition of Afghanistan led by Abdullah Abdullah becoming the main democratic opposition movement in the Afghan parliament.[238][239] Former head of intelligence Amrullah Saleh has created a new movement, Basej-i Milli (Afghanistan Green Trend), with support among the youth mobilizing about 10,000 people in an anti-Taliban demonstration in Kabul in May 2011.[240][241][242]

In January 2012, the National Front of Afghanistan raised concerns about the possibility of a secret deal between the US, Pakistan and the Taliban during a widely publicized meeting in Berlin. U.S. Congressman Louie Gohmert wrote, “These leaders who fought with embedded Special Forces to initially defeat the Taliban represent over 60-percent of the Afghan people, yet are being entirely disregarded by the Obama and Karzai Administrations in negotiations.”[243] After the meeting with US congressmen in Berlin the National Front signed a joint declaration stating among other things:

We firmly believe that any negotiation with the Taliban can only be acceptable, and therefore effective, if all parties to the conflict are involved in the process. The present form of discussions with the Taliban is flawed, as it excludes anti-Taliban Afghans. It must be recalled that the Taliban extremists and their Al-Qaeda supporters were defeated by Afghans resisting extremism with minimal human embedded support from the United States and International community. The present negotiations with the Taliban fail to take into account the risks, sacrifices and legitimate interests of the Afghans who ended the brutal oppression of all Afghans.[244]

— National Front Berlin Statement, January 2012

High-profile U.S. military incidents[edit]

U.S. Army soldiers prepare to conduct security checks near the Pakistan border, February 2012

Beginning in January 2012, incidents involving US troops[245][246][247][248][249][250] occurred which were described by The Sydney Morning Herald as “a series of damaging incidents and disclosures involving US troops in Afghanistan […]”.[245] These incidents created fractures in the partnership between Afghanistan and ISAF,[251] raised the question whether discipline within US troops was breaking down,[252] undermined “the image of foreign forces in a country where there is already deep resentment owing to civilian deaths and a perception among many Afghans that US troops lack respect for Afghan culture and people”[253] and strained the relations between Afghanistan and the United States.[246][247] Besides an incident involving US troops who posed with body parts of dead insurgents and a video apparently showing a US helicopter crew singing “Bye-bye Miss American Pie” before blasting a group of Afghan men with a Hellfire missile[253][254][255] these “high-profile U.S. military incidents in Afghanistan”[249] also included the 2012 Afghanistan Quran burning protests and the Panjwai shooting spree.

Enduring Strategic Partnership Agreement[edit]

Afghan Army units neutralizes an IED in Sangin, Helmand province

On 2 May 2012, Presidents Karzai and Obama signed a strategic partnership agreement between the two countries, after the US president had arrived unannounced in Kabul on the first anniversary of Osama bin Laden’s death.[256] The U.S.-Afghanistan Strategic Partnership Agreement, officially entitled the “Enduring Strategic Partnership Agreement between the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan and the United States of America”,[257] provides the long-term framework for the two countries’ relationship after the drawdown of U.S. forces.[258] The Strategic Partnership Agreement went into effect on 4 July 2012, according to Secretary of State Hillary Clinton on 8 July 2012 at the Tokyo Conference on Afghanistan.[259] On 7 July 2012, as part of the agreement, the U.S. designated Afghanistan a major non-NATO ally after Karzai and Clinton met in Kabul.[260] On 11 November 2012, as part of the agreement, the two countries launched negotiations for a bilateral security agreement.[261]

NATO Chicago Summit: Troops withdrawal and long-term presence[edit]

On 21 May 2012 the leaders of NATO-member countries endorsed an exit strategy during the NATO Summit.[43] ISAF Forces would transfer command of all combat missions to Afghan forces by the middle of 2013,[262] while shifting from combat to advising, training and assisting Afghan security forces.[263][264] Most of the 130,000 ISAF troops would depart by the end of December 2014.[262] A new NATO mission would then assume the support role.[263][265]

2013: Withdrawal[edit]

Karzai–Obama meeting[edit]

Karzai visited the U.S. in January 2012. At the time the U.S. Government stated its openness to withdrawing all of its troops by the end of 2014.[266] On 11 January 2012 Karzai and Obama agreed to transfer combat operations from NATO to Afghan forces by spring 2013 rather than summer 2013.[267][268] “What’s going to happen this spring is that Afghans will be in the lead throughout the country”, Obama said. “They [ISAF forces] will still be fighting alongside Afghan troops…We will be in a training, assisting, advising role.” Obama added[268] He also stated the reason of the withdrawals that “We achieved our central goal, or have come very close…which is to de-capacitate al-Qaeda, to dismantle them, to make sure that they can’t attack us again.”[269]

Soldiers from the Michigan Army National Guard and the Latvian army patrol through a village in Konar province.

Obama also stated that he would determine the pace of troop withdrawal after consultations with commanders.[270] He added that any U.S. mission beyond 2014 would focus solely on counterterrorism operations and training.[269][270] Obama insisted that a continuing presence must include an immunity agreement in which US troops are not subjected to Afghan law.[271] “I can go to the Afghan people and argue for immunity for U.S. troops in Afghanistan in a way that Afghan sovereignty will not be compromised, in a way that Afghan law will not be compromised,” Karzai replied.[268]

Both leaders agreed that the United States would transfer Afghan prisoners and prisons to the Afghan government[268][272] and withdraw troops from Afghan villages in spring 2013.[272][273] “The international forces, the American forces, will be no longer present in the villages, that it will be the task of the Afghan forces to provide for the Afghan people in security and protection,” the Afghan president said.[272]

Security transfer[edit]

On 18 June 2013 the transfer of security responsibilities was completed.[274][275][276][277] The last step was to transfer control of 95 remaining districts. Karzai said, “When people see security has been transferred to Afghans, they support the army and police more than before.” NATO leader Rasmussen said that Afghan forces were completing a five-stage transition process that began in March 2011. “They are doing so with remarkable resolve,” he said. “Ten years ago, there were no Afghan national security forces … now you have 350,000 Afghan troops and police.”[274] ISAF remained slated to end its mission by the end of 2014.[277] Some 100,000 ISAF forces remained in the country.[275]

2014: Withdrawal continues and the insurgency increases[edit]

Resolute Support Colors presented at Kabul on 28 December, after the ISAF colors are encased.

After 2013, Afghanistan was shaken hard with suicide bombings by the Taliban. A clear example of this is a bombing of a Lebanese restaurant in the Wazir Akbar Khan area of Kabul on 18 February 2014. Among the dead in this attack was UN staff and the owner of a restaurant, who died protecting his business; 21 people altogether were killed. Meanwhile, the withdrawal continued, with 200 more US troops going home. The UK halved their force and were slowing withdrawal with all but two bases being closed down. On 20 March 2014, more than 4 weeks after a bomb in a military bus by the Taliban rocked the city once again, a raid on the Serena Hotel’s restaurant in Kabul by the Taliban resulted in the deaths of 9 people, including the 4 perpetrators. The attack came just 8 days after Swedish radio journalist Nils Horner was shot dead by the Taliban.

However, as the US troops withdrew from Afghanistan, they were replaced by private security companies hired by the United States government and the United Nations. Many of these private security companies (also termed military contractors) consisted of ex US Army, US Marine, British, French and Italian defence personnel who had left the defence after a few years of active service. Their past relations with the defence helped establish their credentials, simultaneously allowing the US and British to continue to be involved in ground actions without the requirement to station their own forces. This included companies such as the Ohio based military contracting company, Mission Essential Personal (MEP) set up by Sunil Ramchand, a former White House staffer and U.S. Navy veteran.[278]

Despite the crisis in Crimea, by March 2014 Russia had not tried to exert pressure on the U.S. via the Northern Distribution Network supply line.[279] On 9 June 2014 a coalition air strike mistakenly killed five U.S. troops, an Afghan National Army member and an interpreter in Zabul Province.[280]

A dust storm enveloping Camp Bastion in May 2014

On 5 August 2014, a gunman in an Afghan military uniform opened fire on a number of U.S., foreign and Afghan soldiers, killing a U.S. general, Harold J. Greene[281] and wounding about 15 officers and soldiers including a German brigadier general and a large number of U.S. soldiers at Camp Qargha, a training base west of Kabul.[282]

Two longterm security pacts, the Bilaterial Security agreement between Afghanistan and the United States of America and the NATO Status of Forces Agreement between NATO and Afghanistan, were signed on September 30, 2014. Both pacts lay out the framework for the foreign troop involvement in Afghnistan after the year 2014.[283]

After 13 years Britain and the United States officially ended their combat operation in Afghanistan on October 26, 2014. On that day Britain handed over its last base in Afghanistan, Camp Bastion, while the United States handed over its last base, Camp Leatherneck, to Afghan forces.[284]

As early as November 2012, the U.S. and NATO were considering the precise configuration of their post-2014 presence in Afghanistan.[285][286] On 27 May 2014, President Barack Obama announced that U.S. combat operations in Afghanistan would end in December 2014 (see Withdrawal of U.S. troops from Afghanistan). 9,800 troops were to remain, training Afghan security forces and supporting counterterrorism operations against remnants of al-Qaeda. This force would be halved by the end of 2015, and consolidated at Bagram Air Base and in Kabul. All U.S. forces, with the exception of a “normal embassy presence,” would be removed from Afghanistan by the end of 2016.[287] In 2014, 56 United States service members, and 101 contractors, died in Afghanistan.[288]

On 28 December 2014 NATO officially ended combat operations in a ceremony held in Kabul.[54] Continued operations by United States forces within Afghanistan will continue under the name Operation Freedom’s Sentinel;[289] this was joined by a new NATO mission under the name of Operation Resolute Support.[290] Operation Resolute Support, will involve 28 NATO nations, 14 partner nations, eleven thousand American troops, and eight hundred fifty German troops.[291]

The UK officially commemorated the end of its role in the Afghan war in a ceremony held in St Paul’s cathedral on 13 March 2015. [292]

2015: Secretive war[edit]

Although there was a formal end to combat operations, partially because of improved relations between the United States and the Ghani presidency, American forces increased raids against Islamic militants and terrorists, justified by a broad interpretation of protecting American forces.[293] A joint raid by American and Afghan forces arrested six Taliban connected to the 2014 Peshawar school massacre.[294]

American Secretary of Defense Ash Carter traveled to Afghanistan in February 2015,[295] during a time in which the slowing of American withdrawal from Afghanistan was discussed.[296] In the same month, the headquarters element of the 7th Infantry Division (United States) began to deploy to Afghanistan;[297] it was to be joined by the 2nd Brigade Combat Team, 10th Mountain Division (United States), and by the 101st Combat Aviation Brigade.[298] In March 2015, it was announced that the United States would maintain almost ten thousand service members in Afghanistan until at least the end of 2015, a change from planned reductions.[299] As of late May 2015, American forces continued to conduct airstrikes and Special Operations raids, while Afghan forces were losing ground to Taliban forces in some regions.[300]

Impact on Afghan society[edit]

Civilian casualties[edit]

Victims of the Narang night raid that killed at least 10 Afghan civilians, December 2009

War casualty estimates vary. According to a UN report, the Taliban were responsible for 76% of civilian casualties in Afghanistan in 2009.[301] A UN report in June 2011 stated that 2,777 civilians were known to have been killed in 2010, (insurgents responsible for 75%).[302] A July 2011 UN report said “1,462 non-combatants died” in the first six months of 2011 (insurgents 80%).[303] In 2011 a record 3,021 civilians were killed, the fifth successive annual rise.[304] According to a UN report, in 2013 there were 2,959 civilian deaths with 74% being blamed on anti-government forces, 8% on Afghan security forces, 3% on ISAF forces, 10% to ground engagements between anti-Government forces and pro-Government forces and 5% of the deaths were unattributed.[305] 60% of Afghans have direct personal experience and most others report suffering a range of hardships. 96% have been affected either personally or from the wider consequences.[306]

A report titled Body Count put together by Physicians for Social Responsibility, Physicians for Global Survival and the Nobel Peace Prize-winning International Physicians for the Prevention of Nuclear War (IPPNW) concluded that 106,000–170,000 civilians have been killed as a result of the fighting in Afghanistan at the hands of all parties to the conflict.[307]

According to the Watson Institute for International Studies Costs of War Project, 21,000 civilians have been killed as a result of the war.[308]

Health[edit]

According to Nicholas Kristoff, improved healthcare resulting from the war has saved hundreds of thousands of lives.[309]

Refugees[edit]

Since 2001, more than 5.7 million former refugees have returned to Afghanistan,[310][311][312] but 2.2 million others remained refugees in 2013.[313] In January 2013 the UN estimated that 547,550 were internally displaced persons, a 25% increase over the 447,547 IDPs estimated for January 2012[312][313][314]

Drug trade[edit]

Opium production levels for 2005–2007

Regional security risks and levels of opium poppy cultivation in 2007–2008.

From 1996 to 1999, the Taliban controlled 96% of Afghanistan’s poppy fields and made opium its largest source of revenue. Taxes on opium exports became one of the mainstays of Taliban income. According to Rashid, “drug money funded the weapons, ammunition and fuel for the war.” In The New York Times, the Finance Minister of the United Front, Wahidullah Sabawoon, declared the Taliban had no annual budget but that they “appeared to spend US$300 million a year, nearly all of it on war”. He added that the Taliban had come to increasingly rely on three sources of money: “poppy, the Pakistanis and bin Laden”.[315]

By 2000 Afghanistan accounted for an estimated 75% of the world’s opium supply and in 2000 produced an estimated 3276 tonnes from 82,171 hectares (203,050 acres).[316] Omar then banned opium cultivation and production dropped to an estimated 74 metric tonnes from 1,685 hectares (4,160 acres).[317] Some observers say the ban – which came in a bid for international recognition at the United Nations – was issued only to raise opium prices and increase profit from the sale of large existing stockpiles. 1999 had yielded a record crop and had been followed by a lower but still large 2000 harvest. The trafficking of accumulated stocks continued in 2000 and 2001. In 2002, the UN mentioned the “existence of significant stocks of opiated accumulated during previous years of bumper harvests”. In September 2001 – before 11 September attacks against the U.S. – the Taliban allegedly authorized Afghan peasants to sow opium again.[315]

Soon after the invasion opium production increased markedly.[318] By 2005, Afghanistan was producing 90% of the world’s opium, most of which was processed into heroin and sold in Europe and Russia.[319] In 2009, the BBC reported that “UN findings say an opium market worth $65bn (£39bn) funds global terrorism, caters to 15 million addicts, and kills 100,000 people every year”.[320]

Public education[edit]

As of 2013, 8.2 million Afghans attended school, including 3.2 million girls, up from 1.2 million in 2001, including fewer than 50,000 girls.[321][322]

War crimes[edit]

War crimes (a serious violation of the laws and customs of war giving rise to individual criminal responsibility)[323] have been committed by both sides including civilian massacres, bombings of civilian targets, terrorism, use of torture and the murder of prisoners of war. Additional common crimes include theft, arson, and the destruction of property not warranted by military necessity.

Taliban[edit]

In 2011 The New York Times reported that the Taliban was responsible for 34 of all civilian deaths in the war in Afghanistan.[324][325] In 2013 the UN stated that the Taliban had been placing bombs along transit routes.[326]

In 2015, Amnesty International reported that the Taliban committed mass murder and gang rape of Afghan civilians in Kunduz.[327] Taliban fighters killed and raped female relatives of police commanders and soldiers as well as midwives.[327] One female human rights activist described the situation in the following manner:[327]

When the Taliban asserted their control over Kunduz, they claimed to be bringing law and order and Shari’a to the city. But everything they’ve done has violated both. I don’t know who can rescue us from this situation.

Northern Alliance[edit]

In December 2001 the Dasht-i-Leili massacre took place, where between 250 and 3,000 Taliban fighters who had surrendered, were shot and/or suffocated to death in metal truck containers during transportation by Northern Alliance forces. Reports place U.S. ground troops at the scene.[328][329][330] The Irish documentary Afghan Massacre: The Convoy of Death investigated these allegations and claimed that mass graves of thousands of victims were found by UN investigators[331] and that the US blocked investigations into the incident.[332]

Coalition[edit]

Young Afghan farmer boy murdered on 15 January 2010 by a group of U.S. Army soldiers called the Kill Team.

On 21 June 2003, David Passaro, a CIA contractor and former United States Army Ranger, killed Abdul Wali, a prisoner at a U.S. base 16 km (10 mi) south of Asadabad, in Kunar Province. Passaro was found guilty of one count of felony assault with a dangerous weapon and three counts of misdemeanor assault. On 10 August 2009, he was sentenced to 8 years and 4 months in prison.[333][334]

In 2002, two unarmed civilian Afghan prisoners were tortured and later killed by U.S. armed forces personnel at the Bagram Theater Internment Facility (also Bagram Collection Point or B.C.P.) in Bagram, Afghanistan.[335] The prisoners, Habibullah and Dilawar, were chained to the ceiling and beaten, which caused their deaths.[336] Military coroners ruled that both the prisoners’ deaths were homicides.[337] Autopsies revealed severe trauma to both prisoners’ legs, describing the trauma as comparable to being run over by a bus. Fifteen soldiers were charged.

During the summer of 2010, ISAF charged five United States Army soldiers with the murder of three Afghan civilians in Kandahar province and collecting their body parts as trophies in what came to be known as the Maywand District murders. In addition, seven soldiers were charged with crimes such as hashish use, impeding an investigation and attacking the whistleblower, Specialist Justin Stoner.[338][339][340] Eleven of the twelve soldiers were convicted on various counts.[341]

A British Royal Marine Sergeant, identified as Sergeant Alexander Blackman from Taunton, Somerset,[342] was convicted at court martial in Wiltshire of having murdered an unarmed, reportedly wounded Afghan fighter in Helmand Province in September 2011.[343] In 2013, he received a life sentence from the court martial in Bulford, Wiltshire, and was dismissed with disgrace from the Royal Marines.[344][345]

On 11 March 2012, the Kandahar massacre occurred when sixteen civilians were killed and six wounded in the Panjwayi District of Kandahar Province, Afghanistan.[346][347] Nine of the victims were children,[347] and eleven of the dead were from the same family.[348] United States Army Staff Sergeant Robert Bales was taken into custody and charged with sixteen counts of premeditated murder. After pleading guilty to sixteen counts of premeditated murder, Bales was sentenced to life in prison without parole and dishonourably discharged from the United States Army.[349]

Costs[edit]

The cost of the war reportedly was a major factor as U.S. officials considered drawing down troops in 2011.[350] A March 2011 Congressional Research Service report noted, 1) following the Afghanistan surge announcement in 2009, Defense Department spending on Afghanistan increased by 50%, going from $4.4 billion to $6.7 billion a month. During that time, troop strength increased from 44,000 to 84,000, and was expected to be at 102,000 for fiscal year 2011; 2) The total cost from inception to the fiscal year 2011 was expected to be $468 billion.[351] The estimate for the cost of deploying one U.S. soldier in Afghanistan is over US$1 million a year.[352] According to “Investment in Blood”, a book by Frank Ledwidge, summations for the UK contribution to the war in Afghanistan came to £37bn ($56.46 billion).[353]

Stability problems[edit]

A soldier fits shoes for Afghan children in the Zabul Province

An Afghan market teems with vendors and shoppers on 4 February 2009

U.S. Army soldiers unload humanitarian aid for distribution to the town of Rajan Kala, 5 December 2009

In a 2008 interview, the then-head U.S. Central Command General David H. Petraeus, insisted that the Taliban were gaining strength. He cited a recent increase in attacks in Afghanistan and in neighboring Pakistan. Petraeus insisted that the problems in Afghanistan were more complicated than the ones he had faced in Iraq during his tour and required removing widespread sanctuaries and strongholds.[354]

Observers have argued that the mission in Afghanistan is hampered by a lack of agreement on objectives, a lack of resources, lack of coordination, too much focus on the central government at the expense of local and provincial governments, and too much focus on the country instead of the region.[355]

In 2009, Afghanistan moved three places in Transparency International‘s annual index of corruption, becoming the world’s second most-corrupt country just ahead of Somalia.[356] In the same month, Malalai Joya, a former member of the Afghan Parliament and the author of “Raising My Voice”, expressed opposition to an expansion of the U.S. military presence and her concerns about the future. “Eight years ago, the U.S. and NATO – under the banner of women’s rights, human rights, and democracy – occupied my country and pushed us from the frying pan into the fire. Eight years is enough to know better about the corrupt, mafia system of President Hamid Karzai. My people are crushed between two powerful enemies. From the sky, occupation forces bomb and kill civilians … and on the ground, the Taliban and warlords continue their crimes. It is better that they leave my country; my people are that fed up. Occupation will never bring liberation, and it is impossible to bring democracy by war.”[357]

Pakistan plays a central role in the conflict. A 2010 report published by the London School of Economics says that Pakistan’s ISI has an “official policy” of support to the Taliban.[358] “Pakistan appears to be playing a double-game of astonishing magnitude,” the report states.[358] Amrullah Saleh, former director of Afghanistan’s intelligence service, stated, “We talk about all these proxies [Taliban, Haqqanis] but not the master of proxies, which is the Pakistan army. The question is what does Pakistan’s army want to achieve …? They want to gain influence in the region”[359] About the presence of foreign troops in Afghanistan he stated: “[T]hey fight for the U.S. national interest but … without them we will face massacre and disaster and God knows what type of a future Afghanistan will have.”[359][360]

Afghan security forces[edit]

Afghan National Army[edit]

Afghan Commandos practice infiltration techniques, 1 April 2010 at Camp Morehead in the outer regions of Kabul.

U.S. Marines and ANA soldiers take cover in Marja on 13 February 2010 during their offensive to secure the city from the Taliban.

U.S. policy called for boosting the Afghan National Army to 134,000 soldiers by October 2010. By May 2010 the Afghan Army had accomplished this interim goal and was on track to reach its ultimate number of 171,000 by 2011.[361] This increase in Afghan troops allowed the U.S. to begin withdrawing its forces in July 2011.[362][363]

In 2010, the Afghan National Army had limited fighting capacity.[364] Even the best Afghan units lacked training, discipline and adequate reinforcements. In one new unit in Baghlan Province, soldiers had been found cowering in ditches rather than fighting.[365] Some were suspected of collaborating with the Taliban.[364] “They don’t have the basics, so they lay down,” said Capt. Michael Bell, who was one of a team of U.S. and Hungarian mentors tasked with training Afghan soldiers. “I ran around for an hour trying to get them to shoot, getting fired on. I couldn’t get them to shoot their weapons.”[364] In addition, 9 out of 10 soldiers in the Afghan National Army were illiterate.[366]

The Afghan Army was plagued by inefficiency and endemic corruption.[367] U.S. training efforts were drastically slowed by the problems.[368] U.S. trainers reported missing vehicles, weapons and other military equipment, and outright theft of fuel.[364] Death threats were leveled against U.S. officers who tried to stop Afghan soldiers from stealing. Afghan soldiers often snipped the command wires of IEDs instead of marking them and waiting for U.S. forces to come to detonate them. This allowed insurgents to return and reconnect them.[364] U.S. trainers frequently removed the cell phones of Afghan soldiers hours before a mission for fear that the operation would be compromised.[369] American trainers often spent large amounts of time verifying that Afghan rosters were accurate – that they are not padded with “ghosts” being “paid” by Afghan commanders who stole the wages.[370]

Desertion was a significant problem. One in every four combat soldiers quit the Afghan Army during the 12-month period ending in September 2009, according to data from the U.S. Defense Department and the Inspector General for Reconstruction in Afghanistan.[371]

Afghan National Police[edit]

The Afghan National Police provides support to the Afghan army. Police officers in Afghanistan are also largely illiterate. Approximately 17 percent of them tested positive for illegal drugs in 2010. They were widely accused of demanding bribes.[372] Attempts to build a credible Afghan police force were faltering badly, according to NATO officials.[373] A quarter of the officers quit every year, making the Afghan government’s goals of substantially building up the police force even harder to achieve.[373]

A joint patrol through Laghman province, June 2011

Insider attacks[edit]

Beginning in 2011, insurgent forces in Afghanistan began using a tactic of insider attacks on ISAF and Afghan military forces. In the attacks, Taliban personnel or sympathizers belonging to, or pretending to belong to, the Afghan military or police forces attack ISAF personnel, often within the security of ISAF military bases and Afghan government facilities. In 2011, for example, 21 insider attacks killed 35 coalition personnel. Forty-six insider attacks killed 63 and wounded 85 coalition troops, mostly American, in the first 11 months of 2012.[374] The attacks continued but began diminishing towards the planned 31 December 2014 ending of combat operations in Afghanistan by ISAF. However, on 5 August 2014, a gunman in an Afghan military uniform opened fire on a number of international military personnel, killing a U.S. general and wounding about 15 officers and soldiers, including a German brigadier general and 8 U.S. troops, at a training base west of Kabul.[282]

Reactions[edit]

Domestic reactions[edit]

The majority of Afghanistan’s population supported the American invasion of their country.[32][33] In November 2001, the CNN reported widespread relief amongst Kabul’s residents at the fall of the Taliban, with young men shaving off their beards and women taking off their burqas.[375]

A 2006 WPO opinion poll found that the majority of Afghans endorsed America’s military presence, with 83% of Afghans stating that they had a favourable view of the US military forces in their country. Only 17% gave an unfavourable view.[32] The majority of Afghans, among all ethnic groups including Pashtuns, stated that the overthrowing of the Taliban was a good thing. 82% of Afghans as a whole and 71% of those living in the war zone held this anti-Taliban view.[376] The Afghan population gave the USA one of its most favourable ratings in the world. A solid majority (81%) of Afghans stated that they held a favourable view of the USA.[377] However, the majority of Afghans (especially those in the war zone) held negative views on Pakistan and most Afghans also stated that they believe that the Pakistani government was allowing the Taliban to operate from its soil.[378]

Polls of Afghans displayed strong opposition to the Taliban and significant support of the U.S. military presence. However the idea of permanent U.S. military bases was not popular in 2005.[379]

Afghan women wait outside a USAID-supported health care clinic.

According to a May 2009 BBC poll, 69% of Afghans surveyed thought it was at least mostly good that the U.S. military came in to remove the Taliban – a decrease from 87% of Afghans surveyed in 2005. 24% thought it was mostly or very bad – up from 9% in 2005. The poll indicated that 63% of Afghans were at least somewhat supportive of a U.S. military presence in the country – down from 78% in 2005. Just 18% supported increasing the U.S. military’s presence, while 44% favored reducing it. 90% of Afghans surveyed opposed the Taliban, including 70% who were strongly opposed. By an 82%–4% margin, people said they preferred the current government to Taliban rule.[380]

In a June 2009 Gallup survey, about half of Afghan respondents felt that additional U.S. forces would help stabilize the security situation in the southern provinces. But opinions varied widely; residents in the troubled South were mostly mixed or uncertain, while those in the West largely disagreed that more U.S. troops would help the situation.[381]

In December 2009, many Afghan tribal heads and local leaders from the south and east called for U.S. troop withdrawals. “I don’t think we will be able to solve our problems with military force,” said Muhammad Qasim, a Kandahar tribal elder. “We can solve them by providing jobs and development and by using local leaders to negotiate with the Taliban.”[382] “If new troops come and are stationed in civilian areas, when they draw Taliban attacks civilians will end up being killed,” said Gulbadshah Majidi, a lawmaker and close associate of Mr. Karzai. “This will only increase the distance between Afghans and their government.”[383]

In late January 2010, Afghan protesters took to the streets for three straight days and blocked traffic on a highway that links Kabul and Kandahar. The Afghans were demonstrating in response to the deaths of four men in a NATO-Afghan raid in the village of Ghazni. Ghazni residents insisted that the dead were civilians.[384]

A 2015 survey by Langer Research Associates found that 77% of Afghans support the presence of U.S. forces; 67% also support the presence of NATO forces. Despite the problems in the country, 80% of Afghans still held the view that it was a good thing for the United States to overthrow the Taliban in 2001. More Afghans blame the Taliban or al-Qaeda for the country’s violence (53%) than those who blame the USA (12%).[33]

International reactions[edit]

Public opinion in 2001[edit]

Home-made sign (2015) in Devine, Texas, south of San Antonio, welcomes returning troops from the war in Afghanistan.

When the invasion began in October 2001, polls indicated that about 88% of Americans and about 65% of Britons backed military action.[385]

A large-scale 37-nation poll of world opinion carried out by Gallup International in late September 2001 found that large majorities in most countries favored a legal response, in the form of extradition and trial, over a military response to 9/11: only three countries out of the 37 surveyed – the U.S., Israel and India – did majorities favor military action. In the other 34 countries surveyed, the poll found many clear majorities that favored extradition and trial instead of military action: in the United Kingdom (75%), France (67%), Switzerland (87%), Czech Republic (64%), Lithuania (83%), Panama (80%) and Mexico (94%).[386][387]

An Ipsos-Reid poll conducted between November and December 2001 showed that majorities in Canada (66%), France (60%), Germany (60%), Italy (58%), and the UK (65%) approved of US airstrikes while majorities in Argentina (77%), China (52%), South Korea (50%), Spain (52%), and Turkey (70%) opposed them.[388]

Development of public opinion[edit]

22 June 2007 demonstration in Québec City against the Canadian military involvement in Afghanistan.

In a 47-nation June 2007 survey of global public opinion, the Pew Global Attitudes Project found international opposition to the war. Out of the 47 countries surveyed, 4 had a majority that favoured keeping foreign troops: the U.S. (50%), Israel (59%), Ghana (50%), and Kenya (60%). In 41, pluralities wanted NATO troops out as soon as possible.[389] In 32 out of 47, clear majorities wanted war over as soon as possible. Majorities in 7 out of 12 NATO member countries said troops should be withdrawn as soon as possible.[389][390]

A 24-nation Pew Global Attitudes survey in June 2008 similarly found that majorities or pluralities in 21 of 24 countries want the U.S. and NATO to remove their troops from Afghanistan as soon as possible. Only in three out of the 24 countries – the U.S. (50%), Australia (60%), and Britain (48%) – did public opinion lean more toward keeping troops there until the situation has stabilized.[391][392]

Coalition fatalities per month since the start of the war.

Canadian Forces personnel carry the coffin of a fallen comrade onto an aircraft at Kandahar Air Field, 17 July 2009

Following that June 2008 global survey, however, public opinion in Australia and Britain diverged from that in the U.S. A majority of Australians and Britons now want their troops home. A September 2008 poll found that 56% of Australians opposed continuation of their country’s military involvement.[393][394][395] A November 2008 poll found that 68% of Britons wanted their troops withdrawn within the next 12 months.[396][397][398]

In the U.S., a September 2008 Pew survey found that 61% of Americans wanted U.S. troops to stay until the situation has stabilized, while 33% wanted them removed as soon as possible.[399] Public opinion was divided over Afghan troop requests: a majority of Americans continued to see a rationale for the use of military force in Afghanistan.[400] A slight plurality of Americans favored troop increases, with 42%–47% favoring some troop increases, 39%–44% wanting reduction, and 7–9% wanting no changes. Just 29% of Democrats favored troop increases while 57% wanted to begin reducing troops. Only 36% of Americans approved of Obama’s handling of Afghanistan, including 19% of Republicans, 31% of independents, and 54% of Democrats.[401]

In a December 2009 Pew Research Center poll, only 32 percent of Americans favored increasing U.S. troops in Afghanistan, while 40 percent favored decreasing them. Almost half of Americans, 49 percent, believed that the U.S. should “mind its own business” internationally and let other countries get along the best they can. That figure was an increase from 30 percent who said that in December 2002.[402]

An April 2011 Pew Research Center poll showed little change in American views, with about 50% saying that the effort was going very well or fairly well and only 44% supporting NATO troop presence in Afghanistan.[403]

Protests, demonstrations and rallies[edit]

The war has been the subject of large protests around the world starting with the large-scale demonstrations in the days leading up to the invasion and every year since. Many protesters consider the bombing and invasion of Afghanistan to be unjustified aggression.[404][405] The deaths of Afghan civilians caused directly and indirectly by the U.S. and NATO bombing campaigns is a major underlying focus of the protests.[406] In January 2009, Brave New Foundation launched Rethink Afghanistan, a national campaign for non-violent solutions in Afghanistan built around a documentary film by director and political activist Robert Greenwald.[407] Dozens of organizations planned (and eventually held) a national march for peace in Washington, D.C. on 20 March 2010.[408][409]

Human rights abuses[edit]

Multiple accounts document human rights violations in Afghanistan.[410]

Taliban[edit]

According to a report by the United Nations, the Taliban were responsible for 76% of civilian casualties in Afghanistan in 2009.[301] The Afghanistan Independent Human Rights Commission (AIGRC) called the Taliban’s terrorism against the Afghan civilian population a war crime.[47] According to Amnesty International, the Taliban commit war crimes by targeting civilians, including killing teachers, abducting aid workers and burning school buildings. Amnesty International said that up to 756 civilians were killed in 2006 by bombs, mostly on roads or carried by suicide attackers belonging to the Taliban.[411]

NATO has alleged that the Taliban have used civilians as human shields. As an example, NATO pointed to the victims of NATO air strikes in Farah province in May 2009, during which the Afghan government claims up to 150 civilians were killed. NATO stated it had evidence the Taliban forced civilians into buildings likely to be targeted by NATO aircraft involved in the battle. A spokesman for the ISAF commander said: “This was a deliberate plan by the Taliban to create a civilian casualty crisis. These were not human shields; these were human sacrifices. We have intelligence that points to this.”[412] according to the U.S. State Department, the Taliban committed human rights violations against women in Afghanistan.[413]

White phosphorus use[edit]

White phosphorus has been condemned by human rights organizations as cruel and inhumane because it causes severe burns. White phosphorus burns on the bodies of civilians wounded in clashes near Bagram were confirmed. The U.S. claims at least 44 instances in which militants have used white phosphorus in weapons or attacks.[414] In May 2009, the U.S. confirmed that Western military forces in Afghanistan use white phosphorus to illuminate targets or as an incendiary to destroy bunkers and enemy equipment.[415][416] US forces used white phosphorus to screen a retreat in the Battle of Ganjgal when regular smoke munitions were not available.[417]

Environmental legacy[edit]

Since 1979 landmines, shells, bombs, and other unexploded ordnance have been left behind. In 2015 the NATO’s International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) was replaced by the US-led “Resolute Support” The director of the Mine Action Coordination Centre for Afghanistan (MACCA). ISAF stressed it had never used landmines.borislink26

SADAM I BUS

borisblog24.png

When beginning its military operation in Iraq the USA planned to prove that it was a true global hegemon. However, the result of that operation was the opposite. The results of the US invasion in Iraq showed that even such a powerful state as the USA was incapable of resolving problems while ignoring the opinion of the world community.

In February 2013 a special meeting of the UN Security Council initiated by the USA took place. During that meeting the US Secretary of State Colin Powell stated that he had proof of Iraq possessing weapons of mass destruction. For the sake of illustration he even showed an ampoule with a white powder, which according to Powell was a sample of Iraqi biological weapons. The US Secretary of State failed to convince the Security Council. However, the Americans did not give up their plans to attack Iraq. Sergey Karaganov, head of the Department of World Economy and Politics at the Higher School of Economics, talks about the goals Washington was really after while starting that war.

“There were many goals. Back then everybody said that the Americans were going to Iraq for its oil. But in reality it was not true. The Bush Administration started that war to reestablish what it believed to be its victory in the Cold War, to increase its sphere of influence (back then it was called “the sphere of democracy”) and to show countries in the Middle East who was the boss in the region. For that purpose it was decided to demonstratively crash the regime of Saddam Hussein. There were some other reasons quite strange in nature. According to some sources, George Bush Junior, who is tried to ingratiate himself with his father, ex-president George Bush Senior, wanted to demonstrate what good son he was and revenge his father. As supposedly Hussein (or perhaps it really happened) had organized several assassination attempts on George Bush Senior.”

The military part of the operation was successful and fast. The American army practically met with no resistance. Saddam Hussein hid for a while, but eventually was captured and executed. However, it soon became clear that the removal of the ruling regime was no guarantee of success. To the contrary, after the US invasion Iraq turned from an authoritarian but fairly stable state into a territory where war went on between various religious and ethnic groups. In addition, international terrorists began to establish themselves in Iraq. Sergey Seryogichev, an expert at the Institute for Middle East, talks about the causes of the American failure.

“They believed that the democratic model that offered equal access to governing and media resources to various groups would equalize different interests of different clans, would remove the controversy between the Arabs and the Kurds, the Shea and the Sunni. But in reality it turned out not to work. As in the minds of most Iraqis, as well as all Arabs in general, democracy is some sort of permissiveness, some sort of free rein. In addition, the Kurds wanted to take revenge on the Sunni (they had fewer problems with the Shea). As a result, that model led to the situation when the Shea using the legitimate democratic instruments took power in Iraq as a whole, while the Kurds got from under the control of Baghdad.”

The results of the Iraqi campaign were highly unsatisfactory for the Americans. Forces that did not want to follow the US line came to power in Iraq. At the same time the influence of Iran, the state that president Bush included in the “axis of evil”, greatly increased in the region. The Americans themselves lost over four thousand people in casualties in Iraq and spent billions of dollars on that war. But the main thing is that Washington suffered colossal reputation damage. After the failure of the Iraqi campaign it became clear that the USA with all its financial and military power is incapable of solving problems alone. It means that that country cannot claim to be the world’s hegemon.
Read more: https://sputniknews.com/voiceofrussia/2014_04_02/Bush-Jr-started-war-in-Iraq-to-revenge-Saddam-Hussein-for-attempting-to-assassinate-George-Bush-Sr-political-analyst-9008/

Iraq War

From Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia
This article is about the war that started in 2003 and ended in 2011. For the initial invasion, see 2003 invasion of Iraq. For the ongoing war in Iraq, see Iraqi Civil War (2014–present). For previous wars in Iraq, see Iraq War (disambiguation).
Iraq War
Part of the War on Terror
Iraq War montage.png
Clockwise from top: U.S. troops at Uday and Qusay Hussein’s hideout; insurgents in northern Iraq; an Iraqi insurgent firing a MANPADS; the toppling of the Saddam Hussein statue in Firdos Square.
Date 20 March 2003 – 18 December 2011
(8 years, 8 months and 28 days)
Location Iraq
Result
Belligerents
Invasion phase (2003)
 United States
 United Kingdom
 Australia
 Polandsupport from:
Peshmerga

 Netherlands[1]

Invasion phase (2003)

Ba’athist Iraq

Post-invasion
(2003–11)
 United States
 United Kingdom
 Australia (2003–09)
New Iraqi government

supported by:
Iran Iran[2][3]

 Iraqi Kurdistan

Post-invasion (2003–11)
Iraqi Regional Branch


Sunni insurgents


Shia insurgents

supported by:
Iran Iran


For fighting between insurgent groups, see Sectarian violence in Iraq (2006–07).

Commanders and leaders
Ayad Allawi
Ibrahim al-Jaafari
Nouri al-Maliki
Ricardo Sanchez
George W. Casey, Jr.
David Petraeus
Raymond T. Odierno
Lloyd Austin
George W. Bush
Tommy Franks
Barack Obama
Tony Blair
Gordon Brown
David Cameron
John Howard Anders Fogh Rasmussen

Aleksander Kwaśniewski

Ba’ath Party
Saddam Hussein (POW) Skull and crossbones.svg
Izzat Ibrahim ad-Douri


Sunni insurgency
Abu Musab al-Zarqawi 
Abu Ayyub al-Masri 
Abu Omar al-Baghdadi 
Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi
Islamic Army of Iraq (emblem).png Ishmael Jubouri
Abu Abdullah al-Shafi’i (POW)


Shia insurgency
Muqtada al-Sadr
Shiism arabic blue.svg Abu Deraa
Qais al-Khazali
Akram al-Kabi

Strength
Invasion forces (2003–04)
309,000
 United States: 192,000[15]
 United Kingdom: 45,000
 Australia: 2,000
 Poland: 194
Iraqi Kurdistan Peshmerga: 70,000


Coalition forces (2004–09)
176,000 at peak
United States Forces – Iraq (2010–11)
112,000 at activation
Security contractors 6,000–7,000 (estimate)[16]
Iraqi security forces
805,269 (military andparamilitary: 578,269,[17]police: 227,000)
Awakening militias
≈103,000 (2008)[18]
Iraqi Kurdistan
≈400,000 (Kurdish Border Guard: 30,000,[19]Peshmerga 375,000)

Coat of arms (emblem) of Iraq 1991-2004.svg Iraqi Armed Forces: 375,000 (disbanded in 2003)
Iraqi Republican Guard Symbol.svg Special Iraqi Republican Guard: 12,000
Iraqi Republican Guard Symbol.svg Iraqi Republican Guard: 70,000–75,000
Fedayeen Saddam SSI.svg Fedayeen Saddam: 30,000


Sunni Insurgents
≈70,000 (2007)[20]
al-Qaeda
≈1,300 (2006)[21]

Islamic State of Iraq
≈1,000 (2008)
Army of the Men of the Naqshbandi Order
≈500–1,000 (2007)

Casualties and losses
Iraqi Security Forces (post-Saddam)
Killed: 17,690[22]
Wounded: 40,000+[23]Coalition forces
Killed: 4,815[24][25](4,497 U.S.,[26] 179 UK,[27]139 other)[24]
Missing/captured (U.S.): 17 (8 rescued, 9 died in captivity)[28]
Wounded: 32,776+ (32,249 U.S.,[29] 315 UK, 212+ other[30])[31][32][33][34]Injured/diseases/other medical*: 51,139 (47,541 U.S.,[35] 3,598 UK)[31][33][34]

Contractors
Killed: 1,554[36][37]
Wounded & injured: 43,880[36][37]

Awakening Councils
Killed: 1,002+[38]
Wounded: 500+ (2007),[39] 828 (2008)[40]

Total dead: 25,286
Total wounded: 117,961

Iraqi combatant dead (invasion period): 7,600–10,800[41][42]

Insurgents (post-Saddam)
Killed: 26,544 (2003–11)[43]
Detainees: 12,000 (Iraqi-held)[44]

Total dead: 34,144–37,344

Estimated violent deaths:
Lancet survey (March 2003 – July 2006): 601,027 (95% CI: 426,369–793,663)[45][46]
Iraq Family Health Survey (March 2003 – July 2006): 151,000 (95% CI: 104,000–223,000)[47]
PLOS Medicine Study**: (March 2003 – June 2011): 405,000 95% CI: 48,000–751,000), in addition to 55,000 deaths missed due to emigration.[48]Documented deaths from violence:
Iraq Body Count (2003 – 14 December 2011): 103,160–113,728 civilian deaths recorded,[49] and 12,438 new deaths added from the Iraq War Logs[50]
Associated Press (March 2003 – April 2009): 110,600[51]

For more information see: Casualties of the Iraq War

* “injured, diseased, or other medical”: required medical air transport. UK number includes “aeromed evacuations”
** Total deaths include all additional deaths due to increased lawlessness, degraded infrastructure, poorer healthcare, etc.

The Iraq War[nb 1] was a protracted armed conflict that began in 2003 with the invasion of Iraq by a United States-led coalition that toppled the government of Saddam Hussein. The conflict continued for much of the next decade as an insurgency emerged to oppose the occupying forces and the post-invasion Iraqi government.[52] An estimated 151,000 to 600,000 or more Iraqis were killed in the first 3–4 years of conflict. The United States officially withdrew from the country in 2011 but left private security contractors in its place to continue the war.[53] It again became re-involved in 2014 at the head of a new coalition; the insurgency and many dimensions of the civil armed conflict continue.

The invasion began on 20 March 2003, with the U.S., joined by the United Kingdom and several coalition allies, launching a “shock and awe” bombing campaign. Iraqi forces were quickly overwhelmed as U.S. forces swept through the country. The invasion led to the collapse of the Ba’athist government; President Saddam Hussein was captured during Operation Red Dawn in December of that same year and executed by a military court three years later. However, the power vacuum following Saddam’s demise and the mismanagement of the occupation led to widespread sectarian violence between Shias and Sunnis, as well as a lengthy insurgency against U.S. and coalition forces. The United States responded with a troop surge in 2007. The U.S. began withdrawing its troops in the winter of 2007–08. The winding down of U.S. involvement in Iraq accelerated under President Barack Obama. The U.S. formally withdrew all combat troops from Iraq by December 2011.[54]

The Bush administration based its rationale for war principally on the assertion that Iraq possessed weapons of mass destruction (WMDs) and that the Iraqi government posed an immediate threat to the United States and its coalition allies.[55][56] Select U.S. officials accused Saddam of harboring and supporting al-Qaeda,[57] while others cited the desire to end a repressive dictatorship and bring democracy to the people of Iraq.[58][59] After the invasion, no substantial evidence was found to verify the initial claims about WMDs. The rationale and misrepresentation of pre-war intelligence faced heavy criticism within the U.S. and internationally.[60]

In the aftermath of the invasion, Iraq held multi-party elections in 2005. Nouri al-Maliki became Prime Minister in 2006 and remained in office until 2014. The al-Maliki government enacted policies that were widely seen as having the effect of alienating the country’s Sunni minority and worsening sectarian tensions. In the summer of 2014, the Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant (ISIL) launched a military offensive in Northern Iraq and declared a worldwide Islamic caliphate, eliciting another military response from the United States and its allies. The Iraq War caused hundreds of thousands of civilian, and thousands of military casualties (see estimates below). The majority of casualties occurred as a result of the insurgency and civil conflicts between 2004 and 2007.

Contents

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Background[edit]

Western arming of Iraq[edit]

A 1990 Frontline report on “The arming of Iraq” said, “Officially, most Western nations participated in a total arms embargo against Iraq during the 1980s, but … Western companies, primarily in Germany and Great Britain, but also in the United States, sold Iraq the key technology for its chemical, missile, and nuclear programs. … [M]any Western governments seemed remarkably indifferent, if not enthusiastic, about those deals. … [I]n Washington, the government consistently followed a policy which allowed and perhaps encouraged the extraordinary growth of Saddam Hussein’s arsenal and his power.”[61] The Western arming of Iraq took place in the context of the Iran-Iraq War, which had seen NATO lose a valuable ally in Iran after the Iranian Revolution.

Iraq disarmament and pre-war intelligence[edit]

Prior to September 2002, the CIA was the George W. Bush administration‘s main provider of intelligence on Iraq. In September, a Pentagon unit called the Office of Special Plans (OSP) was created by Paul Wolfowitz and Douglas Feith, and headed by Feith, as charged by then-United States Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld, to supply senior Bush administration officials with raw intelligence pertaining to Iraq.[62] Seymour Hersh writes that, according to a Pentagon adviser, “[OSP] was created in order to find evidence of what Wolfowitz and his boss, Defense Secretary Donald Rumsfeld, wanted to be true—that Saddam Hussein had close ties to Al Qaeda, and that Iraq had an enormous arsenal of chemical, biological, and possibly even nuclear weapons (WMD) that threatened the region and, potentially, the United States. […] ‘The agency [CIA] was out to disprove linkage between Iraq and terrorism’ the Pentagon adviser told me.”[63]

U.N. weapons inspections resume[edit]

The issue of Iraq’s disarmament reached a turning point in 2002–03, when US president George W. Bush demanded a complete end to alleged Iraqi production of weapons of mass destruction and full compliance with U.N. Security Council Resolutions requiring U.N. weapons inspectors unfettered access to suspected weapons production facilities. The U.N. had prohibited Iraq from developing or possessing such weapons after the Gulf War and required Iraq to permit inspections confirming compliance. During inspections in 1999, U.S. intelligence agents on the teams supplied the United States government with a direct feed of conversations between Iraqi security agencies as well as other information. This was confirmed by The New York Times and The Wall Street Journal.[64]

During 2002, Bush repeatedly warned of military action against Iraq unless inspections were allowed to progress unfettered. In accordance with U.N. Security Council Resolution 1441, Iraq agreed to new inspections under United Nations Monitoring, Verification and Inspection Commission (UNMOVIC) in 2002. With the cooperation of the Iraqis, a third weapons inspection team in 2003 led by David Kelly viewed and photographed two alleged mobile weapons laboratories, which were actually facilities for the production of hydrogen gas to fill artillery balloons.[65]

As part of its weapons inspection obligations, Iraq was required to supply a full declaration of its current weapons capabilities and manufacturing. On 3 November 2002, Iraq supplied an 11,800-page report to the UN Security Council and the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), stating that it had no WMDs. The IAEA and UNMOVIC, the two organizations charged with inspecting Iraq’s weapons, reported that the declaration was incomplete.[66]

Weapons of mass destruction[edit]

Yellowcake uranium[edit]

A UN weapons inspector examines an Iraqi factory in 2002.

In 1990, before the Persian Gulf War, Iraq had stockpiled 550 short tons (500 t) of yellowcake uranium at the Tuwaitha nuclear complex about 20 kilometres (12 mi) south of Baghdad.[67] In late February 2002, the CIA sent former Ambassador Joseph C. Wilson to investigate reports (later found to be forgeries) that Iraq was attempting to purchase additional yellowcake from Niger. Wilson returned and informed the CIA that reports of yellowcake sales to Iraq were “unequivocally wrong.”[68] The Bush administration, however, continued to allege Iraq’s attempts to obtain additional yellowcake were a justification for military action, most prominently in the January 2003, State of the Union address, in which President Bush declared that Iraq had sought uranium, citing British intelligence sources.[69]

In response, Wilson wrote a critical New York Times op-ed piece in June 2003 stating that he had personally investigated claims of yellowcake purchases and believed them to be fraudulent.[70][71] After Wilson’s op-ed, Wilson’s wife Valerie Plame was publicly identified as an undercover CIA analyst by the columnist Robert Novak. This led to a Justice Department investigation into the source of the leak. The federal investigation led to the conviction of Scooter Libby, Vice President Dick Cheney’s chief of staff, on charges of perjury and obstruction of justice.[67]

On 1 May 2005, the “Downing Street memo” was published in The Sunday Times. It contained an overview of a secret 23 July 2002 meeting among British government, Ministry of Defence, and British intelligence figures who discussed the build-up to the Iraq war—including direct references to classified U.S. policy of the time. The memo stated that “Bush wanted to remove Saddam, through military action, justified by the conjunction of terrorism and WMD. But the intelligence and facts were being fixed around the policy”.[72]

In September 2002, the Bush administration, the CIA and the DIA (Defense Intelligence Agency) said attempts by Iraq to acquire high-strength aluminum tubes were prohibited under the UN monitoring program and pointed to a clandestine effort to make centrifuges to enrich uranium for nuclear bombs.[73][74] This analysis was opposed by the United States Department of Energy (DOE) and INR, which was significant because of DOE’s expertise in such gas centrifuges and nuclear weapons programs. The DOE and INR argued that the Iraqi tubes were poorly suited for centrifuges and that while it was technically possible with additional modification, conventional military uses were more plausible.[75] A report released by the Institute for Science and International Security in 2002 reported that it was highly unlikely that the tubes could be used to enrich uranium.[76]

An effort by the DOE to correct this detail in comments prepared for United States Secretary of State Colin Powell‘s UN appearance was rebuffed by the administration[76][77] and Powell, in his address to the UN Security Council just before the war, referenced the aluminum tubes, stating that while experts disagreed on whether or not the tubes were destined for a centrifuge program, the specifications of the tubes were unusually tight.[78] Powell later admitted he had presented what turned out to be an inaccurate case to the UN on Iraqi weapons, and the intelligence he was relying on was, in some cases, “deliberately misleading.”[79][80][81] After the 2008 U.S. presidential election, and the election of Democratic party nominee Barack Obama, President Bush stated that “[my] biggest regret of all the presidency has to have been the intelligence failure in Iraq”.[82]

Poison gas[edit]

The CIA had contacted Iraq’s foreign minister, Naji Sabri, who was being paid by the French as an agent. Sabri informed them that Saddam had hidden poison gas among Sunni tribesmen, had ambitions for a nuclear program but that it was not active, and that no biological weapons were being produced or stockpiled, although research was underway.[83] According to Sidney Blumenthal, George Tenet briefed Bush on 18 September 2002, that Sabri had informed them that Iraq did not have WMD.

On 21 June 2006, the U.S. House of Representatives Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence released key points from a classified report from the National Ground Intelligence Center on the recovery of degraded chemical munitions in Iraq. The report stated, “Coalition forces have recovered approximately 500 weapons munitions which contain potentially lethal mustard and pure sarin nerve agent.” However, all are thought to be pre-1991 Gulf War munitions.[84] According to the commander of the National Ground Intelligence Center “These are chemical weapons as defined under the Chemical Weapons Convention, and yes … they do constitute weapons of mass destruction,”. In 2006, 2,400 nerve-agent rockets were found in a single compound.[85]

In October 2014, the New York Times reported that U.S. servicemen had been exposed and injured during the disposal and destruction of abandoned 4,990 chemical weapons that had been discovered in Iraq.[86] CBS News reported that the U.S. government had concealed the fact that troops had been injured by chemical weapons.[87][88] US soldiers reporting exposure to mustard gas and sarin allege they were required to keep their exposure secret, sometimes declined admission to hospital and evacuation home despite the request of their commanders.[88] “We were absolutely told not to talk about it” by a colonel, the former sergeant said.[88]

In November 2014, the Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons reported the recovery and destruction of 4,530 aging chemical weapons by American forces.[89]

In February 2015, The New York Times revealed that following the recovery of 17 Borak in 2004 and early 2005, the United States began acquiring and destroying Borak rockets. The “extraordinary arms purchase plan”, known as Operation Avarice, continued into 2006 and led to the destroying of more than 400 Borak rockets filled with sarin. The sarin was of a higher purity level than that produced in Iraq in the 1980s.[90]

Biological weapons[edit]

Based on reports obtained by the German intelligence service from an Iraqi defector codenamed “Curveball“, Colin Powell presented evidence to the United Nations security council that Iraq had an active biological weapons programs. On 15 February 2011, the defector—a scientist identified as Rafid Ahmed Alwan al-Janabi—admitted to journalists working for The Guardian newspaper that he lied to the Bundesnachrichtendienst in order to strengthen the case against Saddam Hussein, whom he wished to see removed from power.[91]

Post-invasion views on WMD[edit]

In December 2009, the former British prime minister, Tony Blair, stated that he “would still have thought it right to remove [Saddam Hussein]” regardless of whether Iraq possessed weapons of mass destruction or not.[92]

Preparations[edit]

President George Bush, surrounded by leaders of the House and Senate, announces the Joint Resolution to Authorize the Use of United States Armed Forces Against Iraq, 2 October 2002.

Excerpt from Donald Rumsfeld memo dated 27 November 2001[93]

In the days immediately following 9/11, the Bush Administration national security team actively debated an invasion of Iraq. A memo written by Sec. Rumsfeld dated 27 November 2001 considers a U.S.–Iraq war. One section of the memo questions “How start?”, listing multiple possible justifications for a U.S.–Iraq War.[93]

During 2002, the amount of ordnance used by British and American aircraft patrolling the no-fly zones of Iraq increased compared to the previous years[94] and by August had “become a full air offensive”. Tommy Franks, the allied commander, later stated that the bombing was designed to “degrade” the Iraqi air defense system before an invasion.[95]

In October 2002, a few days before the United States Senate voted on the Joint Resolution to Authorize the Use of United States Armed Forces Against Iraq, about 75 senators were told in closed session that Iraq had the means of attacking the Eastern Seaboard of the U.S. with biological or chemical weapons delivered by unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs.)[56] On 5 February 2003, Colin Powell presented further evidence in his Iraqi WMD program presentation to the UN Security Council that UAVs were ready to be launched against the United States. At the time, there was a vigorous dispute within the U.S. military and intelligence communities over the accuracy of the CIA’s conclusions about Iraqi UAVs.[96] Other intelligence agencies suggested that Iraq did not possess any offensive UAV capability, saying the few they had been designed for surveillance and intended for reconnaissance.[97] The Senate voted to approve the Joint Resolution with the support of large bipartisan majorities on 11 October 2002, providing the Bush administration with a legal basis for the U.S. invasion under U.S. law.

The resolution granted the authorization by the Constitution of the United States and the United States Congress for the President to command the military to fight anti-United States violence. Citing the Iraq Liberation Act of 1998, the resolution reiterated that it should be the policy of the United States to remove the Saddam regime and promote a democratic replacement. The authorization was signed by President George W. Bush on 16 October 2002.

Chief UN weapons inspector Hans Blix remarked in January 2003 that “Iraq appears not to have come to a genuine acceptance—not even today—of the disarmament, which was demanded of it and which it needs to carry out to win the confidence of the world and to live in peace.”[98] Among other things he noted that 1,000 short tons (910 t) of chemical agent were unaccounted for, information on Iraq’s VX nerve agent program was missing, and that “no convincing evidence” was presented for the destruction of 8,500 litres (1,900 imp gal; 2,200 US gal) of anthrax that had been declared.[98]

United States Secretary of StateColin Powell holding a model vial of anthrax while giving a presentation to the United Nations Security Council

In the 2003 State of the Union address, President Bush said “we know that Iraq, in the late 1990s, had several mobile biological weapons labs”. On 5 February 2003, Secretary of State Colin Powell appeared before the UN to present evidence that Iraq was hiding unconventional weapons.[99] The French government also believed that Saddam had stockpiles of anthrax and botulism toxin, and the ability to produce VX.[100] In March, Blix said progress had been made in inspections, and no evidence of WMD had been found.[101] Iraqi scientist Rafid Ahmed Alwan al-Janabi, codenamed “Curveball”, admitted in February 2011 that he had lied to the CIA about biological weapons in order to get the U.S. to attack and remove Saddam from power.[102]

From the left: French President Jacques Chirac, U.S. President George W. Bush, UK Prime Minister Tony Blair and Italian Prime Minister Silvio Berlusconi. Chirac was against the invasion, the other three leaders were in favor.

In early 2003, the U.S., British, and Spanish governments proposed the so-called “eighteenth resolution” to give Iraq a deadline for compliance with previous resolutions enforced by the threat of military action. This proposed resolution was subsequently withdrawn due to lack of support on the UN Security Council. In particular, North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) members France, Germany and Canada and non-NATO member Russia were opposed to military intervention in Iraq, due to the high level of risk to the international community’s security, and defended disarmament through diplomacy.[103][104]

A meeting between George W. Bush and Tony Blair took place on 31 January 2003, in the White House. A secret memo of this meeting purportedly showed that the Bush administration had already decided on the invasion of Iraq at that point. Bush was allegedly floating the idea of painting a U‑2 spyplane in UN colors and letting it fly low over Iraq to provoke Iraqi forces into shooting it down, thereby providing a pretext for the United States and Britain to invade. Bush and Blair made a secret deal to carry out the invasion regardless of whether WMD were discovered by UN weapons inspectors, in direct contradiction with statements Blair made to the British House of Commons afterwards that the Iraqi regime would be given a final chance to disarm. In the memo, Bush is paraphrased as saying, “The start date for the military campaign was now pencilled in for 10 March. This was when the bombing would begin.”[105] Bush said to Blair that he “thought it unlikely that there would be internecine warfare between the different religious and ethnic groups” in Iraq after the war.

Opposition to invasion[edit]

In October 2002, former U.S. President Bill Clinton warned about possible dangers of pre-emptive military action against Iraq. Speaking in the UK on a Labour Party conference he said: “As a preemptive action today, however well-justified, may come back with unwelcome consequences in the future…. I don’t care how precise your bombs and your weapons are, when you set them off, innocent people will die.”[106][107] Hillary Clinton while serving as senator voted in favor for military action, though she now says it was a mistake.[108] The majority of Democrats in Congress voted against the Authorization for Use of Military Force Against Iraq Resolution of 2002, although a majority of Democrats in the Senate voted in favor of it. Sen. Jim Webb wrote shortly before the vote “Those who are pushing for a unilateral war in Iraq know full well that there is no exit strategy if we invade.”[109]

In the same period, Pope John Paul II publicly condemned the military intervention. During a private meeting, he also said directly to George W. Bush: “Mr President, you know my opinion about Iraq War. Lets talk about something else. Every violence, against one or a million, is a blasphemy addressed to the image and likeness of God.”[110]

Anti-War protest in London, September 2002. Organised by the British Stop the War Coalition, up to 400,000 took part in the protest.[111]

On 20 January 2003, French Foreign Minister Dominique de Villepin declared “we believe that military intervention would be the worst solution”.[112] Meanwhile, anti-war groups across the world organised public protests. According to French academic Dominique Reynié, between 3 January and 12 April 2003, 36 million people across the globe took part in almost 3,000 protests against war in Iraq, with demonstrations on 15 February 2003, being the largest and most prolific.[113] Nelson Mandela voiced his opposition in late January, stating “All that (Mr. Bush) wants is Iraqi oil,” and questioning if Bush deliberately undermined the U.N. “because the secretary-general of the United Nations [was] a black man”.[114]

In February 2003, the U.S. Army’s top general, Eric Shinseki, told the Senate Armed Services Committee that it would take “several hundred thousand soldiers” to secure Iraq.[115] Two days later, U.S. Defense Secretary Donald Rumsfeld said the post-war troop commitment would be less than the number of troops required to win the war, and that “the idea that it would take several hundred thousand U.S. forces is far from the mark.” Deputy Defense Secretary Paul Wolfowitz said Shinseki’s estimate was “way off the mark,” because other countries would take part in an occupying force.[116]

In March 2003, Hans Blix reported that “no evidence of proscribed activities have so far been found” in Iraq, saying that progress was made in inspections, which would continue. He estimated the time remaining for disarmament being verified through inspections to be “months”.[101] But the U.S. government announced that “diplomacy has failed”, and that it would proceed with a coalition of allied countries—named the “coalition of the willing“—to rid Iraq of its alleged WMD.[citation needed] The U.S. government abruptly advised UN weapons inspectors to leave Baghdad immediately.[117]

There were serious legal questions surrounding the launching of the war against Iraq and the Bush Doctrine of preemptive war in general. On 16 September 2004, Kofi Annan, the Secretary General of the United Nations, said of the invasion, “I have indicated it was not in conformity with the UN Charter. From our point of view, from the Charter point of view, it was illegal.”[118]

In November 2008 Lord Bingham, the former British Law Lord, described the war as a serious violation of international law, and accused Britain and the United States of acting like a “world vigilante“. He also criticized the post-invasion record of Britain as “an occupying power in Iraq”. Regarding the treatment of Iraqi detainees in Abu Ghraib, Bingham said: “Particularly disturbing to proponents of the rule of law is the cynical lack of concern for international legality among some top officials in the Bush administration.”[119] In July 2010, Deputy Prime Minister of the UK Nick Clegg, in an official PMQs session in Parliament, condemned the invasion of Iraq as illegal.[120] Theorist Francis Fukuyama has argued that “the Iraq war and the close association it created between military invasion and democracy promotion tarnished the latter”.[121]

2003: Invasion[edit]

Destroyed remains of Iraqi tanks near Al Qadisiyah

US Marines escort captured enemy prisoners to a holding area in the desert of Iraq on 21 March 2003.

U.S. soldiers at the Hands of Victory monument in Baghdad

The first Central Intelligence Agency team entered Iraq on 10 July 2002.[122] This team was composed of members of the CIA’s Special Activities Division and was later joined by members of the U.S. military’s elite Joint Special Operations Command (JSOC).[123] Together, they prepared for the invasion of conventional forces. These efforts consisted of persuading the commanders of several Iraqi military divisions to surrender rather than oppose the invasion, and to identify all the initial leadership targets during very high risk reconnaissance missions.[123]

Most importantly, their efforts organized the Kurdish Peshmerga to become the northern front of the invasion. Together this force defeated Ansar al-Islam in Iraqi Kurdistan before the invasion and then defeated the Iraqi army in the north.[123][124] The battle against Ansar al-Islam led to the death of a substantial number of militants and the uncovering of a chemical weapons facility at Sargat.[122][125]

At 5:34 a.m. Baghdad time on 20 March 2003 (9:34 p.m., 19 March EST) the surprise[126] military invasion of Iraq began.[127] There was no declaration of war.[128] The 2003 invasion of Iraq, led by U.S. Army General Tommy Franks, under the code-name “Operation Iraqi Freedom”,[129] the UK code-name Operation Telic, and the Australian code-name Operation Falconer. Coalition forces also cooperated with Kurdish Peshmerga forces in the north. Approximately forty other governments, the “Coalition of the Willing,” participated by providing troops, equipment, services, security, and special forces, with 248,000 soldiers from the United States, 45,000 British soldiers, 2,000 Australian soldiers and 194 Polish soldiers from Special Forces unit GROM sent to Kuwait for the invasion.[130] The invasion force was also supported by Iraqi Kurdish militia troops, estimated to number upwards of 70,000.[131]

Iraqi tank on Highway 27 destroyed in April 2003

According to General Tommy Franks, there were eight objectives of the invasion, “First, ending the regime of Saddam Hussein. Second, to identify, isolate, and eliminate Iraq’s weapons of mass destruction. Third, to search for, to capture, and to drive out terrorists from that country. Fourth, to collect such intelligence as we can relate to terrorist networks. Fifth, to collect such intelligence as we can relate to the global network of illicit weapons of mass destruction. Sixth, to end sanctions and to immediately deliver humanitarian support to the displaced and to many needy Iraqi citizens. Seventh, to secure Iraq’s oil fields and resources, which belong to the Iraqi people. And last, to help the Iraqi people create conditions for a transition to a representative self-government.”[132]

Map of the invasion routes and major operations/battles of the Iraq War as of 2007

The invasion was a quick and decisive operation encountering major resistance, though not what the U.S., British and other forces expected. The Iraqi regime had prepared to fight both a conventional and irregular war at the same time, conceding territory when faced with superior conventional forces, largely armored, but launching smaller scale attacks in the rear using fighters dressed in civilian and paramilitary clothes. Since the initiation of the war in Iraq, numerous programs were created to “enhance psychological resilience and prevent psychological morbidity in troops.”[133]

Coalition troops launched air and amphibious assault on the Al-Faw peninsula to secure the oil fields there and the important ports, supported by warships of the Royal Navy, Polish Navy, and Royal Australian Navy. The United States Marine Corps15th  Marine Expeditionary Unit, attached to 3 Commando Brigade and the Polish Special Forces unit GROM attacked the port of Umm Qasr, while the British Army‘s 16 Air Assault Brigade secured the oil fields in southern Iraq.

photograph of three Marines entering a partially destroyed stone palace with a mural of Arabic script

U.S. Marines from 1st Battalion 7th Marines enter a palace during the Fall of Baghdad.

The heavy armor of the U.S. 3rd Infantry Division moved westward and then northward through the western desert toward Baghdad, while the 1st Marine Expeditionary Force moved more easterly along Highway 1 through the center of the country, and 1 (UK) Armoured Division moved northward through the eastern marshland. The U.S. 1st Marine Division fought through Nasiriyah in a battle to seize the major road junction and nearby Talil Airfield. The United States Army 3rd Infantry Division defeated Iraqi forces entrenched in and around the airfield.

With the Nasiriyah and Talil Airfields secured in its rear, the 3rd Infantry Division supported by 101st Airborne Division continued its attack north toward Najaf and Karbala, but a severe sand storm slowed the coalition advance and there was a halt to consolidate and make sure the supply lines were secure. When they started again they secured the Karbala Gap, a key approach to Baghdad, then secured the bridges over the Euphrates River, and U.S. forces poured through the gap on to Baghdad. In the middle of Iraq, the 1st Marine Division fought its way to the eastern side of Baghdad, and prepared for the attack into Baghdad to seize it.[134]

In the north, OIF‑1 used the largest special operations force since the successful attack on the Taliban government of Afghanistan just over a year earlier.

On 9 April, Baghdad fell, ending Saddam’s 24‑year rule. U.S. forces seized the deserted Ba’ath Party ministries and stage-managed[135] the tearing down of a huge iron statue of Saddam, photos and video of which became symbolic of the event, although later controversial. Not seen in the photos or heard on the videos, shot with a zoom lens, was the chant of the inflamed crowd for Muqtada al-Sadr, the radical Shiite cleric.[136] In November 2008, Iraqi protesters staged a similar stomping on and burning of an effigy of George W. Bush.[137] The abrupt fall of Baghdad was accompanied by a widespread outpouring of gratitude toward the invaders, but also massive civil disorder, including the looting of public and government buildings and drastically increased crime.[138][139]

According to the Pentagon, 250,000 short tons (230,000 t) (of 650,000 short tons (590,000 t) total) of ordnance was looted, providing a significant source of ammunition for the Iraqi insurgency. The invasion phase concluded when Tikrit, Saddam’s home town, fell with little resistance to the U.S. Marines of Task Force Tripoli.

In the invasion phase of the war (19 March–30 April), an estimated 9,200 Iraqi combatants were killed by coalition forces along with an estimated 3,750 non-combatants, i.e. civilians who did not take up arms.[140] Coalition forces reported the death in combat of 139 U.S. military personnel[141] and 33 UK military personnel.[142]

2003–11: Post-invasion phase[edit]

2003: Beginnings of insurgency[edit]

A Marine Corps M1 Abrams tank patrols a Baghdad street after its fall in 2003 during Operation Iraqi Freedom.

18 May 2004: Staff Sgt. Kevin Jessen checks the underside of two anti-tank mines found in a village outside Ad Dujayl in the Sunni Triangle.

Polish GROM forces in sea operations during Operation Iraqi Freedom

Marines from D Company, 3rd Light Armored Reconnaissance Battalion guard detainees prior to loading them into their vehicle.

On 1 May 2003, President Bush visited the aircraft carrier USS Abraham Lincoln operating a few miles west of San Diego, California. At sunset Bush held his nationally televised “Mission Accomplished” speech, delivered before the sailors and airmen on the flight deck: Bush declared victory due to the defeat of Iraq’s conventional forces.

Nevertheless, Saddam remained at large and significant pockets of resistance remained. After President Bush’s speech, coalition forces noticed a gradually increasing flurry of attacks on its troops in various regions, especially in the “Sunni Triangle“.[143] The initial Iraqi insurgents were supplied by hundreds of weapons caches created before the invasion by the Iraqi army and Republican Guard.

Initially, Iraqi resistance (described by the coalition as “Anti-Iraqi Forces”) largely stemmed from fedayeen and Saddam/Ba’ath Party loyalists, but soon religious radicals and Iraqis angered by the occupation contributed to the insurgency. The three provinces with the highest number of attacks were Baghdad, Al Anbar, and Salah Ad Din. Those three provinces account for 35% of the population, but as of 5 December 2006, were responsible for 73% of U.S. military deaths and an even higher percentage of recent U.S. military deaths (about 80%.)[144]

Insurgents used guerrilla tactics including: mortars, missiles, suicide attacks, snipers, improvised explosive devices (IEDs), car bombs, small arms fire (usually with assault rifles), and RPGs (rocket propelled grenades), as well as sabotage against the petroleum, water, and electrical infrastructure.

Post-invasion Iraq coalition efforts commenced after the fall of Saddam’s regime. The coalition nations, together with the United Nations, began to work to establish a stable, compliant democratic state capable of defending itself from non-coalition forces, as well as overcoming internal divisions.[145][146]

Meanwhile, coalition military forces launched several operations around the Tigris River peninsula and in the Sunni Triangle. A series of similar operations were launched throughout the summer in the Sunni Triangle. Toward the end of 2003, the intensity and pace of insurgent attacks began to increase. A sharp surge in guerrilla attacks ushered in an insurgent effort that was termed the “Ramadan Offensive“, as it coincided with the beginning of the Muslim holy month of Ramadan.

To counter this offensive, coalition forces began to use air power and artillery again for the first time since the end of the invasion by striking suspected ambush sites and mortar launching positions. Surveillance of major routes, patrols, and raids on suspected insurgents were stepped up. In addition, two villages, including Saddam’s birthplace of al-Auja and the small town of Abu Hishma were surrounded by barbed wire and carefully monitored.

Coalition Provisional Authority and the Iraq Survey Group[edit]

Occupation zones in Iraq as of September 2003

Shortly after the invasion, the multinational coalition created the Coalition Provisional Authority (CPA; Arabic: سلطة الائتلاف الموحدة‎‎), based in the Green Zone, as a transitional government of Iraq until the establishment of a democratic government. Citing United Nations Security Council Resolution 1483 (22 May 2003) and the laws of war, the CPA vested itself with executive, legislative, and judicial authority over the Iraqi government from the period of the CPA’s inception on 21 April 2003, until its dissolution on 28 June 2004.

The CPA was originally headed by Jay Garner, a former U.S. military officer, but his appointment lasted only until 11 May 2003, when President Bush appointed L. Paul Bremer. On 16 May 2003 on his first day on the job Paul Bremer issued CPA executive order No1 to exclude from the new Iraqi government and administration members of the Baathist party. This eventually led to the removal of 85,000 to 100,000 Iraqi people from their job,[147]including 40,000 school teachers who had joined the Baath Party simply to keep their jobs. U.S. army general Sanchez called the decision a “catastrophic failure”[148] Bremer served until the CPA’s dissolution in July 2004.

Another group created by the multinational force in Iraq post-invasion was the 1,400-member international Iraq Survey Group who conducted a fact-finding mission to find Iraqi weapons of mass destruction (WMD) programmes. In 2004 the ISG’s Duelfer Report[149] stated that Iraq did not have a viable WMD program.

Capturing former government leaders[edit]

Saddam Hussein being pulled from his hideaway in Operation Red Dawn, 13 December 2003.

Two insurgents in Iraq with SA-7b and SA-14 MANPADS

In the summer of 2003, the multinational forces focused on capturing the remaining leaders of the former government. On 22 July, a raid by the U.S. 101st Airborne Division and soldiers from Task Force 20 killed Saddam’s sons (Uday and Qusay) along with one of his grandsons. In all, over 300 top leaders of the former government were killed or captured, as well as numerous lesser functionaries and military personnel.

Most significantly, Saddam Hussein himself was captured on 13 December 2003, on a farm near Tikrit in Operation Red Dawn.[150] The operation was conducted by the United States Army‘s 4th Infantry Division and members of Task Force 121. Intelligence on Saddam’s whereabouts came from his family members and former bodyguards.[151]

With the capture of Saddam and a drop in the number of insurgent attacks, some concluded the multinational forces were prevailing in the fight against the insurgency. The provisional government began training the new Iraqi security forces intended to police the country, and the United States promised over $20 billion in reconstruction money in the form of credit against Iraq’s future oil revenues. Oil revenue was also used for rebuilding schools and for work on the electrical and refining infrastructure.

Shortly after the capture of Saddam, elements left out of the Coalition Provisional Authority began to agitate for elections and the formation of an Iraqi Interim Government. Most prominent among these was the Shia cleric Grand Ayatollah Ali al-Sistani. The Coalition Provisional Authority opposed allowing democratic elections at this time.[152] The insurgents stepped up their activities. The two most turbulent centers were the area around Fallujah and the poor Shia sections of cities from Baghdad (Sadr City) to Basra in the south.

2004: Insurgency expands[edit]

Main article: 2004 in Iraq
See also: Military operations of the Iraq War for a list of all Coalition operations for this period, 2004 in Iraq, Iraqi coalition counter-insurgency operations, Iraqi insurgency (2003–11), United States occupation of Fallujah, Iraq Spring Fighting of 2004
File:Apache-killing-Iraq.avi.ogg

Footage from the gun camera of a U.S. Apache helicopter killing suspected Iraqi insurgents[153]

Coalition Provisional Authority director L. Paul Bremer signs over sovereignty to the appointed Iraqi Interim Government, 28 June 2004.

The start of 2004 was marked by a relative lull in violence. Insurgent forces reorganised during this time, studying the multinational forces’ tactics and planning a renewed offensive. However, violence did increase during the Iraq Spring Fighting of 2004 with foreign fighters from around the Middle East as well as al-Qaeda in Iraq (an affiliated al-Qaeda group), led by Abu Musab al-Zarqawi helping to drive the insurgency.[citation needed]

U.S. troops fire mortars

As the insurgency grew there was a distinct change in targeting from the coalition forces towards the new Iraqi Security Forces, as hundreds of Iraqi civilians and police were killed over the next few months in a series of massive bombings. An organized Sunni insurgency, with deep roots and both nationalist and Islamist motivations, was becoming more powerful throughout Iraq. The Shia Mahdi Army also began launching attacks on coalition targets in an attempt to seize control from Iraqi security forces. The southern and central portions of Iraq were beginning to erupt in urban guerrilla combat as multinational forces attempted to keep control and prepared for a counteroffensive.

A USMC M198 artillery piece firing outside Fallujah in October 2004.

The most serious fighting of the war so far began on 31 March 2004, when Iraqi insurgents in Fallujah ambushed a Blackwater USA convoy led by four U.S. private military contractors who were providing security for food caterers Eurest Support Services.[154] The four armed contractors, Scott Helvenston, Jerko Zovko, Wesley Batalona, and Michael Teague, were killed with grenades and small arms fire. Subsequently, their bodies were dragged from their vehicles by local people, beaten, set ablaze, and their burned corpses hung over a bridge crossing the Euphrates.[155] Photos of the event were released to news agencies worldwide, causing a great deal of indignation and moral outrage in the United States, and prompting an unsuccessful “pacification” of the city: the First Battle of Fallujah in April 2004.

The offensive was resumed in November 2004 in the bloodiest battle of the war so far: the Second Battle of Fallujah, described by the U.S. military as “the heaviest urban combat (that they had been involved in) since the battle of Hue City in Vietnam.”[156] During the assault, U.S. forces used white phosphorus as an incendiary weapon against insurgent personnel, attracting controversy. The 46‑day battle resulted in a victory for the coalition, with 95 U.S. soldiers killed along with approximately 1,350 insurgents. Fallujah was totally devastated during the fighting, though civilian casualties were low, as they had mostly fled before the battle.[157]

Another major event of that year was the revelation of widespread prisoner abuse at Abu Ghraib, which received international media attention in April 2004. First reports of the Abu Ghraib prisoner abuse, as well as graphic pictures showing U.S. military personnel taunting and abusing Iraqi prisoners, came to public attention from a 60 Minutes II news report (28 April) and a Seymour M. Hersh article in The New Yorker (posted online on 30 April.)[158] Military correspondent Thomas Ricks claimed that these revelations dealt a blow to the moral justifications for the occupation in the eyes of many people, especially Iraqis, and was a turning point in the war.[159]

2004 also marked the beginning of Military Transition Teams in Iraq, which were teams of U.S. military advisors assigned directly to New Iraqi Army units.

2005: Elections and transitional government[edit]

Further information: 2005 in Iraq and Military transition team

Convention center for Council of Representatives of Iraq

On 31 January, Iraqis elected the Iraqi Transitional Government in order to draft a permanent constitution. Although some violence and a widespread Sunni boycott marred the event, most of the eligible Kurd and Shia populace participated. On 4 February, Paul Wolfowitz announced that 15,000 U.S. troops whose tours of duty had been extended in order to provide election security would be pulled out of Iraq by the next month.[160] February to April proved to be relatively peaceful months compared to the carnage of November and January, with insurgent attacks averaging 30 a day from the prior average of 70.

The Battle of Abu Ghraib on 2 April 2005 was an attack on United States forces at Abu Ghraib prison, which consisted of heavy mortar and rocket fire, under which armed insurgents attacked with grenades, small arms, and two vehicle-borne improvised explosive devices (VBIED). The U.S. force’s munitions ran so low that orders to fix bayonets were given in preparation for hand-to-hand fighting. An estimated 80–120 armed insurgents launched a massive coordinated assault on the U.S. military facility and internment camp at Abu Ghraib, Iraq. It was considered to be the largest coordinated assault on a U.S. base since the Vietnam War.[161]

Hopes for a quick end to the insurgency and a withdrawal of U.S. troops were dashed in May, Iraq’s bloodiest month since the invasion. Suicide bombers, believed to be mainly disheartened Iraqi Sunni Arabs, Syrians and Saudis, tore through Iraq. Their targets were often Shia gatherings or civilian concentrations of Shias. As a result, over 700 Iraqi civilians died in that month, as well as 79 U.S. soldiers.

The summer of 2005 saw fighting around Baghdad and at Tall Afar in northwestern Iraq as U.S. forces tried to seal off the Syrian border. This led to fighting in the autumn in the small towns of the Euphrates valley between the capital and that border.[162]

A referendum was held on 15 October in which the new Iraqi constitution was ratified. An Iraqi national assembly was elected in December, with participation from the Sunnis as well as the Kurds and Shia.[162]

Insurgent attacks increased in 2005 with 34,131 recorded incidents, compared to a total 26,496 for the previous year.[163]

2006: Civil war and permanent Iraqi government[edit]

The beginning of 2006 was marked by government creation talks, growing sectarian violence, and continuous anti-coalition attacks. Sectarian violence expanded to a new level of intensity following the al-Askari Mosque bombing in the Iraqi city of Samarra, on 22 February 2006. The explosion at the mosque, one of the holiest sites in Shi’a Islam, is believed to have been caused by a bomb planted by al-Qaeda.

Although no injuries occurred in the blast, the mosque was severely damaged and the bombing resulted in violence over the following days. Over 100 dead bodies with bullet holes were found on 23 February, and at least 165 people are thought to have been killed. In the aftermath of this attack the U.S. military calculated that the average homicide rate in Baghdad tripled from 11 to 33 deaths per day. In 2006 the UN described the environment in Iraq as a “civil war-like situation”.[164]

On March 12, five United States Army soldiers of the 502nd Infantry Regiment, raped the 14-year-old Iraqi girl Abeer Qassim Hamza al‑Janabi, and then murdered her, her father, her mother Fakhriya Taha Muhasen and her six-year-old sister Hadeel Qassim Hamza al-Janabi. The soldiers then set fire to the girl’s body to conceal evidence of the crime.[165] Four of the soldiers were convicted of rape and murder and the fifth was convicted of lesser crimes for the involvement in the war crime, that became known as the Mahmudiyah killings.[166][167]

Nouri al-Maliki meets with George W. Bush, June 2006

On 6 June 2006, the United States was successful in tracking Abu Musab al-Zarqawi, the leader of al-Qaeda in Iraq who was killed in a targeted killing, while attending a meeting in an isolated safehouse approximately 8 km (5.0 mi) north of Baqubah. Having been tracked by a British UAV, radio contact was made between the controller and two United States Air Force F-16C jets, which identified the house and at 14:15 GMT, the lead jet dropped two 500‑pound (230 kg) guided bombs, a laser-guided GBU‑12 and GPS-guided GBU‑38 on the building where he was located at. Six others—three male and three female individuals—were also reported killed. Among those killed were one of his wives and their child.

The current government of Iraq took office on 20 May 2006, following approval by the members of the Iraqi National Assembly. This followed the general election in December 2005. The government succeeded the Iraqi Transitional Government, which had continued in office in a caretaker capacity until the formation of the permanent government.

Iraq Study Group report and Saddam’s execution[edit]

The Iraq Study Group Report was released on 6 December 2006. Iraq Study Group, made up of people from both of the major U.S. parties, was led by co-chairs James Baker, a former Secretary of State (Republican), and Lee H. Hamilton, a former U.S. Representative (Democrat). It concluded that “the situation in Iraq is grave and deteriorating” and “U.S. forces seem to be caught in a mission that has no foreseeable end.” The report’s 79 recommendations include increasing diplomatic measures with Iran and Syria and intensifying efforts to train Iraqi troops. On 18 December, a Pentagon report found that insurgent attacks were averaging about 960 attacks per week, the highest since the reports had begun in 2005.[168]

Coalition forces formally transferred control of a province to the Iraqi government, the first since the war. Military prosecutors charged eight U.S. Marines with the murders of 24 Iraqi civilians in Haditha in November 2005, 10 of them women and children. Four officers were also charged with dereliction of duty in relation to the event.[169]

Saddam Hussein was hanged on 30 December 2006, after being found guilty of crimes against humanity by an Iraqi court after a year-long trial.[170]

2007: U.S. troops surge[edit]

President George W. Bush announces the new strategy on Iraq from the White House Library, 10 January 2007.

In a January 10, 2007, televised address to the U.S. public, Bush proposed 21,500 more troops for Iraq, a job program for Iraqis, more reconstruction proposals, and $1.2 billion for these programs.[171] On 23 January 2007, in the 2007 State of the Union Address, Bush announced “deploying reinforcements of more than 20,000 additional soldiers and Marines to Iraq”.

On 10 February 2007, David Petraeus was made commander of Multi-National Force – Iraq (MNF-I), the four-star post that oversees all coalition forces in country, replacing General George Casey. In his new position, Petraeus oversaw all coalition forces in Iraq and employed them in the new “Surge” strategy outlined by the Bush administration.[172][173] 2007 also saw a sharp increase in insurgent chlorine bombings.

On 10 May 2007, 144 Iraqi Parliamentary lawmakers signed onto a legislative petition calling on the United States to set a timetable for withdrawal.[174] On 3 June 2007, the Iraqi Parliament voted 85 to 59 to require the Iraqi government to consult with Parliament before requesting additional extensions of the UN Security Council Mandate for Coalition operations in Iraq.[175] Despite this, the mandate was renewed on 18 December 2007, without the approval of the Iraqi parliament.[176]

Pressures on U.S. troops were compounded by the continuing withdrawal of coalition forces.[citation needed] In early 2007, British Prime Minister Blair announced that following Operation Sinbad British troops would begin to withdraw from Basra Governorate, handing security over to the Iraqis.[177] In July Danish Prime Minister Anders Fogh Rasmussen also announced the withdrawal of 441 Danish troops from Iraq, leaving only a unit of nine soldiers manning four observational helicopters.[178]

Planned troop reduction[edit]

In a speech made to Congress on 10 September 2007, Petraeus “envisioned the withdrawal of roughly 30,000 U.S. troops by next summer, beginning with a Marine contingent [in September].”[179] On 13 September, Bush backed a limited withdrawal of troops from Iraq.[180] Bush said 5,700 personnel would be home by Christmas 2007, and expected thousands more to return by July 2008. The plan would take troop numbers back to their level before the surge at the beginning of 2007.

Effects of the surge on security[edit]

U.S. soldiers take cover during a firefight with insurgents in the Al Doura section of Baghdad 7 March 2007.

By March 2008, violence in Iraq was reported curtailed by 40–80%, according to a Pentagon report.[181] Independent reports[182][183] raised questions about those assessments. An Iraqi military spokesman claimed that civilian deaths since the start of the troop surge plan were 265 in Baghdad, down from 1,440 in the four previous weeks. The New York Times counted more than 450 Iraqi civilians killed during the same 28‑day period, based on initial daily reports from Iraqi Interior Ministry and hospital officials.

Historically, the daily counts tallied by The New York Times have underestimated the total death toll by 50% or more when compared to studies by the United Nations, which rely upon figures from the Iraqi Health Ministry and morgue figures.[184]

The rate of U.S. combat deaths in Baghdad nearly doubled to 3.14 per day in the first seven weeks of the “surge” in security activity, compared to previous period. Across the rest of Iraq it decreased slightly.[185][186]

On 14 August 2007, the deadliest single attack of the whole war occurred. Nearly 800 civilians were killed by a series of coordinated suicide bomb attacks on the northern Iraqi settlement of Kahtaniya. More than 100 homes and shops were destroyed in the blasts. U.S. officials blamed al‑Qaeda. The targeted villagers belonged to the non-Muslim Yazidi ethnic minority. The attack may have represented the latest in a feud that erupted earlier that year when members of the Yazidi community stoned to death a teenage girl called Du’a Khalil Aswad accused of dating a Sunni Arab man and converting to Islam. The killing of the girl was recorded on camera-mobiles and the video was uploaded onto the internet.[187][188][189][190]

On 13 September 2007, Abdul Sattar Abu Risha was killed in a bomb attack in the city of Ramadi.[191] He was an important U.S. ally because he led the “Anbar Awakening“, an alliance of Sunni Arab tribes that opposed al-Qaeda. The latter organisation claimed responsibility for the attack.[192] A statement posted on the Internet by the shadowy Islamic State of Iraq called Abu Risha “one of the dogs of Bush” and described Thursday’s killing as a “heroic operation that took over a month to prepare”.[193]

A graph of U.S. troop fatalities in Iraq March 2003 – July 2010, the orange and blue months are the period of the troop surge and its aftermath.

There was a reported trend of decreasing U.S. troop deaths after May 2007,[194] and violence against coalition troops had fallen to the “lowest levels since the first year of the American invasion”.[195] These, and several other positive developments, were attributed to the surge by many analysts.[196]

Data from the Pentagon and other U.S. agencies such as the Government Accountability Office (GAO) found that daily attacks against civilians in Iraq remained “about the same” since February. The GAO also stated that there was no discernible trend in sectarian violence.[197] However, this report ran counter to reports to Congress, which showed a general downward trend in civilian deaths and ethno-sectarian violence since December 2006.[198] By late 2007, as the U.S. troop surge began to wind down, violence in Iraq had begun to decrease from its 2006 highs.[199]

Entire neighborhoods in Baghdad were ethnically cleansed by Shia and Sunni militias and sectarian violence has broken out in every Iraqi city where there is a mixed population.[200][201][202] Investigative reporter Bob Woodward cites U.S. government sources according to which the U.S. “surge” was not the primary reason for the drop in violence in 2007–08. Instead, according to that view, the reduction of violence was due to newer covert techniques by U.S. military and intelligence officials to find, target and kill insurgents, including working closely with former insurgents.[203]

In the Shia region near Basra, British forces turned over security for the region to Iraqi Security Forces. Basra is the ninth province of Iraq’s 18 provinces to be returned to local security forces’ control since the beginning of the occupation.[204]

Political developments[edit]

Official Iraq-benchmark of the Congress, 2007

More than half of the members of Iraq’s parliament rejected the continuing occupation of their country for the first time. 144 of the 275 lawmakers signed onto a legislative petition that would require the Iraqi government to seek approval from Parliament before it requests an extension of the UN mandate for foreign forces to be in Iraq, which expires at the end of 2008. It also calls for a timetable for troop withdrawal and a freeze on the size of foreign forces. The UN Security Council mandate for U.S.‑led forces in Iraq will terminate “if requested by the government of Iraq.”[205] Under Iraqi law, the speaker must present a resolution called for by a majority of lawmakers.[206]59% of those polled in the U.S. support a timetable for withdrawal.[207]

In mid-2007, the Coalition began a controversial program to recruit Iraqi Sunnis (often former insurgents) for the formation of “Guardian” militias. These Guardian militias are intended to support and secure various Sunni neighborhoods against the Islamists.[208]

Tensions with Iran[edit]

In 2007, tensions increased greatly between Iran and Iraqi Kurdistan due to the latter’s giving sanctuary to the militant Kurdish secessionist group Party for a Free Life in Kurdistan (PEJAK.) According to reports, Iran had been shelling PEJAK positions in Iraqi Kurdistan since 16 August. These tensions further increased with an alleged border incursion on 23 August by Iranian troops who attacked several Kurdish villages killing an unknown number of civilians and militants.[209]

Coalition forces also began to target alleged Iranian Quds force operatives in Iraq, either arresting or killing suspected members. The Bush administration and coalition leaders began to publicly state that Iran was supplying weapons, particularly EFP devices, to Iraqi insurgents and militias although to date have failed to provide any proof for these allegations. Further sanctions on Iranian organizations were also announced by the Bush administration in the autumn of 2007. On 21 November 2007, Lieutenant General James Dubik, who is in charge of training Iraqi security forces, praised Iran for its “contribution to the reduction of violence” in Iraq by upholding its pledge to stop the flow of weapons, explosives and training of extremists in Iraq.[210]

Tensions with Turkey[edit]

Border incursions by PKK militants based in Northern Iraq have continued to harass Turkish forces, with casualties on both sides. In the fall of 2007, the Turkish military stated their right to cross the Iraqi Kurdistan border in “hot pursuit” of PKK militants and began shelling Kurdish areas in Iraq and attacking PKK bases in the Mount Cudi region with aircraft.[211][212] The Turkish parliament approved a resolution permitting the military to pursue the PKK in Iraqi Kurdistan.[213] In November, Turkish gunships attacked parts of northern Iraq in the first such attack by Turkish aircraft since the border tensions escalated.[214] Another series of attacks in mid-December hit PKK targets in the Qandil, Zap, Avashin and Hakurk regions. The latest series of attacks involved at least 50 aircraft and artillery and Kurdish officials reported one civilian killed and two wounded.[215]

Additionally, weapons that were given to Iraqi security forces by the U.S. military were being recovered by authorities in Turkey after being used by PKK in that state.[216]

Blackwater private security controversy[edit]

On 17 September 2007, the Iraqi government announced that it was revoking the license of the U.S. security firm Blackwater USA over the firm’s involvement in the killing of eight civilians, including a woman and an infant,[217] in a firefight that followed a car bomb explosion near a State Department motorcade.

2008: Civil war continues[edit]

Further information: 2008 in Iraq

Soldiers of the 3rd Brigade, 14th Iraqi Army division graduate from basic training.

Throughout 2008, U.S. officials and independent think tanks began to point to improvements in the security situation, as measured by key statistics. According to the U.S. Defense Department, in December 2008 the “overall level of violence” in the country had dropped 80% since before the surge began in January 2007, and the country’s murder rate had dropped to prewar levels. They also pointed out that the casualty figure for U.S. forces in 2008 was 314 against a figure of 904 in 2007.[218]

According to the Brookings Institution, Iraqi civilian fatalities numbered 490 in November 2008 as against 3,500 in January 2007, whereas attacks against the coalition numbered somewhere between 200 and 300 per week in the latter half of 2008, as opposed to a peak of nearly 1,600 in summer 2007. The number of Iraqi security forces killed was under 100 per month in the second half of 2008, from a high of 200 to 300 in summer 2007.[219]

Meanwhile, the proficiency of the Iraqi military increased as it launched a spring offensive against Shia militias, which Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki had previously been criticized for allowing to operate. This began with a March operation against the Mehdi Army in Basra, which led to fighting in Shia areas up and down the country, especially in the Sadr City district of Baghdad. By October, the British officer in charge of Basra said that since the operation the town had become “secure” and had a murder rate comparable to Manchester in England.[220] The U.S. military also said there had been a decrease of about a quarter in the quantity of Iranian-made explosives found in Iraq in 2008, possibly indicating a change in Iranian policy.[221]

Progress in Sunni areas continued after members of the Awakening movement were transferred from U.S. military to Iraqi control.[222] In May, the Iraqi army – backed by coalition support – launched an offensive in Mosul, the last major Iraqi stronghold of al-Qaeda. Despite detaining thousands of individuals, the offensive failed to lead to major long-term security improvements in Mosul. At the end of the year, the city remained a major flashpoint.[223][224]

3D map of southern Turkey and northern Iraq

In the regional dimension, the ongoing conflict between Turkey and PKK[225][226][227] intensified on 21 February, when Turkey launched a ground attack into the Quandeel Mountains of Northern Iraq. In the nine-day-long operation, around 10,000 Turkish troops advanced up to 25 km into Northern Iraq. This was the first substantial ground incursion by Turkish forces since 1995.[228][229]

Shortly after the incursion began, both the Iraqi cabinet and the Kurdistan regional government condemned Turkey’s actions and called for the immediate withdrawal of Turkish troops from the region.[230] Turkish troops withdrew on 29 February.[231] The fate of the Kurds and the future of the ethnically diverse city of Kirkuk remained a contentious issue in Iraqi politics.

U.S. military officials met these trends with cautious optimism as they approached what they described as the “transition” embodied in the U.S.–Iraq Status of Forces Agreement, which was negotiated throughout 2008.[218] The commander of the coalition, U.S. General Raymond T. Odierno, noted that “in military terms, transitions are the most dangerous time” in December 2008.[218]

Spring offensives on Shiite militias[edit]

An Iraqi soldier and vehicles from the 42nd Brigade, 11th Iraqi Army Division during a firefight with armed militiamen in the Sadr City district of Baghdad 17 April 2008.

At the end of March, the Iraqi Army, with Coalition air support, launched an offensive, dubbed “Charge of the Knights”, in Basra to secure the area from militias. This was the first major operation where the Iraqi Army did not have direct combat support from conventional coalition ground troops. The offensive was opposed by the Mahdi Army, one of the militias, which controlled much of the region.[232][233] Fighting quickly spread to other parts of Iraq: including Sadr City, Al Kut, Al Hillah and others. During the fighting Iraqi forces met stiff resistance from militiamen in Basra to the point that the Iraqi military offensive slowed to a crawl, with the high attrition rates finally forcing the Sadrists to the negotiating table.

Following talks with Brig. Gen. Qassem Suleimani, commander of the Qods brigades of Iran’s Revolutionary Guard Corps, and the intercession of the Iranian government, on 31 March 2008, al‑Sadr ordered his followers to ceasefire.[234] The militiamen kept their weapons.

By 12 May 2008, Basra “residents overwhelmingly reported a substantial improvement in their everyday lives” according to The New York Times. “Government forces have now taken over Islamic militants’ headquarters and halted the death squads and ‘vice enforcers’ who attacked women, Christians, musicians, alcohol sellers and anyone suspected of collaborating with Westerners”, according to the report; however, when asked how long it would take for lawlessness to resume if the Iraqi army left, one resident replied, “one day”.[233]

In late April roadside bombings continued to rise from a low in January—from 114 bombings to more than 250, surpassing the May 2007 high.

Congressional testimony[edit]

General David Petraeus in testimony before Congress on 8 April 2008

Speaking before the Congress on 8 April 2008, General David Petraeus urged delaying troop withdrawals, saying, “I’ve repeatedly noted that we haven’t turned any corners, we haven’t seen any lights at the end of the tunnel,” referencing the comments of then President Bush and former Vietnam-era General William Westmoreland.[235] When asked by the Senate if reasonable people could disagree on the way forward, Petraeus said, “We fight for the right of people to have other opinions.”[236]

Upon questioning by then Senate committee chair Joe Biden, Ambassador Crocker admitted that Al‑Qaeda in Iraq was less important than the Al Qaeda organization led by Osama bin Laden along the Afghan-Pakistani border.[237]Lawmakers from both parties complained that U.S. taxpayers are carrying Iraq’s burden as it earns billions of dollars in oil revenues.

Iraqi security forces rearm[edit]

An Iraqi Army unit prepares to board a Task Force Baghdad UH-60 Blackhawk helicopter for a counterinsurgency mission in Baghdad in 2007.

Iraq became one of the top current purchasers of U.S. military equipment with their army trading its AK‑47 assault rifles for the U.S. M‑16 and M‑4 rifles, among other equipment.[238] In 2008 alone, Iraq accounted for more than $12.5 billion of the $34 billion U.S. weapon sales to foreign countries (not including the potential F-16 fighter planes.).[239]

Iraq sought 36 F‑16s, the most sophisticated weapons system Iraq has attempted to purchase. The Pentagon notified Congress that it had approved the sale of 24 American attack helicopters to Iraq, valued at as much as $2.4 billion. Including the helicopters, Iraq announced plans to purchase at least $10 billion in U.S. tanks and armored vehicles, transport planes and other battlefield equipment and services. Over the summer, the Defense Department announced that the Iraqi government wanted to order more than 400 armored vehicles and other equipment worth up to $3 billion, and six C-130J transport planes, worth up to $1.5 billion.[240][241] From 2005 to 2008, the United States had completed approximately $20 billion in arms sales agreements with Iraq.[242]

Status of forces agreement[edit]

The U.S.–Iraq Status of Forces Agreement was approved by the Iraqi government on 4 December 2008.[243] It established that U.S. combat forces would withdraw from Iraqi cities by 30 June 2009, and that all U.S. forces would be completely out of Iraq by 31 December 2011. The pact was subject to possible negotiations which could have delayed withdrawal and a referendum scheduled for mid-2009 in Iraq, which might have required all U.S. forces to completely leave by the middle of 2010.[244][245] The pact required criminal charges for holding prisoners over 24 hours, and required a warrant for searches of homes and buildings that are not related to combat.[246]

U.S. contractors working for U.S. forces will be subject to Iraqi criminal law, while contractors working for the State Department and other U.S. agencies may retain their immunity. If U.S. forces commit still undecided “major premeditated felonies” while off-duty and off-base, they will be subject to the still undecided procedures laid out by a joint U.S.‑Iraq committee if the United States certifies the forces were off-duty.[247][248][249][250]

Some Americans have discussed “loopholes”[251] and some Iraqis have said they believe parts of the pact remain a “mystery”.[252] U.S. Secretary of Defense Robert Gates has predicted that after 2011 he would expect to see “perhaps several tens of thousands of American troops” as part of a residual force in Iraq.[253]

Several groups of Iraqis protested the passing of the SOFA accord[254][255][256] as prolonging and legitimizing the occupation. Tens of thousands of Iraqis burned an effigy of George W. Bush in a central Baghdad square where U.S. troops five years previously organized a tearing down of a statue of Saddam Hussein.[135][252][257] Some Iraqis expressed skeptical optimism that the U.S. would completely end its presence by 2011.[258] On 4 December 2008, Iraq’s presidential council approved the security pact.[243]

A representative of Grand Ayatollah Ali Husseini al‑Sistani expressed concern with the ratified version of the pact and noted that the government of Iraq has no authority to control the transfer of occupier forces into and out of Iraq, no control of shipments, and that the pact grants the occupiers immunity from prosecution in Iraqi courts. He said that Iraqi rule in the country is not complete while the occupiers are present, but that ultimately the Iraqi people would judge the pact in a referendum.[257] Thousands of Iraqis have gathered weekly after Friday prayers and shouted anti‑U.S. and anti-Israeli slogans protesting the security pact between Baghdad and Washington. A protester said that despite the approval of the Interim Security pact, the Iraqi people would break it in a referendum next year.[259]

2009: Coalition redeployment[edit]

Further information: 2009 in Iraq

Transfer of Green Zone[edit]

Aerial view of the Green Zone, Baghdad International Airport, and the contiguous Victory Base Complex in Baghdad

On 1 January 2009, the United States handed control of the Green Zone and Saddam Hussein’s presidential palace to the Iraqi government in a ceremonial move described by the country’s prime minister as a restoration of Iraq’s sovereignty. Iraqi Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki said he would propose 1 January be declared national “Sovereignty Day”. “This palace is the symbol of Iraqi sovereignty and by restoring it, a real message is directed to all Iraqi people that Iraqi sovereignty has returned to its natural status”, al‑Maliki said.

The U.S. military attributed a decline in reported civilian deaths to several factors including the U.S.‑led “troop surge”, the growth of U.S.-funded Awakening Councils, and Shiite cleric Muqtada al-Sadr’s call for his militia to abide by a cease fire.[260]

Provincial elections[edit]

Election map. Shows what was the largest list in every governorate.

On 31 January, Iraq held provincial elections.[261] Provincial candidates and those close to them faced some political assassinations and attempted assassinations, and there was also some other violence related to the election.[262][263][264][265]

Iraqi voter turnout failed to meet the original expectations which were set and was the lowest on record in Iraq,[266] but U.S. Ambassador Ryan Crocker characterized the turnout as “large”.[267] Of those who turned out to vote, some groups complained of disenfranchisement and fraud.[266][268][269] After the post-election curfew was lifted, some groups made threats about what would happen if they were unhappy with the results.[270]

File:President Obama's speech at Camp Lejeune on 2009-02-27.ogv

U.S. President Barack Obama delivering a speech at Camp Lejeune on 27 February 2009.

Exit strategy announcement[edit]

On 27 February, United States President Barack Obama gave a speech at Marine Corps Base Camp Lejeune in the U.S. state of North Carolina announcing that the U.S. combat mission in Iraq would end by 31 August 2010. A “transitional force” of up to 50,000 troops tasked with training the Iraqi Security Forces, conducting counterterrorism operations, and providing general support may remain until the end of 2011, the president added.[271]

The day before Obama’s speech, Prime Minister of Iraq Nuri al‑Maliki said at a press conference that the government of Iraq had “no worries” over the impending departure of U.S. forces and expressed confidence in the ability of the Iraqi Security Forces and police to maintain order without U.S. military support.[272]

Sixth anniversary protests[edit]

On 9 April, the 6th anniversary of Baghdad’s fall to coalition forces, tens of thousands of Iraqis thronged Baghdad to mark the anniversary and demand the immediate departure of coalition forces. The crowds of Iraqis stretched from the Sadr City slum in northeast Baghdad to the square around 5 km (3.1 mi) away, where protesters burned an effigy featuring the face of U.S. President George W. Bush.[273] There were also Sunni Muslims in the crowd. Police said many Sunnis, including prominent leaders such as a founding sheikh from the Sons of Iraq, took part.[274]

Coalition forces withdraw[edit]

On 30 April, the United Kingdom formally ended combat operations. Prime Minister Gordon Brown characterized the operation in Iraq as a “success story” because of UK troops’ efforts. Britain handed control of Basra to the United States Armed Forces.[275]

On 28 July, Australia withdrew its combat forces as the Australian military presence in Iraq ended, per an agreement with the Iraqi government.

The withdrawal of U.S. forces began at the end of June, with 38 bases to be handed over to Iraqi forces. On 29 June 2009, U.S. forces withdrew from Baghdad. On 30 November 2009, Iraqi Interior Ministry officials reported that the civilian death toll in Iraq fell to its lowest level in November since the 2003 invasion.[276]

Iraq awards oil contracts[edit]

U.S. Navy and Coast Guard personnel stand guard aboard the Al Basrah Oil Terminal in July 2009.

On 30 June and 11 December 2009, the Iraqi ministry of oil awarded contracts to international oil companies for some of Iraq’s many oil fields. The winning oil companies enter joint ventures with the Iraqi ministry of oil, and the terms of the awarded contracts include extraction of oil for a fixed fee of approximately $1.40 per barrel.[277][278][279] The fees will only be paid once a production threshold set by the Iraqi ministry of oil is reached.

2010: U.S. drawdown and Operation New Dawn [edit]

On 17 February 2010, U.S. Secretary of Defense Robert Gates announced that as of 1 September, the name “Operation Iraqi Freedom” would be replaced by “Operation New Dawn”.[280]

On 18 April, U.S. and Iraqi forces killed Abu Ayyub al-Masri the leader of al-Qaeda in Iraq in a joint American and Iraqi operation near Tikrit, Iraq.[281] The coalition forces believed al-Masri to be wearing a suicide vest and proceeded cautiously. After the lengthy exchange of fire and bombing of the house, the Iraqi troops stormed inside and found two women still alive, one of whom was al-Masri’s wife, and four dead men, identified as al-Masri, Abu Abdullah al-Rashid al-Baghdadi, an assistant to al-Masri, and al-Baghdadi’s son. A suicide vest was indeed found on al-Masri’s corpse, as the Iraqi Army subsequently stated.[282] Iraqi Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki announced the killings of Abu Omar al-Baghdadi and Abu Ayyub al-Masri at a news conference in Baghdad and showed reporters photographs of their bloody corpses. “The attack was carried out by ground forces which surrounded the house, and also through the use of missiles,” Mr Maliki said. “During the operation computers were seized with e-mails and messages to the two biggest terrorists, Osama bin Laden and [his deputy] Ayman al-Zawahiri”, Maliki added. U.S. forces commander Gen. Raymond Odierno praised the operation. “The death of these terrorists is potentially the most significant blow to al‑Qaeda in Iraq since the beginning of the insurgency”, he said. “There is still work to do but this is a significant step forward in ridding Iraq of terrorists.”

U.S. Vice President Joe Biden stated that the deaths of the top two al‑Qaeda figures in Iraq are “potentially devastating” blows to the terror network there and proof that Iraqi security forces are gaining ground.[283]

On 20 June, Iraq’s Central Bank was bombed in an attack that left 15 people dead and brought much of downtown Baghdad to a standstill. The attack was claimed to have been carried out by the Islamic State of Iraq. This attack was followed by another attack on Iraq’s Bank of Trade building that killed 26 and wounded 52 people.[284]

Iraqi commandos training under the supervision of soldiers from the U.S. 82nd Airborne in December 2010.

In late August 2010, insurgents conducted a major attack with at least 12 car bombs simultaneously detonating from Mosul to Basra and killing at least 51. These attacks coincided with the U.S. plans for a withdrawal of combat troops.[285]

From the end of August 2010, the United States attempted to dramatically cut its combat role in Iraq, with the withdrawal of all U.S. ground forces designated for active combat operations. The last U.S. combat brigades departed Iraq in the early morning of 19 August. Convoys of U.S. troops had been moving out of Iraq to Kuwait for several days, and NBC News broadcast live from Iraq as the last convoy crossed the border. While all combat brigades left the country, an additional 50,000 personnel (including Advise and Assist Brigades) remained in the country to provide support for the Iraqi military.[286][287] These troops are required to leave Iraq by 31 December 2011 under an agreement between the U.S. and Iraqi governments.[288]

The desire to step back from an active counter-insurgency role did not however mean that the Advise and Assist Brigades and other remaining U.S. forces would not be caught up in combat. A standards memo from the Associated Press reiterated “combat in Iraq is not over, and we should not uncritically repeat suggestions that it is, even if they come from senior officials”.[289]

State Department spokesman P. J. Crowley stated “… we are not ending our work in Iraq, We have a long-term commitment to Iraq.”[290] On 31 August, Obama announced the end of Operation Iraqi Freedom from the Oval Office. In his address, he covered the role of the United States’ soft power, the effect the war had on the United States economy, and the legacy of the Afghanistan and Iraq wars.[291]

On the same day in Iraq, at a ceremony at one of Saddam Hussein‘s former residences at Al Faw Palace in Baghdad, a number of U.S. dignitaries spoke in a ceremony for television cameras, avoiding overtones of the triumphalism present in U.S. announcements made earlier in the war. Vice President Joe Biden expressed concerns regarding the ongoing lack of progress in forming a new Iraqi government, saying of the Iraqi people that “they expect a government that reflects the results of the votes they cast”. Gen. Ray Odierno stated that the new era “in no way signals the end of our commitment to the people of Iraq”. Speaking in Ramadi earlier in the day, Gates said that U.S. forces “have accomplished something really quite extraordinary here, [but] how it all weighs in the balance over time I think remains to be seen”. When asked by reporters if the seven-year war was worth doing, Gates commented that “It really requires a historian’s perspective in terms of what happens here in the long run”. He noted the Iraq War “will always be clouded by how it began” regarding Saddam Hussein’s supposed weapons of mass destruction, which were never confirmed to have existed. Gates continued, “This is one of the reasons that this war remains so controversial at home”.[292] On the same day Gen. Ray Odierno was replaced by Lloyd Austin as Commander of U.S. forces in Iraq.

Alabama Army National Guard MP, MSG Schur, during a joint community policing patrol in Basra, 3 April 2010

On 7 September, two U.S. troops were killed and nine wounded in an incident at an Iraqi military base. The incident is under investigation by Iraqi and U.S. forces, but it is believed that an Iraqi soldier opened fire on U.S. forces.[293]

On 8 September, the U.S. Army announced the arrival in Iraq of the first specifically-designated Advise and Assist Brigade, the 3d Armored Cavalry Regiment. It was announced that the unit would assume responsibilities in five southern provinces.[294] From 10–13 September, Second Advise and Assist Brigade, 25th Infantry Division fought Iraqi insurgents near Diyala.

According to reports from Iraq, hundreds of members of the Sunni Awakening Councils may have switched allegiance back to the Iraqi insurgency or al Qaeda.[295]

Wikileaks disclosed 391,832 classified U.S. military documents on the Iraq War.[296][297][298] Approximately, 58 people were killed with another 40 wounded in an attack on the Sayidat al‑Nejat church, a Chaldean Catholic church in Baghdad. Responsibility for the attack was claimed by the Islamic State in Iraq organization.[299]

Coordinated attacks in primarily Shia areas struck throughout Baghdad on 2 November, killing approximately 113 and wounding 250 with around 17 bombs.[300]

Iraqi security forces transition towards self-reliance[edit]

Preparing to buy $13 billion worth of American arms, the Iraq Defense Ministry intends to transform the country’s degraded conventional forces into a state-of-the-art military and become among the world’s biggest customers for American military arms and equipment. Part of the planned purchase includes 140 M1 Abrams main battle tanks. Iraqi crews have already begun training on them. In addition to the $13 billion purchase, the Iraqis have requested 18 F-16 Fighting Falcons as part of a $4.2 billion program that also includes aircraft training and maintenance, AIM‑9 Sidewinder air-to-air missiles, laser-guided bombs and reconnaissance equipment.[301] If approved by Congress, the first aircraft could arrive in spring 2013. Under the plan, the first 10 pilots would be trained in the United States.[302]

The Iraqi navy also inaugurated U.S.‑built Swift Class patrol boat at Umm Qasr, Iraq’s main port at the northern end of the gulf. Iraq is to take delivery of 14 more of these $20 million, 50‑foot craft before U.S. forces depart. The high-speed vessels’ main mission will be to protect the oil terminals at al‑Basra and Khor al-Amiya through which some 1.7 million barrels a day are loaded into tankers for export. Two U.S.‑built offshore support vessels, each costing $70 million, were expected to be delivered in 2011.[301]

M1 Abrams tanks in Iraqi service, January 2011

The United States Department of Defense had issued notification of an additional $100 million proposed sales of arms from the U.S. to Iraq. General Dynamics is to be the prime contractor on a $36 million deal for the supply of ammunition for Iraq’s Abrams M1 A1 tanks. The sale consists of: 14,010 TP-T M831A1 120mm Cartridges; 16,110 TPCSDS-T M865 120mm Cartridges; and 3,510 HEAT-MP-T M830A1 120mm Cartridges. Raytheon is proposed as the prime contractor for a $68 million package of “Command, Control, Communications, Computers, Intelligence, Surveillance and Reconnaissance (C4ISR) Systems”.[303]

UN lifts restrictions on Iraq[edit]

In a move to legitimize the existing Iraqi government, the United Nations lifted the Saddam Hussein-era UN restrictions on Iraq. These included allowing Iraq to have a civilian nuclear program, permitting the participation of Iraq in international nuclear and chemical weapons treaties, as well as returning control of Iraq’s oil and gas revenue to the government and ending the Oil-for-Food Programme.[304]

2011: U.S. withdrawal[edit]

Further information: 2011 in Iraq

Muqtada al-Sadr returned to Iraq in the holy city of Najaf to lead the Sadrist movement after being in exile since 2007.[305]

On 15 January 2011, three U.S. troops were killed in Iraq. One of the troops was killed on a military operation in central Iraq, while the other two troops were deliberately shot by one or two Iraqi soldiers during a training exercise.[306]

On 6 June, five U.S. troops were killed in an apparent rocket attack on JSS Loyalty.[307] A sixth soldier, who was wounded in the attack, died 10 days later of his wounds.[308]

On 13 June 2011, two U.S. troops were killed in an IED attack located in Wasit Province.[309]

On 26 June 2011, a U.S. troop was killed. [310] Sergeant Brent McBride was sentenced to four years, two months for the death. [311]

On 29 June, three U.S. troops were killed in a rocket attack on a U.S. base located near the border with Iran. It was speculated that the militant group responsible for the attack was the same one which attacked JSS Loyalty just over three weeks before.[312] With the three deaths, June 2011, became the bloodiest month in Iraq for the U.S. military since June 2009, with 15 U.S. soldiers killed, only one of them outside combat.[313]

In September, Iraq signed a contract to buy 18 Lockheed Martin F-16 warplanes, becoming the 26th nation to operate the F-16. Because of windfall profits from oil, the Iraqi government is planning to double this originally planned 18, to 36 F-16s. Iraq is relying on the U.S. military for air support as it rebuilds its forces and battles a stubborn Islamist insurgency.[314]

With the collapse of the discussions about extending the stay of any U.S. troops beyond 2011, where they would not be granted any immunity from the Iraqi government, on 21 October 2011, President Obama announced at a White House press conference that all remaining U.S. troops and trainers would leave Iraq by the end of the year as previously scheduled, bringing the U.S. mission in Iraq to an end.[315] The last American soldier to die in Iraq before the withdrawal was killed by a roadside bomb in Baghdad on 14 November.[316]

In November 2011, the U.S. Senate voted down a resolution to formally end the war by bringing its authorization by Congress to an end.[317]

U.S. and Kuwaiti troops closing the gate between Kuwait and Iraq on 18 December 2011.

The last U.S. troops withdrew from Iraq on 18 December, although the U.S. embassy and consulates continue to maintain a staff of more than 20,000 including U.S. Marine Embassy Guards and between 4,000 and 5,000 private military contractors.[318][319] The next day, Iraqi officials issued an arrest warrant for the Sunni Vice-President Tariq al-Hashimi. He has been accused of involvement in assassinations and fled to the Kurdish part of Iraq.[320]

Aftermath – post U.S. withdrawal[edit]

November 25, 2016 military situation:

  Controlled by Iraqi government
  Controlled by the Islamic State in Iraq and the Levant (ISIS)
  Controlled by Iraqi Kurds
  Controlled by Syrian government
  Controlled by Syrian rebels
  Controlled by Syrian Kurds

The invasion and occupation led to sectarian violence which caused widespread displacement among Iraqi civilians. The Iraqi Red Crescent organization estimated the total internal displacement was around 2.3 million in 2008, and as many as 2 million Iraqis leaving the country. Poverty led many Iraqi women to turn to prostitution to support themselves and their families, attracting sex tourists from regional lands. The invasion led to a constitution which supported democracy as long as laws did not violate traditional Islamic principles, and a parliamentary election was held in 2005. In addition the invasion preserved the autonomy of the Kurdish region, and stability brought new economic prosperity. Because the Kurdish region is historically the most democratic area of Iraq, many Iraqi refugees from other territories fled into the Kurdish land.[321]

Iraqi insurgency surged in the aftermath of the U.S. withdrawal. The terror campaigns have since been engaged by Iraqi, primarily radical Sunni, insurgent groups against the central government and the warfare between various factions within Iraq. The events of post U.S. withdrawal violence succeeded the previous insurgency in Iraq (prior to 18 December 2011), but have showed different patterns, raising concerns that the surging violence might slide into another civil war. Some 1,000 people were killed across Iraq within the first two months after U.S. withdrawal.

Sectarian violence continued in the first half of 2013— at least 56 people died in April when a Sunni protest in Hawija was interrupted by a government-supported helicopter raid and a series of violent incidents occurred in May. On 20 May 2013, at least 95 people died in a wave of car bomb attacks that was preceded by a car bombing on 15 May that led to 33 deaths; also, on 18 May, 76 people were killed in the Sunni areas of Baghdad. Some experts have stated that Iraq could return to the brutal sectarian conflict of 2006.[322][323]

On 22 July 2013, at least five hundred convicts, most of whom were senior members of al-Qaida who had received death sentences, broke out of Iraq’s Abu Ghraib jail when comrades launched a military-style assault to free them. The attack began when a suicide bomber drove a car packed with explosives into prison gates.[324] James F. Jeffrey, the United States ambassador in Baghdad when the last American troops exited, said the assault and resulting escape “will provide seasoned leadership and a morale boost to Al Qaeda and its allies in both Iraq and Syria … it is likely to have an electrifying impact on the Sunni population in Iraq, which has been sitting on the fence.”[325]

By mid-2014 the country was in chaos with a new government yet to be formed following national elections, and the insurgency reaching new heights. In early June 2014 the Islamic State in Iraq and the Levant (ISIS) took over the cities of Mosul and Tikrit and said it was ready to march on Baghdad, while Iraqi Kurdish forces took control of key military installations in the major oil city of Kirkuk. Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki asked his parliament to declare a state of emergency that would give him increased powers, but the lawmakers refused.[326]

In the summer of 2014 President Obama announced the return of U.S. Forces to Iraq, but only in the form of aerial support, in an effort to halt the advance of ISIS forces, render humanitarian aid to stranded refugees and stabilize the political situation.[327] On 14 August 2014, Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki succumbed to pressure at home and abroad to step down. This paved the way for Haidar al-Abadi to take over On 19 August 2014. In what was claimed to be revenge for the aerial bombing ordered by President Obama, ISIS, which by this time had changed their name to the Islamic State, beheaded an American journalist, James Foley, who had been kidnapped two years previously. Despite U.S. bombings and breakthroughs on the political front, Iraq remained in chaos with the Islamic State consolidating its gains, and sectarian violence continuing unabated. On 22 August 2014, suspected Shia militants opened fire on a Sunni mosque during Friday prayers, killing 70 worshippers. Separately, Iraqi forces in helicopters killed 30 Sunni fighters in the town of Dhuluiya.[328] A day later, apparently in retaliation for the attack on the mosque, three bombings across Iraq killed 35 people.[329]

Casualty estimates[edit]

Wounded U.S. personnel flown from Iraq to Ramstein, Germany, for medical treatment (February 2007)

Marines unload a wounded comrade from an Army UH-60 Blackhawk helicopter for medical treatment at Al Qaim.

For coalition death totals see the infobox at the top right. See also Casualties of the Iraq War, which has casualty numbers for coalition nations, contractors, non-Iraqi civilians, journalists, media helpers, aid workers, and the wounded. Casualty figures, especially Iraqi ones, are highly disputed.

There have been several attempts by the media, coalition governments and others to estimate the Iraqi casualties. The table below summarizes some of these estimates and methods.

Source Iraqi casualties March 2003 to …
Iraq Family Health Survey 151,000 violent deaths. June 2006
Lancet survey 601,027 violent deaths out of 654,965 excess deaths. June 2006
PLOS Medicine Study 460,000 excess deaths including 132,000 violent deaths from conflict violent deaths from the conflict.[48] June 2011
Opinion Research Business survey 1,033,000 violent deaths from the conflict. August 2007
Iraqi Health Ministry 87,215 violent deaths per death certificates issued.
Deaths prior to January 2005 unrecorded.
Ministry estimates up to 20% more deaths are undocumented.
January 2005 to
February 2009
Associated Press 110,600 violent deaths.
Health Ministry death certificates plus AP estimate of casualties for 2003–04.
April 2009
Iraq Body Count 105,052–114,731 violent civilian deaths.
compiled from commercial news media, NGO and official reports.
Over 162,000 civilian and combatant deaths
January 2012
WikiLeaks. Classified Iraq war logs 109,032 violent deaths including 66,081 civilian deaths. January 2004 to
December 2009

Criticism and cost[edit]

A city street in Ramadi heavily damaged by the fighting in 2006

A memorial in North Carolina in December 2007; U.S. casualty count can be seen in the background[330]

The Bush Administration’s rationale for the Iraq War has faced heavy criticism from an array of popular and official sources both inside and outside the United States, with many U.S. citizens finding many parallels with the Vietnam War.[331] For example, a former CIA officer described the Office of Special Plans as a group of ideologues who were dangerous to U.S. national security and a threat to world peace, and stated that the group lied and manipulated intelligence to further its agenda of removing Saddam.[332] The Center for Public Integrity alleges that the Bush administration made a total of 935 false statements between 2001 and 2003 about Iraq’s alleged threat to the United States.[333]

Both proponents and opponents of the invasion have also criticized the prosecution of the war effort along a number of other lines. Most significantly, critics have assailed the United States and its allies for not devoting enough troops to the mission, not adequately planning for post-invasion Iraq, and for permitting and perpetrating human rights abuses. As the war has progressed, critics have also railed against the high human and financial costs. In 2016, the United Kingdom published the Iraq Inquiry, a public inquiry which was broadly critical of the actions of the British government and military in making the case for the war, in tactics and in planning for the aftermath of the war.[334][335][336]

  States participating in the invasion of Iraq
  States in support of an invasion
  States in opposition to an invasion
  States with an uncertain or no official standpoint

Criticisms include:

After President Barack Obama was inaugurated in 2009, some anti-war groups decided to stop protesting even though the war was still going on. Some of them decided to stop because they felt they should give the new President time to establish his administration, and others stopped because they believed that Obama would end the war.[351]

Financial cost[edit]

In March 2013, the total cost of the Iraq War was estimated to have been $1.7 trillion by the Watson Institute of International Studies at Brown University.[352] Critics have argued that the total cost of the war to the U.S. economy is estimated to be from $3 trillion[353] to $6 trillion,[354] including interest rates, by 2053. The upper ranges of these estimates include long-term veterans costs and economic impacts. For example, Harvard’s public finance expert Linda J. Bilmes has estimated that the long-term cost of providing disability compensation and medical care to U.S. troops injured in the Iraq conflict will reach nearly $1 trillion over the next 40 years.[355]

A CNN report noted that the United States-led interim government, the Coalition Provisional Authority lasting until 2004 in Iraq had lost $8.8 billion in the Development Fund for Iraq. In June 2011, it was reported by CBS News that $6 billion in neatly packaged blocks of $100 bills was air-lifted into Iraq by the George W. Bush administration, which flew it into Baghdad aboard C‑130 military cargo planes. In total, the Times says $12 billion in cash was flown into Iraq in 21 separate flights by May 2004, all of which has disappeared. An inspector general’s report mentioned that “‘Severe inefficiencies and poor management’ by the Coalition Provisional Authority would leave no guarantee that the money was properly used”, said Stuart W. Bowen, Jr., director of the Office of the Special Inspector General for Iraq Reconstruction. “The CPA did not establish or implement sufficient managerial, financial and contractual controls to ensure that funds were used in a transparent manner.”[356] Bowen told the Times the missing money may represent “the largest theft of funds in national history.”[357]

Humanitarian crises[edit]

Child killed by a car bomb in Kirkuk, July 2011

The child malnutrition rate rose to 28%.[358] Some 60–70% of Iraqi children were reported to be suffering from psychological problems in 2007.[359] Most Iraqis had no access to safe drinking water. A cholera outbreak in northern Iraq was thought to be the result of poor water quality.[360] As many as half of Iraqi doctors left the country between 2003 and 2006.[361] The use of depleted uranium and white phosphorus by the U.S. military has been blamed for birth defects and cancers in the Iraqi city of Fallujah.[362][363][364]

By the end of 2015, according to the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees, 4.4 million Iraqis had been internally displaced.[365] The population of Iraqi Christians dropped dramatically during the war, from 1.5 million in 2003 to 500,000 in 2015,[366] and perhaps only 275,000 in 2016.

The Foreign Policy Association reported that “Perhaps the most perplexing component of the Iraq refugee crisis … has been the inability for the United States to absorb more Iraqis following the 2003 invasion of the country. To date, the United States has granted around 84,000 Iraqis refugee status, of the more than two million global Iraqi refugees. By contrast, the United States granted asylum to more than 100,000 Vietnamese refugees during the Vietnam War.”[367][368][369]

Human rights abuses[edit]

File:CollateralMurder.ogv

Gun camera footage of the airstrike of 12 July 2007 in Baghdad, showing the slaying of Namir Noor-Eldeen and a dozen other civilians by a U.S. helicopter.

Throughout the entire Iraq war, there have been human rights abuses on all sides of the conflict.

Iraqi government[edit]

Coalition forces and private contractors[edit]

This photograph from Abu Ghraib released in 2006 shows a pyramid of naked Iraqi prisoners.

Insurgent groups[edit]

Car bombings are a frequently used tactic by insurgents in Iraq.

  • Killing over 12,000 Iraqis from January 2005 to June 2006, according to Iraqi Interior Minister Bayan Jabr, giving the first official count for the victims of bombings, ambushes and other deadly attacks.[381] The insurgents have also conducted numerous suicide attacks on the Iraqi civilian population, mostly targeting the majority Shia community.[382][383] An October 2005 report from Human Rights Watch examines the range of civilian attacks and their purported justification.[384]
  • Attacks against civilians including children through bombing of market places and other locations reachable by suicide bombers.
  • Attacks against civilians by sectarian death squads primarily during the Iraqi Civil war.
  • Attacks on diplomats and diplomatic facilities including; the bombing of the UN headquarters in Baghdad in August 2003 killing the top UN representative in Iraq and 21 other UN staff members;[385] beheading several diplomats: two Algerian diplomatic envoys Ali Belaroussi and Azzedine Belkadi,[386] Egyptian diplomatic envoy al-Sherif,[387] and four Russian diplomats.[388]
  • The February 2006 bombing of the al-Askari Mosque, destroying one of the holiest Shiite shrines, killing over 165 worshipers and igniting sectarian strife and reprisal killings.[389]
  • The publicised killing of several contractors; Eugene Armstrong, Jack Hensley, Kenneth Bigley, Ivaylo Kepov and Georgi Lazov (Bulgarian truck drivers.)[390] Other non-military personnel murdered include: translator Kim Sun-il, Shosei Koda, Fabrizio Quattrocchi (Italian), charity worker Margaret Hassan, reconstruction engineer Nick Berg, photographer Salvatore Santoro (Italian)[391] and supply worker Seif Adnan Kanaan (Iraqi.) Four private armed contractors, Scott Helvenston, Jerko Zovko, Wesley Batalona and Michael Teague, were killed with grenades and small arms fire, their bodies dragged from their vehicles, beaten and set ablaze. Their burned corpses were then dragged through the streets before being hung over a bridge crossing the Euphrates.[392]
  • Torture or killing of members of the New Iraqi Army,[393] and assassination of civilians associated with the Coalition Provisional Authority, such as Fern Holland, or the Iraqi Governing Council, such as Aqila al-Hashimi and Ezzedine Salim, or other foreign civilians, such as those from Kenya.[394]

Public opinion on the war[edit]

International opinion[edit]

Protesters on 19 March 2005, in London, where organizers claim over 150,000 marched

According to a January 2007 BBC World Service poll of more than 26,000 people in 25 countries, 73% of the global population disapproved of U.S. handling of the Iraq War.[395] A September 2007 poll conducted by the BBC found that two-thirds of the world’s population believed the U.S. should withdraw its forces from Iraq.[396]

In 2006 it was found that majorities in the UK and Canada believed that the war in Iraq was “unjustified” and – in the UK – were critical of their government’s support of U.S. policies in Iraq.[397]

According to polls conducted by the Arab American Institute, four years after the invasion of Iraq, 83% of Egyptians had a negative view of the U.S. role in Iraq; 68% of Saudi Arabians had a negative view; 96% of the Jordanian population had a negative view; 70% of the population of the United Arab Emirates and 76% of the Lebanese population also described their view as negative.[398] The Pew Global Attitudes Project reports that in 2006 majorities in the Netherlands, Germany, Jordan, France, Lebanon, Russia, China, Canada, Poland, Pakistan, Spain, Indonesia, Turkey, and Morocco believed the world was safer before the Iraq War and the toppling of Saddam, while pluralities in the United States and India believe the world is safer without Saddam Hussein.[399]

Iraqi opinion[edit]

A woman pleads with an Iraqi army soldier from 2nd Company, 5th Brigade, 2nd Iraqi Army Division to let a suspected insurgent free during a raid near Tafaria, Iraq

Directly after the invasion, polling suggested that a slight majority supported the U.S. invasion.[400] Polls conducted between 2005 and 2007 showed 31–37% of Iraqi’s wanted U.S. and other Coalition forces to withdraw once security was restored and that 26–35% wanted immediate withdrawal instead.[401][402][403] Despite a majority having previously been opposed to the U.S. presence, 60% of Iraqis opposed American troops leaving directly prior to withdrawal, with 51% saying withdrawal would have a negative effect.[404][405] In 2006, a poll conducted on the Iraqi public revealed that 52% of the ones polled said Iraq was going in the right direction and 61% claimed it was worth ousting Saddam Hussein.[401]

Relation to the Global War on Terrorism[edit]

Though explicitly stating that Iraq had “nothing” to do with 9/11,[406] erstwhile President George W. Bush consistently referred to the Iraq war as “the central front in the War on Terror“, and argued that if the United States pulled out of Iraq, “terrorists will follow us here”.[407][408][409] While other proponents of the war have regularly echoed this assertion, as the conflict has dragged on, members of the U.S. Congress, the U.S. public, and even U.S. troops have questioned the connection between Iraq and the fight against anti-U.S. terrorism. In particular, a consensus has developed among intelligence experts that the Iraq war has increased terrorism. Counterterrorism expert Rohan Gunaratna frequently refers to the invasion of Iraq as a “fatal mistake”.[410]

London’s International Institute for Strategic Studies concluded in 2004 that the occupation of Iraq had become “a potent global recruitment pretext” for Mujahideen and that the invasion “galvanised” al-Qaeda and “perversely inspired insurgent violence” there.[411] The U.S. National Intelligence Council concluded in a January 2005 report that the war in Iraq had become a breeding ground for a new generation of terrorists; David Low, the national intelligence officer for transnational threats, indicated that the report concluded that the war in Iraq provided terrorists with “a training ground, a recruitment ground, the opportunity for enhancing technical skills … There is even, under the best scenario, over time, the likelihood that some of the jihadists who are not killed there will, in a sense, go home, wherever home is, and will therefore disperse to various other countries.” The Council’s chairman Robert Hutchings said, “At the moment, Iraq is a magnet for international terrorist activity.”[412] And the 2006 National Intelligence Estimate, which outlined the considered judgment of all 16 U.S. intelligence agencies, held that “The Iraq conflict has become the ’cause célèbre’ for jihadists, breeding a deep resentment of U.S. involvement in the Muslim world and cultivating supporters for the global jihadist movement.”[413]

Foreign involvement[edit]

Role of Saudi Arabia and non-Iraqis[edit]

Origins of suicide bombers in Iraq 2003–2007
Nationality
Saudi Arabia 53
Iraq 18
Italy 8
Syria 8
Kuwait 7
Jordan 4
*Other 26
*Three each from Egypt, Libya, Tunisia, Turkey, Yemen; two each from Belgium, France, Spain; one each from Britain, Lebanon, Morocco, Sudan[414]

According to studies, most of the suicide bombers in Iraq are foreigners, especially Saudis.[414][415][416]

Iranian involvement[edit]

Although some military intelligence analysts have concluded there is no concrete evidence, U.S. Major General Rick Lynch has claimed that Iran has provided training, weapons, money, and intelligence to Shiite insurgents in Iraq and that up to 150 Iranian intelligence agents, plus members of the Iranian Revolutionary Guard are believed to be active in Iraq at any given time.[417][418] Lynch thinks that members of the Iranian Quds Force and the Iranian Revolutionary Guard have trained members of the Qazali terror network in explosives technology and also provided the network with arms, munitions, and military advisors. Many explosive devices, including improvised explosives (IEDs) and explosively-formed projectiles (EFPs), used by insurgents are claimed by Lynch to be Iranian-made or designed.

According to two unnamed U.S. officials, the Pentagon is examining the possibility that the Karbala provincial headquarters raid, in which insurgents managed to infiltrate an American base, kill five U.S. soldiers, wound three, and destroy three humvees before fleeing, was supported by Iranians. In a speech on 31 January 2007, Iraqi Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki stated that Iran was supporting attacks against Coalition forces in Iraq[419] and some Iraqis suspect that the raid may have been perpetrated by the Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps‘s Qods Force in retaliation for the detention of five Iranian officials by U.S. forces in the northern Iraqi city of Irbil on 11 January.[420][421]

Michael Weiss and Dexter Filkins have described the extensive involvement of Iranian Quds Force commander Qasem Suleimani in arming and training both Sunni and Shi’ite militias in Iraq. According to Weiss, Iranian strategy was designed to prevent the Iraqi government from functioning so that Iran could exert greater control over the country under the guise of providing stability. Weiss also traced the origins of al Qaeda in Iraq, which entered Iraqi Kurdistan through Iran, to covert Iranian operations to destabilize the Iraqi government of Saddam Hussein.[422] According to a Western diplomat quoted by Filkins: “Suleimani wanted to bleed the Americans, so he invited in the jihadis, and things got out of control.”[423] In 2011, U.S. ambassador James Jeffrey stated that Iranian proxies were responsible for roughly one-fourth of U.S. casualties in Iraq.[424]

See also[edit]

Footnotes[edit]

  1. Jump up^ The conflict is also known as the War in Iraq, the Occupation of Iraq, the Second Gulf War, Gulf War II, and Gulf War 2. The period of the war lasting from 2003 to 2010 was referred to as Operation Iraqi Freedom by the United States military.

References[edit]

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Further reading[edit]